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Abstract 
This thesis investigates a precise and efficient pattern-based intrusion detection approach by extracting 
patterns from sequential adversarial commands. As organisations are further placing assets within the 
cyber domain, mitigating the potential exposure of these assets is becoming increasingly imperative. 
Machine learning is the application of learning algorithms to extract knowledge from data to determine 
patterns between data points and make predictions. Machine learning algorithms have been used to 
extract patterns from sequences of commands to precisely and efficiently detect adversaries using the 
Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. Seeing as SSH is one of the most predominant methods of accessing 
systems it is also a prime target for cyber criminal activities.  
 
For this study, deep packet inspection was applied to data acquired from three medium interaction 
honeypots emulating the SSH service. Feature selection was used to enhance the performance of the 
selected machine learning algorithms. A pre-processing procedure was developed to organise the 
acquired datasets to present the sequences of adversary commands per unique SSH session. The pre-
processing phase also included generating a reduced version of each dataset that evenly and coherently 
represents their respective full dataset. This study focused on whether the machine learning algorithms 
can extract more precise patterns efficiently extracted from the reduced sequence of commands datasets 
compared to their respective full datasets.  Since a reduced sequence of commands dataset requires less 
storage space compared to the relative full dataset. Machine learning algorithms selected for this study 
were the Naïve Bayes, Markov chain, Apriori and Eclat algorithms 
 
The results show the machine learning algorithms applied to the reduced datasets could extract 
additional patterns that are more precise, compared to their respective full datasets. It was also 
determined the Naïve Bayes and Markov chain algorithms are more efficient at processing the reduced 
datasets compared to their respective full datasets. The best performing algorithm was the Markov chain 
algorithm at extracting more precise patterns efficiently from the reduced datasets. The greatest 
improvement in processing a reduced dataset was 97.711%. This study has contributed to the domain 
of pattern-based intrusion detection by providing an approach that can precisely and efficiently detect 
adversaries utilising SSH communications to gain unauthorised access to a system.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Study  
Mitigating the exposure of digital assets is becoming increasingly imperative. Estimates have shown 
cybercrime costs Australia one billion AUD each year (The Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, 2016). A defence in depth cyber security strategy can mitigate the exposure of these digital 
assets. Intrusion detection approaches are deployed by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), to monitor 
network traffic and trigger an alert, or an appropriate response when unauthorised activities are detected 
on a network. The concept of intrusion detection was first introduced in 1980 by Anderson (1980). 
Traditionally there are two types of intrusion detection approaches that are implemented, signature or 
misuse based, and anomaly based. 
 
The signature or misuse based detection category involves comparing the signatures of current network 
traffic to a database of known bad signatures of network traffic. If a reasonable match is found an alert 
is triggered for possible adversarial activities on the network (Sultana, Chilamkurti, Peng, & Alhadad, 
2018). The signature or misuse based detection approaches are known for precisely classifying known 
bad network traffic. However, unknown or new activities go undetected, as the signatures have not yet 
been generated for a comparison to take place. Previously unknown or new vulnerabilities exposed by 
adversarial activities (Bilge & Dumitra, 2012) are colloquially known as zero day attacks.  
 
Anomaly based detection approaches involve generating a baseline of normal network traffic behaviour. 
The generated baseline is then compared to the current network traffic observed. Any nonconformities 
to the baseline are considered to be anomalous traffic, and an alert is triggered for possible adversarial 
activities detected on the network (Sultana et al., 2018). Though, any authorised network traffic that 
does not conform to the baseline also triggers an alert. This impacts the precision of anomaly based 
intrusion detection approaches to classify network traffic. Unlike the signature or misuse based 
detection category, these approaches can identify zero day attacks as anomalous traffic generally results 
in nonconforming traffic to the baseline.    
 
Precision and efficiency are key performance attributes of an intrusion detection approach. A detection 
approach needs to be precise at detecting both, known and unknown adversarial activities on a network. 
Along with precisely detecting adversarial activities on a network, an intrusion detection approach 
needs to efficiently process the network traffic. Allowing for a timely detection of an adversary on the 
network prior to protected assets being attacked and subsequently compromised (Masduki & Ramli, 
2016).  
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The efficiency of an intrusion detection approach is significant, as predictions show on a global scale 
the number of Exabytes (1018) per month of IP traffic sent is set to increase with the passing of each 
year. Table 1.1 shows there is an annual growth rate of 24% in the Exabytes per month of IP traffic 
between the years of 2016 until 2021 (Cisco, 2017). Table 1.1 is adapted from Cisco’s 2017 white 
paper, that forecasted the trends and predictions of global internet traffic (Cisco, 2017). The increase in 
Internet traffic can also be aligned with the increase in other network traffic such as that exhibited on 
organisational networks. Processing the increase in network traffic and precisely detecting adversarial 
activities is a major challenge.  
 
Table 1.1, Shows the global forecasted increase in the Exabytes per month of Internet Protocol (IP) traffic sent 
for the years between 2016 and 2021. Adapted from (Cisco, 2017) 
Year Exabytes (1018) per Month 
2016 96  
2017 122 
2018 151 
2019 186 
2020 228 
2021 278 
 
Typically, intrusion detection approaches monitor and analyse network flow data or packet level data. 
Network flow data consists of monitoring and analysing features associated with the flow of data 
through the network. These features include the source and destination IP address, along with the source 
and destination port numbers (Hellemons et al., 2012). Monitoring and analysing packet level data have 
more processing and storage overheads compared to analysing network flow data because there are 
more features that can be extracted from packet level data compared to network flow data. Examples 
of additional features that can be extracted include, protocol type and the number of root connections 
to name a few. This impacts the processing and storage overheads of packet level data analysis.  
 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is the further examination of packet level data to gain a further insight 
into network traffic communications and can be used for real-time analysis and off-line analysis. There 
are many uses of DPI within the cyber security domain, including for intrusion detection purposes. The 
additional knowledge gained from a DPI can be used for cyber defence optimisation, malicious software 
detection and user activity monitoring including adversary activity identification (Rabadia, Valli, 
Ibrahim, & Baig, 2017). 
 
The publicly available (open-source) datasets are commonly utilised for benchmarking and evaluating 
intrusion detection approaches. Since the features required for a DPI are omitted within the open-source 
datasets, data acquired from three distinct Secure Shell (SSH) honeypots have been utilised for this 
study. SSH is used for point to point communication over an insecure network, creating an encrypted 
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tunnel for remote communications and access (Tatu Ylonen, 2017c). SSH was developed in 1995 by 
Tatu Ylonen and was a response to a password sniffing attack against Helsinki University of 
Technology. This first version is referred to as SSH-1. The SSH service is predominately targeted by 
adversaries to attempt to gain unauthorised remote access to a system.   
 
This study aims to investigate adversarial SSH commands for a pattern-based intrusion detection 
approach. Seeing as SSH is one of the most predominant methods of remotely accessing a systems 
compared to Telnet and is also a prime vector for cyber criminal activities. Pattern-based intrusion 
detection approaches discover and extract patterns within network traffic data for adversarial activity 
detection. Some of the most common means of implementing pattern-based intrusion detection 
approaches are utilising machine learning algorithms to analyse network traffic. Machine learning is 
the application of learning algorithms to extract knowledge from data to determine patterns between 
data points and make predictions. This study utilises selected machine learning algorithms to extract 
patterns from adversarial SSH commands. The selected machine learning algorithms are the Naïve 
Bayes, Markov chain, Apriori and Equivalence Class Transformation (Eclat) algorithms.  
 
There are two main approaches for enhancing the precision and efficiency of pattern-based intrusion 
detection approaches for the SSH service. These involve implementing the use of hybrid algorithms 
and feature selection of the dataset. Hybrid algorithms are developed by combining two or more 
algorithms. The notion of a hybrid algorithm is combining machine learning algorithms that 
complement each other. Algorithms belonging to different machine learning categories are typically 
combined, such as clustering and classification algorithms (Soheily-Khah, Marteau, & Béchet, 2018). 
While feature selection is choosing relevant attributes within a dataset that will allow for additional 
information to be extracted by classifying the dataset based on the selected features. The pre-processing 
phase is a critical process when applying machine learning algorithms (Malley, Ramazzotti, & Wu, 
2016). In the pre-processing phase, the datasets are processed and prepared to be applied to the selected 
machine learning algorithms. The feature selection process takes place in the pre-processing phase. The 
pre-processing phase also includes a data reduction step to enhance the performance of the selected 
machine learning algorithms. Data reduction involves generating a reduced dataset that evenly and 
coherently represents the respective full dataset. For this study precision is in reference to correctly 
identifying patterns in sequential adversarial commands within the given datasets. Furthermore for this 
study efficiency is in reference to the processing time for the selected machine learning algorithms to 
extract the patterns from the given datasets. 
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1.2 Purpose and Scope of Study 
The pattern-based intrusion detection approach investigated in this study focuses on adversary 
command data, as a means of detecting adversaries on the monitored network. In conjunction with 
efficiently processing the network data to timely detect adversaries. This study aims to contribute to the 
knowledge domain of pattern-based intrusion detection approaches for the SSH service.  
 
The focus of this study was the use of adversary command patterns for intrusion detection purposes, 
DPI was required to ascertain the adversary command data. The examination of existing literature has 
shown there has been research conducted in the domain of adversary based intrusion detection 
approaches utilising DPI (Pimenta Rodrigues et al., 2017). Although there are gaps in the knowledge 
domain of DPI, this thesis aims to contribute in terms of pattern identification within a sequence of 
adversary interaction commands. Together with evaluating whether a reduced sequence of command 
dataset can be efficiently processed and whether the patterns extracted are more precise compared to 
the respective full dataset. 
 
A pre-processing procedure that encompasses feature selection and data reduction is deployed for this 
study and is to be applied to the acquired datasets prior to the application of the chosen machine learning 
algorithms. The selected machine learning algorithms have been utilised to extract patterns from a 
sequence of adversarial SSH interaction commands. The selected machine learning algorithms are the 
Naïve Bayes, Markov chain, Apriori and Equivalence Class Transformation (Eclat) algorithms. The 
Naïve Bayes and Markov chain algorithms are probabilistic classification algorithms and have been 
selected as they aligned with the machine learning problem of classification and the Bayesian theorem 
interpretation of probability. The Apriori and Eclat algorithms are association rule mining algorithms 
and have been selected as they aligned with the machine learning problem of association and the 
frequentist theorem interpretation of probability. 
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1.3 Research Questions and associated Hypotheses  
The research questions and the associated hypotheses of this thesis are presented below. 
 
RQ1: Is there an increase in the number of patterns extracted from the reduced datasets by the 
machine learning algorithms, compared to the number of patterns extracted from their respective 
full datasets? 
H1: More class patterns can be extracted from the reduced sequence of commands datasets, compared 
to those extracted from their respective full datasets by the selected probabilistic classification 
algorithms.   
 
H2: More patterns can be extracted from the rule sets of the reduced sequence of commands datasets, 
compared to those extracted from their respective full datasets by the selected association rule mining 
algorithms. 
 
RQ2: Are the extracted patterns from the reduced datasets by the machine learning algorithms 
overall more precise, compared to those extracted from their relevant full datasets? 
H3: The class patterns extracted by the probabilistic classification algorithms from the reduced 
sequence of commands datasets are more precise, compared to those extracted from their respective 
full datasets. 
 
H4: The patterns extracted from the rule sets by the association rule mining algorithms from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets are more precise, compared to those rule sets extracted from 
their respective full datasets. 
 
RQ3: Are the machine learning algorithms more efficient at extracting patterns from 
the reduced datasets, compared to the processing time of their respective full datasets? 
H5: The probabilistic classification algorithms are more efficient at extracting patterns from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets, compared to their respective full datasets. 
 
H6: The association rule mining algorithms are more efficient at extracting patterns from the rule set 
for the reduced sequence of commands datasets, compared to their respective full datasets.	
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
The structure of the remaining thesis is as follows.  
 
Chapter Two is the Literature Review. This is the exploration of the existing literature surrounding this 
study in order to identify the gap in the knowledge this study intends to fill. Literature surrounding DPI, 
for adversarial pattern-based intrusion detection approaches are explored, along with identifying the 
suitable machine learning algorithms to be utilised for this study. 
 
Chapter Three is the Research Methodology and Design for this study. The research approach that 
underpins this study is established. The research procedure, encompassing five phases is outlined. 
Further, an overview of data analysis is presented along with the equipment, and resources utilised for 
this study. 
 
Chapter Four is the Preliminary analysis for this study. Initial exploration and analysis of the acquired 
datasets are conducted in this chapter along with applying the pre-processing procedure developed for 
this study. On the conclusion of this chapter, the three SSH honeypot datasets are processed resulting 
in three reduced datasets and their respective full datasets. 
  
Chapter Five is the Results Chapter. In this chapter, the results collected from the experiments 
conducted to test the hypotheses of this study. The experiments encompass applying the selected 
machine learning algorithms to the reduced datasets and their respective full datasets.  
 
Chapter Six is the Discussion and Findings Chapter. The results obtained from the experiments 
conducted to test the hypotheses in relation to addressing the research questions are analysed. As well 
as presenting the implications of this study along with a critical review of this study.  
 
Chapter Seven is the Conclusion. In this chapter, an overview of this study and the contributions this 
thesis has made to the knowledge domain are outlined. Finally, the recommendations and potential 
further research areas are outlined. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of Intrusion Detection Approaches 
This study investigated whether patterns extracted from sequential adversarial SSH commands can be 
utilised as a pattern-based intrusion detection approach. A pattern-based intrusion detection approach 
discovers and extracts patterns from network traffic to detect adversaries on the network. The signature-
misuse based and anomaly based detection are the two common intrusion detection categories. The 
detection methods and properties of these common intrusion detection categories are presented in Table 
2.1.  
 
Table 2.1, Shows the detection methods and properties of the two common intrusion detection categories 
(Butun, Morgera, & Sankar, 2014) 
Intrusion detection categories Detection method Properties of the categories 
Signature-misuse based 
detection 
The signature-misuse based 
detection approaches compare the 
current network traffic signature to 
a database of known ‘bad’ network 
traffic signatures. If a significant 
match is found, an alert is triggered 
indicating a possible intruder on the 
network. 
 
Has a low false alert rate 
compared to anomaly detection 
approach category, as known 
‘bad’ network traffic signatures 
are easily identified. 
 
The associated risk is new or 
zero day attacks go undetected, 
as the network signatures have 
not been generated yet. Zero day 
attacks are previously unknown 
attacks. 
Anomaly based detection 
Anomaly based detection 
approaches compare the current 
network traffic to a generated 
baseline of normal traffic exhibited 
on the network. If the current 
network traffic does not conform to 
the baseline, it is considered to be 
anomalous traffic. An alert is 
triggered indicating a possible 
intruder on the network.  
Unknown or ‘zero day’ attacks 
can be identified, as the attack 
would cause abnormal traffic to 
be exhibited on the network. 
 
There is a higher false alert rate 
compared to the signature-misuse 
based detection approach 
category. As any legitimate 
network traffic that does not 
conform to the baseline would 
trigger an alert. 
 
Precision and efficiency are key attributes of an intrusion detection approach. An intrusion detection 
approach needs to precisely detect adversaries on the network. There should be a low rate of 
misclassified network traffic (false alert rate) and high rate of correctly classified network traffic (true 
alert rate. An intrusion detection approach also needs to be efficient at detecting adversaries on a 
network to prevent the exposure of assets in a timely manner (Masduki & Ramli, 2016). For this study 
precision is in reference to correctly identifying patterns in sequential adversarial commands within the 
given datasets. Furthermore for this study efficiency is in reference to the processing time for the 
selected machine learning algorithms to extract the patterns from the given datasets. 
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An intrusion detection approach either monitors packet level data or network flow data. Network flow 
data consists of monitoring source IP, destination IP, source port and destination port along with the 
number of packets sent per flow (Hellemons et al., 2012). Whereas, packet level monitoring also 
monitors the protocol type and the number of root connections to name a few attributes. Consequently, 
monitoring network flow data has less processing and storage overheads compared to monitoring packet 
level data. However, additional information can be extracted from packet level data compare to network 
flow data. Within the literature open-source or publicly available datasets are typically utilised when 
conducting studies on enhancing intrusion detection approaches. 
 
2.1.1 Open-source Intrusion Detection Datasets 
The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) released an intrusion detection dataset in 
1998, known as the DARPA 1998 dataset. The DARPA 1998 dataset was derived from a simulated Air 
Force base network that encompasses fictitious Internet traffic, malicious scripts, injection attacks and 
Sun BSM attack data (DARPA, 1998). In the year 1999, the DARPA 1998 intrusion detection dataset 
was revised to contain supplementary attacks as well as Windows NT attack data and is referred to as 
the DARPA 99 dataset (DARPA, 1999). However, that same year the Knowledge Discovery in 
Databases (SIGKDD) Cup 99 dataset was released. The data in the KDD cup 99 dataset is formulated 
from the DARPA 1999 dataset (SIGKDD, 1999). The KDD Cup 99 dataset was originally used for The 
Third International KDD and Data Mining Tools Competition. Since then the KDD Cup 99 dataset has 
become a benchmark dataset in the domain of intrusion detection research (Gharib, Sharafaldin, 
Lashkari, & Ghorbani, 2016; Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, & Ghorbani, 2009). 
 
The KDD Cup 99 dataset became the benchmark dataset, as unlike the DARPA 99 dataset users were 
not required to convert the data from a raw format to a readable format, as well as the necessary features 
had already been extracted. The KDD Cup 99 dataset contains 14 additional attacks compared to the 
DARPA 99 dataset. These additional 14 attacks are only seen in the test dataset. Allowing for a 
detection approach to be evaluated based on unseen attacks, similar to ‘zero day’ attacks that are seen 
in real network traffic (SIGKDD, 1999; Tavallaee et al., 2009). Consequently, there are inherent issues 
with redundant data within the KDD Cup 99 dataset since it is derived from the DARPA 99 dataset, 
resulting in classification bias. 78.05% of the KDD Cup 99 training dataset is redundant data and 
75.15% of the test dataset is redundant (Tavallaee et al., 2009).   
 
In 2009, Tavallaee et al. (2009) presented a revised version of the KDD Cup 99 dataset, known as the 
NSL-KDD dataset. The NSL-KDD dataset addresses some of the issues associated with the KDD Cup 
99 dataset. Redundant records had been removed to avoid classification bias. Additionally, allowing 
data to be randomly selected from the training and testing sets. The data chosen to be included in the 
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NSL-KDD dataset, have been chosen based on different levels of difficulties to reflect the original KDD 
Cup 99 dataset for different machine learning algorithms to be tested. Both the KDD Cup 99 dataset 
and the NSL-KDD dataset have four categories of attacks, Denial of Service (Koch, Golling, & 
Rodosek), Probe, Remote to Local (R2L) and User to Root (U2R). Additionally, both datasets have 41 
features with varying data types between nominal, continuous and binary data types. However, none of 
the 41 features within the KDD Cup 99 dataset nor the NSL-KDD dataset contain adversary command 
data. The datasets have issues with high levels of redundant data as well as the absence of adversary 
command data. From exploring the DARPA 98, DARPA 99, KDD Cup 99 and NSL-KDD datasets are 
not suitable to be utilised for this study. It has been ~20 years since the benchmark KDD Cup 99 dataset 
was released and ~10 years since the improved NSL-KDD dataset was released. The focus of this study 
was to extract patterns from adversarial command interaction data, in reference to the commands 
utilised by adversaries while interacting with a system. 
 
Other intrusion detection datasets include the PREDICT dataset, UNSW-NB15 dataset and KYOTO 
honeypot dataset (Gharib et al., 2016). The PREDICT dataset was developed by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Centre of Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) released to the 
public in 2016. Access to the dataset is restricted to researchers based in the United States and approved 
DHS countries. Although Australia is among the list of approved countries, the dataset was not suitable 
for this study due to risks of data exposure and publication restrictions (CAIDA, 2016; Impact Cyber 
Trust, 2017).  The UNSW-NB15 dataset was released to the public in 2015, it was developed by 
academics at the University of New South Wales the dataset consists of 49 features and nine attack 
types (Moustaf & Slay, 2016; Moustafa & Slay, 2015) . Adversary command data is absent deeming 
the dataset unsuitable for this study. The Kyoto honeypot dataset, was generated by the Kyoto 
University between 2009 and 2015. The data is collected from Nepenthes low interaction honeypots. 
The Kyoto dataset contains a total of 24 features (Jungsuk Song, Hiroki Takakura, & Okabe; Kyoto 
University, 2015). Similar to the previous intrusion detection datasets, the Kyoto honeypot dataset does 
not contain adversary command data thus deeming the dataset unsuitable for this study.  
 
From evaluating the possible open-source datasets, none of the datasets explored contains adversarial 
command data. The adversarial command data required for this study was gathered by honeypots. 
Honeypots are Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) (SURF cert IDS, 2013) tools used to gather data on 
adversary activities.  
 
2.1.2 Honeypots  
Honeypots are decoy systems intended to be attacked with the purpose of gathering data of adversarial 
interactions with the system. These systems are predominantly located in the Demilitarised Zone 
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(DMZ) of a network, to separate the decoy system from the real network (The Honeynet Project, 2011). 
There are two categories of honeypots that can be deployed depending on the purpose: production 
honeypots and research honeypots. Production honeypots are commonly utilised by organisations to 
gather data on adversaries attempting to gain access to their infrastructure. The data collected from the 
production honeypots can be used by an organisation to determine potential vulnerabilities in their cyber 
security strategy that could be exploited by adversaries. This allows the organisation to address the 
vulnerabilities reducing the probability of adversaries gaining unauthorised access to the network. 
While data collected from the research honeypots are used to analyse the techniques and methods 
adversaries use to gain unauthorised access. Data collected from research honeypots can be used to 
assist organisations in improving their intrusion detection policies and rules. There are three types of 
honeypots that can be implemented depending on the requirements of the deployment.  
 
The types of honeypots are based on the level of interaction that occurs between the system and the 
adversary. In Table 2.2, the properties of the different types honeypots and examples of existing Secure 
Shell (SSH) honeypots are presented. The three types of honeypots are, high interaction, medium 
interaction and low interaction, honeypots. 
 
Table 2.2, Shows the three types of honeypots and their properties including examples of existing SSH 
honeypots (Rabadia et al., 2017) 
Honeypot type Properties Example 
High interaction 
These honeypots emulate a fully 
functioning system. Adversaries are led to 
believe they are interacting with a real 
system. The high interaction honeypots 
have a similar configuration process to a 
real system, consequentially the 
maintenance requirements are demanding. 
• HonSSH 
Medium interaction 
These honeypots exhibit selected 
functionalities of a real system, for example, 
a SSH session. As a result, the configuration 
process is simpler than a high-interaction 
honeypot but the maintenance required is 
more demanding than a low-interaction 
honeypot. 
• Kippo SSH  
• Cowrie SSH 
Low interaction 
These hosts have minimal functionalities 
compared to a real system. They are simple 
to configure with low maintenance 
requirements. Adversaries have minimal 
interactions with the host compared with a 
high interaction honeypot. 
• Honeyd 
 
The SSH protocol is the selected network traffic chosen to be investigated. Seeing as SSH is one of the 
most predominant methods of remotely accessing a systems compared to Telnet and is also a prime 
vector for cyber criminal activities. Since the focus of this study is on a selected network traffic, a 
medium interaction honeypot was appropriate for this study. A medium interaction honeypot has more 
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functionalities that are similar to a real system compared to a low interaction honeypot. There are also 
fewer maintenance requirements compared to a high interaction honeypot. Research based honeypots 
had been chosen as the data gathered was for academic in this study.  
 
The data acquired for this study had been collected from the Kippo and Cowrie medium interaction 
SSH honeypots. Kippo SSH honeypots had been adapted from Kojoney honeypots, a low interaction 
SSH honeypot. The Kippo SSH honeypot was released in 2009 and actively developed until October 
2016 (Desaster, 2016). Cowrie developer Michel Oosterhof was a former contributor to the Kippo SSH 
honeypot project. But after no longer actively being developed he launched and continues to develop 
the Cowrie SSH honeypot.  
 
In both honeypots, a fake file system can be added and removed, adversaries can interact with a fake 
file system, reply to attacks and the files downloaded by an adversary are saved for later inspection. 
The Kippo and Cowrie SSH honeypots are both written in Python 2.7 and use the Twisted library to 
emulate a SSH session (Michel Oosterhof, 2018a). The honeypots log forced attempts to gain 
unauthorised access to the systems as well as the shell session interactions between the honeypot and 
the adversary.  
 
2.1.2.1 Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol 
SSH is used for point to point communications over an insecure network essentially creating an 
encrypted tunnel for remote communication (Tatu Ylonen, 2017c). SSH was developed in 1995 by Tatu 
Ylonen and was a response to a password sniffing attack against Helsinki University of Technology 
and is referred to as SSH-1. The SSH protocol was initially introduced to replace the Telnet protocol 
due to the lack of encryption. SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) (Tatu Ylonen, 2017b) runs over the 
SSH protocol and was introduced to replace the insecure File Transfer Protocol (FTP) (Tatu Ylonen, 
2017a).  
 
By default, SSH runs on the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
on port 22. The protocol was taken to a working group at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
for standardisation and evolved into SSH-2. In 2006, SSH-2 was assigned a Request For Comment 
(Network Working Group, 2006b) number and is currently the widely used version of SSH. Figure 2.1, 
illustrates the three main components of SSH-2, transport layer protocol, user authentication layer 
protocol and connection layer protocol.  
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Figure 2.1, illustrates the three main components of SSH-2, transport layer protocol, user authentication layer 
protocol and connection layer protocol 
The transport layer protocol predominantly runs over the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP), typically running on port 22. The Transport layer provides cryptographic server 
authentication, integrity and encryption for confidentiality. All packets sent from one direction should 
be considered as one stream. Data from both streams should be encrypted using the same encryption 
algorithm. The	3dec-cbc	encryption algorithm is required for encryption if the key lengths are of 112 
bits. The integrity of the streams is ensured by the Message	Authentication	Code (Mackenzie & Knipe) 
algorithm. The MAC algorithm is a combination of a shared secret (a message the client can verify), 
packet sequence number and the payload.  The required MAC algorithm is hmac-shal, a key length of 
20 octets (160 bits). All other layers of the SSH protocol run over the transport layer protocol (Network 
Working Group, 2006b).  
 
The user authentication layer protocol runs over the Open System Interconnection (OSI) Transport layer 
protocol, authenticating clients to the server. There are four methods a client can use to authenticate to 
a server; public key (required), password (optional), host base (optional) and none (not recommended). 
The common form of authentication is public key and password based. The public key method of 
authentication uses a pair of cryptographic keys, public and private. The public key of the server is 
available to everyone and is used for encryption and can only be decrypted by the associated private 
key. Larger organisations commonly use the password method of authentication as well. The passwords 
must be encoded with ISO-1064	UFT-8 before transmission by the Transport layer, as stated in RFC 
4252. The authentication protocol assumes the Transport layer provides integrity and confidentiality 
(Network Working Group, 2006a). 
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The connection layer protocol runs over the Authentication and Transport protocol. The connection 
layer protocol allows for login sessions, interactive terminal sessions, remote command execution, 
forwarded TCP/IP and X11 connections are channels that are multiplexed into one encrypted 
connection. The Connection layer protocol allows for flow control before channels have received a 
message to indicate a window space is available. The window is the number of bytes that can be sent 
within the channel. Windows can be adjusted for a larger flow of data however, the window cannot 
exceed 2^32	–	1	bytes in size. Data can be transferred in both directions, between the client and the 
server (Network Working Group, 2006c). 
 
2.1.3 Issues in Intrusion Detection  
Traditionally intrusion detection approaches fit into the signature-misuse based or anomaly based 
category. Ideally, an intrusion detection approach needs to be precise and efficient at timely detecting 
adversaries on a network. This study investigated whether patterns extracted from adversarial SSH 
commands can be utilised as a pattern-based intrusion detection approach.  
 
The open-source or publicly available intrusion detection databases have been deemed unsuitable for 
this study. The benchmark KDD Cup 99 dataset has issues with redundant records resulting in 
classification bias as well as the dataset dating back to 1999. The NSL-KDD dataset was released in 
2009 to replace the aging KDD Cup 99 dataset. The data within the NSL-KDD dataset is a subset of 
the KDD Cup 99 dataset, has inherited some of the issues mentioned. In addition to the absence of 
adversarial command data within other open-source datasets, adversary command data is also absent. 
Instead, data for this study was acquired from honeypots, a type of IDS used to gather adversarial data. 
Medium interaction research honeypots had been chosen that emulate the SSH protocol. Since the focus 
of this study was the use of adversary command patterns for intrusion detection purposes, Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI) techniques have been used to ascertain the adversary command data. 
		
2.2 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 
DPI is the further examination of packet level data to gain a further insight into network traffic 
communications and can be used for real-time analysis and off-line analysis. There are many uses of 
DPI in the cyber security domain, including intrusion detection. The additional knowledge gained from 
a DPI can be used for cyber defence optimisation, malicious software detection and user activity 
monitoring including adversary activity identification. Packets from all layers of the TCP/IP can be 
inspected, including the Application layer of the TCP/IP protocol in which the SSH protocol operates 
(Pimenta Rodrigues et al., 2017).  
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There are two main challenges of DPI in the context of conducting a forensic investigation (Pimenta 
Rodrigues et al., 2017). Encryption of packet level data can inhibit the readability of the packet and 
needs to be decrypted before a DPI process can take place. Additionally, deception techniques such as 
The Onion Router (Keith Stouffer, Victoria Pillitteri, Suzanne Lightman, Marshall Abrams, & Hahn, 
2015) are used to maintain the anonymity of the user, as such DPIs can result in incorrect outcomes.  
 
There are also two main intrusion detection challenges of DPI (Pimenta Rodrigues et al., 2017). The 
performance of DPIs can be affected by the volume of data needing to be processed and stored. In 
addition to the challenge of precisely detecting unauthorised activities, as identifying zero-day attacks 
would require further investigations to be conducted and the established signatures would need to be 
updated regularly. 
  
This study focuses on precisely and efficiently detecting adversarial activities for intrusion detection 
purposes using DPI to extract sequential adversarial commands. The following section examines the 
literature on adversary command pattern identification for intrusion detection purposes.   
 
2.2.1 Adversary Pattern-Based Intrusion Detection 
Studies have been conducted on the use of adversarial command based detection as an intrusion 
detection approach. Adversarial commands based intrusion detection methods are in reference to, 
detecting intruder activities based on the commands utilised by an adversary to gain unauthorised access 
to an asset. There is existing literature with the aim of improving the efficiency of the pattern-based 
detection within DPI for cyber security purposes.  
 
In the study by Bando, Artan, and Chao (2012), introduced a technique using DPI to optimise regular 
expressions (RegEx). The authors referred to as Lookahead Finite Automata (LaFA) detection. The aim 
of the LaFA approach was to address the scalability and redundancy issues of RegEx when processing 
network data. It was achieved by reducing the data structure of the RegEx string. The proposed LaFA 
detection by Bando et al. (2012) had been shown to need less storage memory compared to the RegEx 
detection tested. In the current study a reduced sequence of commands dataset requires less storage 
space compared to the relative full dataset.  
 
Tsai et al. (2017) also conducted a study with the aim of improving the DPI process using RegEx 
strings. The study sought to implement a wildcard pattern search as referred to by the authors, on a 
Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM) search technique. The wildcard pattern search is based 
on repeated character sets identified by a finite state machine. Thereafter the TCAM search technique 
was used to efficiently search for the wildcard patterns. The results showed the TCAM wildcard pattern 
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search was less memory intensive and more efficient compared to the TCAM RegEx string search. The 
current study also investigates whether more precise patterns can be extracted from the reduced datasets. 
 
The studies conducted by Bando et al. (2012) and Tsai et al. (2017) focused on improving the efficiency 
of a DPI. Whilst, this thesis aimed to improve the precision and efficiency of a DPI. Similar to Bando 
et al. (2012), a reduced dataset is utilised in the procedure to improve the efficiency of the pattern-based 
intrusion detection approaches. Though unlike the aforementioned studies, this thesis investigated 
improving the precision and the efficiency of processing a reduced dataset compared to the respective 
full dataset. 
 
The study conducted by Ramsbrock, Berthier, and Cukier (2007) attempted to profile adversaries based 
on data collected from a honeypot emulating the SSH service. The data collected was of the usernames 
and passwords used to attempt to gain access to the system, the number of logins per day and the ratio 
of failed and successful login attempts data. The study had determined there are seven categories of an 
attacker’s behaviour once they have gained unauthorised access to a system. These categories are 
checking the software configuration, installing programs, downloading files, running malicious 
programs, changing account passwords, checking the hardware configuration and changing the system 
configuration.  
 
The seven categories defined by Ramsbrock et al. (2007), had been utilised by the study conducted by 
Koch et al. (2014). Their study presented a behaviour based detection architecture for intrusion 
detection in an encrypted environment. The seven categories have been used to develop an attack tree, 
based on data collected from SSH honeypots and export knowledge. The attack tree developed depicts 
the probability of a sequence of adversary commands occurring. The results show the attack tree can 
detect 93.75% of sequential malicious activities compared to 84.70% of single malicious activities. 
Koch et al. (2014) showed an attack tree can be utilised for intrusion detection purposes, however for 
this study an attack tree was not considered due to the issue of state explosion. State explosion is when 
the number the states grow exponentially. A full study on the proposed attack tree architecture is yet to 
be conducted. This thesis aimed to fill the gap in command based detection as an intrusion detection 
approach, through identifying patterns within adversary command sequences. Unlike the proposed 
attack trees by Koch et al. (2014), this study utilises machine learning algorithms to identified patterns 
within adversary command sequences. 
 
Research has been conducted on investigating command based detection as an intrusion detection 
approach. Moon, Pan, and Kim (2016) proposed a malware detection approach that analysed 
information gathered from behaviour while running processes on a host. Process related features had 
been extracted from normal and abnormal traffic and referred to as “characteristic parameters”. A total 
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of 39 “characteristic parameters” had been identified. These characteristics are grouped into seven 
categories. These categories are, process, thread, file system, registry, network, services and 
miscellaneous. The characteristics are used to determine abnormal and normal behaviour. The C4.5 
algorithm is a decision tree algorithm and was used to classify the behaviour exhibited on the network, 
with a false negative rate of 2% and a false positive rate of 5.8% of abnormal or malware related 
behaviour detected on a host. The study conducted by Moon et al. (2016) provides evidence that process 
related features can be utilised to determine abnormal or normal behaviour on a host. This provides 
evidence that command based features could be utilised for the purpose of an intrusion detection.  
 
Kudłacik, Porwik, and Wesołowski (2016) proposed a profile based detection approach for classifying 
normal and abnormal traffic. Two profiles had been created, a local profile containing data from current 
users and a fuzzy profile containing generic behaviour. The study used the Schonlau dataset, an open-
source UNIX command dataset containing files of normal user commands and adversary commands. 
The study by Kudłacik et al. (2016) focused on the commands of the adversary instead of the sequence 
of commands as this research intended to investigate. Additionally, this research is focused on 
investigating the sequence of commands utilised by an adversary on SSH services instead of detecting 
adversary activity in normal network activities. Studies have focused on using adversary commands to 
classify normal and abnormal traffic (Caselli, Zambon, & Kargl, 2015). However, there is a gap in 
knowledge in investigating the sequence of commands an adversary utilises to gain unauthorised access 
to a system. 
 
The studies examined in this chapter show, there has been research conducted in the area of adversary 
based intrusion detection approaches utilising DPI. Although there are gaps in the knowledge that was 
identified this thesis aims to contribute to. This domain of knowledge is within the domain of pattern 
identification in a sequence of adversary interaction commands. Machine learning algorithms can be 
used to extract patterns from a sequence of adversary commands.  
	
2.3 Machine learning 
Machine learning is the application of learning algorithms to extract knowledge from data to determine 
patterns between data points and make predictions. A machine learning algorithm can be categorised 
into three classes: supervised learning, unsupervised learning and semi-supervised learning (Mohri, 
Rostamizadeh, & Talwalkar, 2014). The algorithms within the supervised learning category are 
commonly utilised for making predictions. Predictions are formulated by applying the supervised 
learning algorithms to “pre-labelled” data. The “pre-labelled” data is used to train the algorithms with 
adjustments made until an acceptable outcome is achieved. Whereas, unsupervised learning algorithms 
are commonly utilised to determine patterns between data points. The patterns are determined from 
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unlabelled data and the training process that exists with supervised learning algorithms is omitted. 
Unsupervised learning algorithms formulate patterns unaided. The third machine learning category is 
the semi-supervised learning algorithms. Algorithms within this category use procedures from both 
supervised and unsupervised learning to extract knowledge from a dataset. To evaluate whether a 
machine learning algorithm is suitable to assist with an enquiry, the four main problem domains 
machine learning algorithms solve should be examined (Mohri et al., 2014). The four problem domains 
of machine learning algorithms are, classification, regression, clustering and association (Hastie, 
Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2013). 
 
The problems solved by supervised learning algorithms are classification and regression issues. The 
classification problem is solved by training a classifier to form classes based on labelled data. Trained 
classifiers can be utilised to predict occurrences. The classification solution has the desired outcome of 
classifying the data into groups. The regression problems also use labelled data to train the predictor. 
The regression solution is commonly used to predict particular instances based on the existing data to 
estimate whether there is a dependant or independent relationship between one or more variables. 
 
Clustering and association are the problems solved by unsupervised learning algorithms. The clustering 
problem is organising data into subsets to form clusters based on observations seen between data points. 
The outcome of a clustering solution is groups of similar data points, clustering can be utilised for 
identifying commonality or abnormality in a dataset.  
 
The association problem is identifying association patterns between objects within a dataset (Alpaydin 
& Bach, 2014). The association solution is discovering patterns between frequently occurring objects 
in a dataset and calculating the probability of these objects occurring together based on the given data.   
 
The machine learning problems of regression and clustering do not align with the enquiry of this study. 
The regression problem is used to predict particular values occurring by identifying the relationship 
between one or more variables. The enquiry of this study is extracting patterns occurring in a sequence 
of adversary commands, rather than the regression problem of predicting the occurrence of commands 
without considering the sequence pattern. The clustering problem of grouping similar data points to 
form clusters does not align with the enquiry of this study. The clustering solution would cluster similar 
commands rather than identifying patterns between adversary commands occurring in a sequence. 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify and extract patterns from a sequence of adversary commands. 
The machine learning problems were align with this study are classification and association. The 
classification problem encompasses training labelled data to form classes that can be utilised for 
decision and prediction.  
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The association problem addresses whether patterns of association exist between objects within a given 
dataset. This study investigates whether adversary commands can be classified based on their placement 
in a sequence of commands, allowing for the probability to be calculated for the observed commands 
occurring within a sequence.  
 
This thesis attempts to identify whether there is an association of patterns between adversary commands 
in a sequence within a given dataset. However, labelled datasets are utilised within this study, deeming 
the association algorithms applied to the datasets as semi-supervised learning algorithms. As a training 
process is not conducted with the association algorithms and with unsupervised learning algorithms. 
Therefore, the association algorithms that have been applied in this study are categorised as semi-
supervised.  
 
To identify the classification and association machine learning algorithms that had been utilised to 
extract patterns within the sequence of adversary commands, the probability inferences that align with 
this study must be understood. The interpretation of the probability is essential since this study focuses 
on calculating the probability of a command occurring within a sequence based on the patterns extracted 
from the sequence of adversary commands. In the following section the interpretations of probability 
theories are elaborated. 
 
2.3.1 Probability Theory  
Probability theory provides the framework to address the uncertainties that arise within the domain of 
pattern recognition. Probability can be interpreted in four different ways based on the inference of the 
occurrence of an event through the epistemology of the interpretation (Howie, 2002). Epistemology is 
the nature of knowledge and how it is created. The four interpretations of probability that are presented 
in Table 2.3 are, classical, propensity, Bayesian and frequentist. The epistemology of each interpretation 
and an example of the four interpretations of probability are also presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3, Shows the four interpretations of probability. Along with the purpose and epistemology of the four 
interpretations of probability 
Probabilistic 
interpretation Purpose Epistemology Example 
Classicalist  
(Mellor & Koslow, 
2004a) 
Prior knowledge is 
unknown, allowing for 
the probability of all 
outcomes to be equally 
possible.  
The probability of an event 
occurring is evenly 
distributed between the 
possible outcomes. 
The probability of choosing 
the correct multiple-choice 
answer from four possible 
answers (A, B, C, D) is 
0.25. 
Propensity 
(Mellor & Koslow, 
2004b) 
The physical property of 
an object or conditions 
can affect the probability 
of an event occurring. 
The probability is based on 
the physical reality or 
property of an object in a 
single case occurrence. 
A coin weighted on a single 
side would impact the 
probability when the coin is 
flipped.  
Bayesian  
(Howie, 2002) 
The context of the event 
occurring is known, 
allowing for a degree of 
confidence to be 
determined and 
quantified.  
The Bayesian 
interpretation is the degree 
of confidence in an event 
occurring based on the 
subjective knowledge of 
the conditions or 
expectations.   
Bayesian probability is 
commonly implemented as 
a spam filter, with particular 
known trigger words such 
as “you have won” flagging 
a possible spam email. The 
trigger words are 
determined based on prior 
knowledge on the subject. 
Frequentist  
(Howie, 2002) 
The frequency of an event 
occurring based on 
previous occurrences of 
that event.   
The frequency probability 
interpretation is the 
probability of an event 
occurring based on past 
tests or trials, occurring. 
With an infinite amount of 
trials the results should 
converge and a true 
probability can be 
ascertained. 
The frequency of the 
grocery shopper buying 
milk, eggs and bread within 
a single transaction can be 
utilised to predict grocery 
transaction patterns.  
 
 
The classicalist interpretation of probability is not appropriate for this study. As the epistemology of 
the classicalist interpretation states, all outcomes have an equal probability of an event occurring 
(Mellor & Koslow, 2004a). This study recognises the probability of an adversary command occurring 
is established through calculating a sequence of adversary commands, rather than the probability of 
each command occurring in a single instance. 
 
The propensity interpretation of probability is also not applicable to this study, as shown above in Table 
2.3. The epistemology states, the physical property or reality of an object has an impact of the outcome 
of the event (Mellor & Koslow, 2004b). It is uncertain whether the physical property of the emulated 
SSH session of the adversary interacting with the honeypot could have impacted the outcomes of the 
sequence of commands utilised. Since the uncertainty is not tangible it cannot be confirmed as is 
required for the propensity interpretation of probability, it is not applicable for this study. 
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The Bayesian probability interpretation is the degree of confidence that can be determined and 
quantified for an event occurring based on knowledge of the conditions  (Howie, 2002). The Bayesian 
probability interpretation is applicable to this study as the commands an adversary could utilise is based 
on the known commands that have occurred within that sequence. The Bayesian probability 
interpretation aligns with the classification problem solved by the machine learning algorithms (Howie, 
2002). 
 
The epistemology of the frequentist interpretation of probability is the occurrence of an event during a 
trial test, with an infinite amount of tests the results will converge to a true probability (Howie, 2002). 
The frequentist interpretation of probability is applicable to this study because the frequency of the 
sequence of adversary commands occurring could be used to calculate the probability of subsequent 
commands occurring. The frequentist interpretation of probability aligns with the association problem 
solved by the machine learning algorithms. 
 
From examining the different probability interpretations, Bayesian and frequentist interpretations have 
been selected for this study. The Bayesian interpretation of probability aligns with the classification 
category of machine learning algorithms. While the frequentist interpretations of probability align with 
the association category of machine learning algorithms. The probabilistic classification algorithms that 
are based on the Bayesian theorem as well as the association algorithms that are based on the frequentist 
theorem are presented in the following sections.  
 
2.3.2 Probabilistic Classification algorithms  
There are various classification algorithms. As this study focuses on calculating the probability of 
sequences of commands occurring probabilistic classification algorithms had been selected. The 
probabilistic classification is a sub-group, within the classification category based on the Bayesian 
theorem. The probabilistic classification algorithms selected are the Naïve Bayes and the Markov chain 
algorithms. 
 
The Bayesian theorem equation is presented in Eq 2.1 where ! represents the probability of an instance 
occurring, the " denotes the prior probability or the hypothesis that is being investigated and # signifies 
the predictor or the conditional information based on a new piece of information.    
 ! " # = ! # " 	!(")!(#)  
(Eq 2.1) 
 
21 
 
2.3.2.1 Naïve Bayes algorithm 
The Naïve Bayes algorithm is based on the Bayesian theorem of probability and is also a probabilistic 
classification machine learning algorithm (Howie, 2002). The Naïve Bayes algorithm requires labelled 
data used to train the classifier. The Naïve Bayes algorithm differs from the conventional Bayesian 
algorithms as each feature is treated as an independent feature. A class within the dataset is chosen as 
the predicted class used to train the Naïve Bayes classifier (Bishop, 2006). The training process 
encompasses the features that appear frequently in a class independently, this is known as the prior 
probability. The prior probability is then used to identify the likelihood of features appearing in a class. 
The training process is based on the predicted class. The trained classifier is then ready to be applied to 
a test dataset.  
 
There are three types of Naïve Bayes algorithms, these are namely the Gaussian algorithm, the 
MultiNomial algorithm and the Bernoulli algorithm. The Gaussian Naïve Bayes algorithm is 
appropriate for normal data distribution and utilised the mean and standard deviation of a class to train 
the classifier. The MultiNomial Naïve Bayes algorithm is commonly utilised for filtering spam emails, 
as it is used for classifying multinomial distributed data such as text based data. While the Bernoulli 
Naïve Bayes algorithm is predominantly utilised for classifying binary value features (Bishop, 2006).  
 
Within the domain of intrusion detection, the Naïve Bayes algorithm is commonly utilised as a base 
algorithm to, developing hybrid detection algorithms or alternatively testing the precision of the 
proposed hybrid detection algorithms (Aziz, Hanafi, & Hassanien, 2017; Goeschel, 2016; Kevric, Jukic, 
& Subasi, 2017; Xiao, Chen, & Chang, 2014). Through exploring literature there is evidence of the 
Naïve Bayes algorithm being used to filter SSH network flow data to identify adversarial activities, in 
particular, for SSH brute force authorisation attempts (Najafabadi, Khoshgoftaar, Calvert, & Kemp, 
2015). A study conducted by Abd-Eldayem (2014), investigated an intrusion detection approach based 
on the Naïve Bayes algorithm, to detect adversarial activities that utilise the HTTP protocol. The 
experiments conducted have shown the Naïve Bayes algorithm is precise in classifying the adversarial 
activities based on network packet data, the experiments had been conducted using the aforementioned 
NSL-KDD dataset.  
 
The Naïve Bayes algorithm has been utilised for intrusion detection purposes, predominantly for 
analysing network flow and network packet data. This study aims to contribute to the DPI domain 
utilising the Naïve Bayes algorithm. From examining existing literature, the Naïve Bayes algorithm has 
been utilised for analysing the network flow of SSH traffic rather than DPI. This study aimed to 
contribute to the domain by examining, whether the Naïve Bayes algorithm could be utilised as part of 
a DPI investigation to extract patterns within sequential SSH adversarial command interactions. There 
are limited studies that have been conducted on improving the efficiency of the Naïve Bayes algorithm 
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for classifying data. This study aimed to investigate whether an appropriately processed dataset could 
improve the efficiency of the Naïve Bayes algorithm.  
	
2.3.2.2 Markov Chain algorithm 
Since the data utilised for this study was labelled, the Markov chain supervised machine learning 
algorithm had been selected instead of the Hidden Markov Model (HMM), an unsupervised machine 
learning algorithm  (Ali, Abbas, & Abbas, 2018). Markov chains are based on the Bayesian theorem of 
probability and are also a probabilistic classification machine learning algorithm. A Markov chain is a 
stochastic model that calculates the probability of the transition of states, from the current state to the 
next state occurring. A transition matrix is generated to predict the probability of a change in state, the 
columns represent the current states and the rows represent the next states. For this study, a state is the 
current command, a change in state is the probability of the next command in a sequence occurring. 
Training a Markov chain algorithm is adjusting the values in the transition matrix until they converge. 
The values in the columns equate to 1 as the probability is distributed between the possibilities in the 
next state occurring.  
 
There is existing literature on the utilisation of the Markov chain algorithms for intrusion detection 
purposes. Markov chain algorithms have been applied to SSH network flow analysis (Hofstede, 
Hendriks, Sperotto, & Pras, 2014) and to detect stealthy brute-force SSH access attempts (Javed & 
Paxson, 2013). The Markov chain algorithms have also been studied to identify abnormal Internet 
applications utilising SSH sessions (Korczyński & Duda, 2014). The Markov chain algorithm 
implemented in a study conducted by Tapaswi et al. (2014) to predict the next IP address on a network 
an adversary will probe and move a honeypot to that particular IP address to gather further adversary 
interaction data. Tapaswi et al. (2014) show the Markov chain algorithm was successfully able to 
predict the next probeable IP address. Caselli et al. (2015), used Markov chains to predict the sequence 
of events within the Modbus traffic. The study successfully predicted anomalous traffic from a sequence 
of Modbus events. The scope of the study omitted the efficiency of the Markov chain to converge the 
transition matrix. Ali et al. (2018), conducted a review on the use of HMM for intrusion detection 
purposes and identified six prominent contributions to knowledge that can be undertaken within the 
domain. One of which is the need to efficiently train or converge the transition matrix for a HMM. The 
need to efficiently train or converge the transition matrix is also applicable to the Markov chain 
algorithm domain.  
 
From examining literature, the Markov chain algorithm has been utilised within the intrusion detection 
domain for network flow analysis and packet inspection for services including SSH. Although applying 
the Markov chain algorithm to data extracted from a DPI investigation has been conducted on Modbus 
traffic, the commands predicted are Modbus service commands. This study examines whether the 
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Markov chain algorithm can efficiently extract patterns within sequential SSH adversarial commands 
interactions by means of DPI.  
	
2.3.3 Association Rule Mining Algorithm 
The association class machine learning algorithms are known as the association rule mining algorithms 
(Howie, 2002). This study investigates whether there is an association of patterns between adversary 
commands in a sequence within a given dataset. The association rule mining algorithms address whether 
patterns of association exist between objects within a given dataset and is based on the frequentist 
theorem of probability. The association rule mining algorithms examined in this section are the Apriori 
and Equivalence Class Transformation (Eclat) algorithms.  
 
The frequentist theorem of probability is calculated using equation Eq. 2.2. To ascertain the true 
probability based on an infinite number of trials equation Eq. 2.3 should be utilised. ! represents the 
probability of the events occurring based as seen in the given data and (" represents the number of 
events occurring. )* denotes the number of trials or tests conducted. 
 ! " ≈ )"),  
(Eq. 2.2) 
 ! " = lim0,→2)"),  
(Eq. 2.3) 
	
The Apriori and Eclat algorithms both calculate the probability of a sequence of objects occurring based 
on the frequency they appear in the given datasets. The extracted sequence of objects together with the 
probability of the occurrence is then formulated into rules. Each rule has three values of interest used 
to determine the probability of the extracted rule occurring; the values are support, confidence and lift. 
The support value determines the probability of a rule occurring in the given datasets. The confidence 
of a rule measures the probability of observing an object within a sequence, based on the presence of 
an initial object/s. The lift value given to a rule measures the dependency or independence of objects 
within an extracted rule.  
	
2.3.3.1 Apriori algorithm 
The Apriori algorithm is the prominent association rule mining algorithm and is based on the frequentist 
theorem of probability (Kotiyal et al., 2013). The frequentist theorem of probability is the occurrence 
of an event during a trial, with an infinite amount of tests the results will converge to a true probability. 
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In the context of this study, the events are the sequence of adversarial SSH commands. While the objects 
are the commands within the sequences. The Apriori algorithm is more suited for processing a greater 
volume of data compared to the Eclat algorithm (Kotiyal et al., 2013). 
	
Research conducted by Khalili and Sami (2015), proposed an industrial intrusion detection approach to 
mitigate threats to cyber physical systems that utilised sequential patterns extracted by the Apriori 
algorithm to aid experts in identifying critical states. The study had shown the Apriori algorithm could 
be used to extract sequential patterns to monitor industrial processes. The study utilised network packet 
data which was utilised for inspection, while this study utilises DPI to identify patterns within 
adversarial sequence commands. A study conducted by Han-Wei, Huey-Min, and Wei-Cheng (2013), 
investigated the use of the Apriori algorithm to track adversaries transitioning through sequences of 
hosts to launch an attack. Data were extracted from network packets to determine the sequence of hosts. 
The Apriori algorithm had proven to be suitable for that study and provides evidence the algorithm 
would be applicable to this study.  
Research has also been conducted in the utilisation of the Apriori algorithm outside of the cyber security 
domain. A study conducted by Jung and Chung (2015) applied the Apriori algorithm to the smart health 
service. The Apriori algorithm was applied to a set of images of a patient to generate bio sequential 
patterns of the patient. The bio-sequential patterns are then utilised to create a baseline and any deviation 
from the bio sequential patterns could suggest a possible emergency situation taking place. The study 
utilised surveillance technology to acquire the patient images. The study has given evidence of the use 
of the Apriori algorithm to establish bio-sequential patterns and could be applied to a sequence of 
adversary SSH commands to extract patterns.  
A review of the current literature has shown the Apriori algorithm has been applied to the domain of 
cyber security as well as other knowledge domains. The review has shown the Apriori algorithm could 
extract sequential patterns from network flow and network packet data. This study aims to contribute 
to the domain of sequential pattern extraction from DPI data. In addition to extracting patterns from a 
sequence of adversarial commands, based on the association of commands within the sequence.   
2.3.3.2 Eclat algorithm 
Eclat algorithm is an association rule mining algorithm similar to the Apriori algorithm that is based on 
the frequentist theorem of probability (Kotiyal et al., 2013). The frequentist theorem of probability is 
the occurrence of an event during a trial test, with an infinite amount of tests the results will converge 
to a true probability. In the context of this study, the events are the sequence of adversarial SSH 
commands. The Eclat algorithm focuses on the frequency of objects occurring within a given dataset, 
by utilising a depth-first search technique. The algorithm is considered to be efficient at processing a 
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given dataset compared to the Apriori algorithm as well as processing data in real-time (Kotiyal et al., 
2013). 
 
Although there is a minimal application of the Eclat algorithm within the domain of cyber security, 
there is literature surrounding the application of the algorithm in other knowledge domains. A study 
conducted by Jin, Varadharajan, and Tupakula (2017) proposed a strategy based on the Eclat algorithm 
to detect malicious users that launch an attack that reports false location data on the Cognitive Radio 
Network. The proposed strategy based on the Eclat algorithm was proven to perform better than 
traditional approaches within the domain there providing evidence that the Eclat algorithm could be 
utilised for sequential adversarial commands. Additionally, a study conducted by Arincy and 
Sitanggang (2015), utilised association rule mining algorithms, including the Eclat algorithm. to extract 
a pattern between environmental conditions and forest fires. Suggesting the Eclat algorithm could be 
utilised for pattern extraction from sequential adversarial commands. A recent study conducted by 
Wang, Huang, Luo, Pei, and Xu (2018) utilised the Eclat algorithm to extract associations between 
hazards and the work environment in order to predict workplace hazards. The Eclat algorithm has also 
been utilised within the area of energy management. The study conducted by Jiang (2017) utilised the 
Eclat algorithm to identify associations between Global Horizontal Irradiance (GHI) and their 
associated variables in order to identify predictors that can be applied to a proposed model for 
photovoltaic installations. An additional study conducted by Jiang and Dong (2016), utilised the Eclat 
algorithm to identify associations between solar radiation and different meteorological variables to 
forecast global solar radiations.  
 
The studies that have been examined involve the application of the Eclat algorithm within other 
knowledge domains outside of the cyber security domain. The studies have shown the Eclat algorithm 
could be utilised to extract associations between objects within a given dataset. Suggesting the Eclat 
algorithm could be utilised to extract patterns between sequential SSH adversarial commands. The 
application of the Eclat algorithm for pattern-based intrusion detection approaches for SSH is a 
contribution to the knowledge domain of cyber security and patter-based intrusion detection 
approaches.  
 
The Naïve Bayes and Markov chain probabilistic classification algorithms and the Apriori and Eclat 
association rule mining algorithms have been chosen for this study. The chosen machine learning 
algorithms are applied to the sequential SSH adversarial commands datasets in order to extract patterns 
in this study. Since this study aimed to investigate a precise and efficient pattern-based intrusion 
detection approach enhancing the performance of the selected machine learning algorithms needed to 
be taken into consideration. In the following section, two approaches for enhancing the performance of 
machine learning algorithms are presented.  
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2.3.4 Enhancing Intrusion Detection Approaches  
By examining literature there are two main approaches for enhancing machine learning algorithms for 
intrusion detection purposes. These are: 1. implementing hybrid algorithms and 2. feature selection. 
Hybrid algorithms which are developed by combining two or more algorithms. While feature selection 
is choosing relevant attributes within a dataset that will allow for additional information to be extracted 
by classifying the dataset based on choosing selected features. 
	
2.3.4.1 Hybrid Algorithms  
There have been studies conducted in enhancing intrusion detection approaches by developing hybrid 
algorithms and approaches to detect unauthorised activities. Kevric et al. (2017) developed a hybrid 
classification algorithm combining the random decision tree and the Naïve Bayes classifier. 
Experiments conducted on the NSL-KDD dataset showed the proposed hybrid algorithm outperformed 
the standard machine learning algorithms. Aslahi-Shahri et al. (2016) proposed a Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) and a Genetic Algorithm (GA) hybrid approach. The GA was used for feature selection 
while the SVM classified the data. The results obtained from applying the developed hybrid algorithm 
to the KDD Cup 99 dataset, showed the developed hybrid algorithm is more accurate at classifying 
network traffic compared to the standard machine learning algorithms tested. A study conducted by 
Soheily-Khah et al. (2018) developed a hybrid detection approach based on the K-means and Random 
Forest decision tree classifier. The K-means was utilised to pre-process the ISCX intrusion detection 
datasets followed by the results being processed by the Random Forest classifier. Results had shown 
the proposed algorithm was precise and efficient compared to other machine learning algorithms tested. 
In addition, studies have been conducted in applying fuzzy logic to association rule mining algorithms 
(Aburrous, Hossain, Dahal, & Thabtah, 2010; Changguo, Nianzhong, Tailei, Qin, & Xiaorong, 2009). 
Fuzzy logic allows more flexible segment boundaries, by giving the administrator control of defining 
the fuzzy set range associated with the boundary. The association rule mining algorithms that had fuzzy 
logic applied produced greater precision and efficiency compared to the standard association rule 
mining algorithms examined.    
 
Hybrid algorithms have been proven to enhance the precision and efficiency of machine learning 
algorithms (Agrawal & Agrawal, 2015). However, the current study intended to utilise the machine 
learning algorithms to extract patterns from sequential SSH adversarial commands and compare the 
results between the reduced dataset to the respective full dataset. As such this study is not concerned 
with implementing enhanced versions of the chosen machine learning algorithms instead to enhance 
the performance of the existing algorithms. 
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2.3.4.2 Feature Selection   
Studies have been conducted on improving the feature selection process to enhance intrusion detection 
approaches. Feature selection is choosing relevant attributes within a dataset that will allow for 
additional information to be extracted by classifying the datasets based on the selected features. Studies 
within the  relevant literature have focused on improving feature selection as part of developing hybrid 
approaches to enhance intrusion detection approaches. De la Hoz, De La Hoz, Ortiz, Ortega, and Prieto 
(2015) suggested using the probability based Self-Organising Maps (SOMs) and using Principle 
Component Analysis (PCA) and Fisher Discriminant Ratio (FDR) for selecting features. The 
experiments conducted suggested the proposed feature selection approach applied on the NSL-KDD 
dataset was precise compared to the results obtained from standard algorithms. Gauthama Raman, 
Kirthivasan, and Shankar Sriram (2017) focused on Rough Set Theory (RST) to extract additional data 
from a dataset and proposed Rough Set Hyper-graph (RSHGT) as a solution for extracting an optimised 
feature subset. Experiments had been conducted on the KDD Cup 99 dataset, the proposed RSHGT was 
evaluated by applying the selected features on chosen classifiers then comparing the results to other 
feature extraction techniques using the same chosen classifiers.  
	
Aminanto, Choi, Tanuwidjaja, Yoo, and Kim (2018), identified the optimal feature to detect an 
impersonator on a Wi-Fi network using machine learning algorithms. The results show by identifying 
the optimal features the performance of that machine learning algorithms can be enhanced. This 
suggests selecting the optimal feature for the current study can enhance the performance of the machine 
learning algorithms. The feature selection process can take place in the pre-processing phase of this 
study. The study conducted by Soheily-Khah et al. (2018) presented the pre-processing procedure that 
had been implemented on the ISCX dataset. The processing procedure implemented was developed to 
convert raw traffic and separate the data into different traffic types (normal and abnormal). That 
particular study converted the data from nominal to numeric. 
 
The pre-processing phase is a critical process when applying machine learning (Malley et al., 2016). In 
the pre-processing phase, the datasets are massaged and prepared to be applied to the selected machine 
learning algorithms. However, there is a combination of steps that can be taken in the pre-processing 
phase depending on the requirements of this study and the data collected. Within literature, there are 
variations of the pre-processing phase (Bramer, 2013; García, 2015; Hackeling, 2014). Hence, after 
considering the combination of possible steps within the pre-processing phase and the requirements of 
this study, a pre-processing phase was developed for this study (presented in Section 4.2).  The pre-
processing procedure developed processes, the acquired SSH honeypot datasets to exhibit the sequence 
of adversary commands for a unique session.  
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The classification and association problems that are solved by the machine learning algorithms, align 
with the current study. In order to identify the classification and association machine learning 
algorithms that should be utilised, the four main probability inferences were examined. The Bayesian 
and frequentist interpretations of probability were selected for this study. The Naïve Bayes and Markov 
chain probabilistic classification algorithms, that are based on the Bayesian theorem of probability had 
been chosen. Along with the Apriori and Eclat association rule mining algorithms, that are based on the 
frequentist theorem of probability, had also been chosen for this study. 
	
2.4 Conclusion 
Traditionally intrusion detection approaches are either signature or misuse based or anomaly based 
detection approaches. An intrusion detection approach should precisely and efficiently detect 
adversaries on the network in a timely manner to avoid assets being compromised. The current study 
investigated whether patterns extracted from adversarial SSH commands can be utilised as a pattern-
based intrusion detection approach. The data for this study has been acquired from three medium 
interaction research honeypots that emulate the SSH protocol. Since the open-source intrusion detection 
datasets had been deemed unsuitable for this study as the adversary command interaction data is absent.  
 
As the focus of this study was the use of adversary command patterns for intrusion detection purposes, 
DPI, was required to ascertain the adversary command data. The examination of existing studies show 
there has been research conducted in the domain of adversary based intrusion detection approaches 
utilising DPI. Although there are gaps in the knowledge domain this thesis aims to contribute in terms 
of pattern identification within a sequence of adversary interaction commands. By investigating whether 
more precise patterns can be extracted efficiently from a reduced dataset by selected machine learning 
algorithms compared to the patterns extracted from the respective full dataset.  
 
Machine learning is the application of learning algorithms to extract knowledge from data to determine 
patterns between data points and in turn make predictions. The Naïve Bayes and Markov chain 
probabilistic classification algorithms, that are based on the Bayesian theorem of probability, were 
chosen along with the Apriori and Eclat association rule mining algorithms, that are based on the 
frequentist theorem of probability. For the current study a pre-processing procedure that encompasses 
feature selection and data reduction are deployed, to be applied to the acquired datasets prior to the 
application of the chosen machine learning algorithms.   
 
The Naïve Bayes and Apriori algorithms have been utilised for intrusion detection purposes, 
predominantly for analysing network flow and network packet data. The current study aimed to 
contribute to the domain by examining whether the Naïve Bayes and Apriori algorithms could be 
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utilised for DPI to extract patterns within sequential SSH adversarial command interactions. The 
Markov chain algorithm has been utilised to extract data by means of DPI for Modbus traffic. However, 
the Markov chain algorithm has not been applied to extract patterns within sequential SSH adversarial 
commands interactions by means of DPI. This study also researched whether reducing a dataset can 
improve the efficiency of training or converging the Markov chain transition matrix, further 
contributing to the knowledge domain. The Eclat algorithm has predominantly been utilised in studies 
outside of the cyber security domain. Those studies had shown the Eclat algorithm can be utilised to 
extract associations between objects within a given dataset. Suggesting the Eclat algorithm could be 
utilised to extract patterns between sequential SSH adversarial commands. The application of the Eclat 
algorithm for pattern-based intrusion detection approaches for SSH would contribute to the Eclat 
application in the cyber security domain. The research methodology and research design are discussed 
in the following Chapter 3. 
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3 Research Methodology and Design  
3.1 Research Methodology   
In order to define the research methodology for this study the philosophical assumption also known as 
the research paradigm, has to be established. Williamson and Johanson (2013) state a research 
methodology is a framework consisting of a set of principles that are underpinned by the chosen 
research paradigm. The research paradigms that are discussed are; positivism, post-positivism, 
interpretivist and critical theory (Creswell, 2014; Williamson & Johanson, 2013). 
 
The aim of this study is established through the ontology and epistemology of this study. Ontology is 
concerned with this study of reality and the existence of things. Posing the questions, when is the thing 
real and how do these things interact? Epistemology is nested in the ontology of the research. It is 
concerned with the nature of knowledge and how it is created. Posing the question, what is the 
relationship between the research and the researcher? Table 3.1, shows the ontology and epistemology 
for each of the four research paradigms along with the reason for conducting the research and modes of 
inquiry (Creswell, 2014; Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006; Williamson & Johanson, 2013) 
 
The positivist research paradigm is also referred to as rationalism or realism. Both positivist and post-
positivist use deductive empirical techniques to verify hypotheses through testing. Discoveries are made 
using quantitative methods of inquiry and validation. The common research designs associated with 
positivism and post-positivism are experimental design or survey techniques. The difference between 
positivism and post-positivism is the differences in the core principle of each paradigm. The principle 
of positivism is to identify the absolute truth through measurements and observations. Hypotheses need 
to be proven as the absolute truth, else the hypotheses are rejected. Whereas, the principle of post-
positivism is the absolute truth is unattainable, as not all variables can be controlled or accounted for. 
For this reason, a wider critical analysis should be conducted. Hypotheses are proven through the 
correctness of the statement through scientific inquiry rather than obtaining absolute truth.  
 
The interpretative research paradigm involves investigating the meaning and experiences of human 
interactions. The interpretative research paradigm is also linked with constructivism and 
phenomenology, major differences are in the purpose of the research conducted. Interpretivism focuses 
on how the researcher or participants perceive the surrounding world. Constructivism focuses on the 
interaction of the participants and the surrounding world. Phenomenology is focused on the experiences 
of the participants and the surrounding world, and qualitative means of inquiry are commonly used with 
research techniques including; surveys, interviews and observing the participants. Theories are 
predominantly developed after the data analysis phase is complete. Regarding the current study, theories 
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are tested through the developments of hypotheses and tested using experiments before the data analysis 
phase. Thus, the research paradigm for this study does not align with the interpretative research 
paradigm. 
 
Table 3.1, Shows the reason for research, ontology, epistemology, mode of inquiry for the four research 
paradigms. Adapted from Creswell (2014), Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) and Williamson and Johnson (2013) 
	
Paradigms Positivist Post-positivist Interpretive Critical Theory 
Reason for 
research  
To discover the 
absolute truth to 
predict and describe 
events.  
To discover the 
correctness of the 
truth to predict and 
describe events. 
To understand and 
describe human 
interactions with 
the surrounding 
world.  
To empower society to 
challenge and change social 
divides.  
Ontology There is a reality 
‘out there’ waiting 
to be discovered, 
regardless of the 
researcher 
There is a reality 
‘out there’ but it’s 
beyond the control 
of the researcher 
Reality is 
conditional on the 
interpretations of 
experiences by 
people.  
Reality is socially 
constructed and perceived 
objectively.  
 
Epistemology Knowledge is 
unbiased, it is real 
when empirically 
true and repeatable.  
 
Reality can only be 
approximated. 
Knowledge can be 
obtained through 
correctness using 
empirical learning. 
Bias can impact 
knowledge if not 
controlled and 
maintained.   
 
Knowledge is 
subjective based on 
the participants of 
the research and 
the interactions 
they have with the 
surrounding world.  
  
Knowledge is subjective 
based on power and justice 
related to social divides. 
Knowledge can be used to 
empower the social 
constraints.  
 
Mode of inquiry • Laboratory 
experiments 
• Quasi-
experimental 
• Sample survey  
 
• Sample survey  
• Quasi-
experimental  
 
• Ethnographic 
case study  
• Survey 
• Interview 
• Observation 
 
• Critical ethnography  
• Collaborative inquiry  
• Survey 
• Focus groups 
• Interview 
• Observation  
 
 
The critical theory research paradigm is focused on social empowerment. Although similar to 
interpretivism the main difference is the defined scope of the research. Interpretivism, is seen to have a 
broad objective, whereas the critical theory is concerned with an in-depth exploration of particular 
issues arising from social divides. Investigations are conducted using a qualitative means of inquiry. 
The focus of critical theory research is on social change through the understanding of the research 
problem. Therefore, the critical theory research paradigm does not align with the current study as this 
study focus is on discovering knowledge through identifying patterns within a sequence of commands 
utilised by adversaries.  
 
Post-positivism was selected as the research paradigm for this study as the core principles of scientific 
inquiry to prove the correctness of the hypotheses aligns with this study. The ontology of this study 
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recognises the absolute truth could exist but may not be attainable by the researcher. Knowledge is 
discovered through measurements and observations using empirical techniques as the epistemology. 
Knowledge is discovered through identifying patterns within a sequence of commands utilised by 
adversaries, the absolute truth is unattainable. However, the correctness of the hypotheses can be tested, 
hence a post-positivist research paradigm was selected. Therefore, this PhD study has taken a 
quantitative method with an experimental research design.   
 
Experimental research design uses a quantitative means of inquiry. Experiments can be conducted in 
either a laboratory setting or as field-based studies (Jackson, 2012). Laboratory experiments are based 
in precise control environments. The researcher has greater control over variables and influencing 
factors compared to field experiments. Field experiments are conducted in a ‘real’ setting subsequently, 
the researcher has less control over variables and influencing factors. This study used a field based 
experimental design due to the lack of control of some variables and factors. The current study focused 
on data collected from real adversarial interactions. Thus, the datasets had been acquired from public 
facing honeypots capturing legitimate adversarial activities as opposed to deploying internal facing 
honeypots to capture simulated activities. Therefore, there was a lack of control over the volume and 
adversary interactions and the resultant data recorded by the honeypots. The lack of control over some 
variables and factors fit within the quasi-experimental research design frame. The quasi-experimental 
design acknowledges there can be a lack of control over extraneous variables and factors of the research. 
 
Quasi-experimental research designs can either be; non-equivalent comparison group design, 
interrupted time-series design or regression discontinuously design (Christensen, Johnson, & Turner, 
2011; Jackson, 2012). Non-equivalent comparison group design encompasses both an experimental 
group and control group, the data assigned to groups are randomly selected. However, they are not 
identical instead the groups are comparable. With the interrupted time-series design measurements are 
taken before, during and after testing. Measurements are taken several times and can be taken over an 
extended period of time. Whereas, the regression discontinuous design allocates groups based on 
assignment measurements prior to testing. The focus is on any irregularity in the groups plotted 
regression line after testing.  
 
After evaluating the three quasi-experimental designs a non-equivalent control group pretest-posttest 
design was selected. As the experiments in this study evaluate and analyse the patterns extracted from 
sequential adversarial patterns in a full dataset to a reduced dataset after appropriately pre-processing 
(data treatment) the dataset. In a pretest-posttest, the whole dataset is tested before and after applying 
the data treatment framework and the results are compared. A posttest was not chosen as the results are 
only analysed after the treatment is applied, leaving no prior test comparison results (Christensen et al., 
2011). 
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The underpinning research paradigm for this study is a post-positivist quantitative approach. This is in 
conjunction with a field experimental research design using a quasi-experimentation in a non-equivalent 
control group pretest-posttest design.   
 
3.2 Research Questions 
After reflecting upon the literature surrounding the area of study, three research questions were 
formulated. The hypotheses associated with each research question have been developed to test, 
evaluate and answer the research questions posed.  The objective of this study is to investigate whether 
selected machine learning algorithms can yield more precise patterns efficiently from the reduced 
sequence of commands datasets compared to their respective full datasets. For this study precision is in 
reference to correctly identifying patterns in sequential adversarial commands within the given datasets. 
Furthermore for this study efficiency is in reference to the processing time for the selected machine 
learning algorithms to extract the patterns from the given datasets. 
  
RQ1: Is there an increase in the number of patterns extracted from the reduced datasets by the 
machine learning algorithms, compared to the number of patterns extracted from their respective 
full datasets? 
H1: More class patterns can be extracted from the reduced sequence of commands datasets, compared 
to those extracted from their respective full datasets by the selected probabilistic classification 
algorithms.   
 
H2: More patterns can be extracted from the rule sets of the reduced sequence of commands datasets, 
compared to those extracted from their respective full datasets by the selected association rule mining 
algorithms. 
 
RQ2: Are the extracted patterns from the reduced datasets by the machine learning algorithms 
overall more precise, compared to those extracted from their relevant full datasets? 
H3: The class patterns extracted by the probabilistic classification algorithms from the reduced 
sequence of commands datasets are more precise, compared to those extracted from their respective 
full datasets. 
 
H4: The patterns extracted from the rule sets by the association rule mining algorithms from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets are more precise, compared to those rule sets extracted from 
their respective full datasets. 
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RQ3: Are the machine learning algorithms more efficient at extracting patterns from the reduced 
datasets, compared to the processing time of their respective full datasets? 
H5: The probabilistic classification algorithms are more efficient at extracting patterns from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets, compared to their respective full datasets. 
 
H6: The association rule mining algorithms are more efficient at extracting patterns from the rule set 
for the reduced sequence of commands datasets, compared to their respective full datasets. 
 
3.3 Research Variables 
When conducting experiments to test the hypotheses, the research variables associated with this study 
must be identified as either; dependent, independent, controlled, and confound variables. Within this 
section, the research variables for this study are presented. 
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables that are measured and observed when testing hypotheses are stated below. 
• DV1: Precision as stated in Section 3.5, of each machine learning algorithm identifying patterns 
in the sequence of commands utilised by adversaries. 
• DV2: Time in milliseconds (efficiency), for each algorithm to calculate the probability of a 
chain of adversary commands occurring. The tictoc R package was chosen to measure the time 
in milliseconds as stated in Section 3.5. 
• DV3: The patterns within the classification of the datasets extracted by the probabilistic 
classification algorithms. 
• DV4: The patterns within the rule sets extracted by the association rule algorithms from the 
datasets. 
• DV5: The length and commands within a chain utilised by an adversary during a session. 
	
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
Independent variables cause change when interacting with other variables in this study. In this study, 
the experimental datasets are the independent variables. Since the changes in the patterns extracted from 
the full and the corresponding reduced sequence of commands datasets by the machine learning 
algorithms.  
• IV1: Experimental datasets: 
• The full sequence of commands datasets: The full length of the sequence without 
clustering the commands.  
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• The reduced sequence of commands datasets: The reduced sequence of commands. By 
clustering commands together based on the function performed by the given command.  
 
3.3.3 Controlled Variables 
To maintain the validity of this study when testing the hypotheses, control variables must be isolated 
and kept constant, to avoid this study being compromised affecting the dependent and independent 
variables. To facilitate outcome this the following are required: 
• ContV1: Computer setup, all experiments and tests should be conducted on the same computer 
device (elaborated in Section 3.6.1). The computer device was also isolated from other 
networks ensuring the device was kept at a constant throughout the experimental phase. 
• ContV2: Software used, the software applications and associated packages used to conduct the 
experiments throughout this study (elaborated in Section 3.6.2) had been kept constant. No 
updates, application settings or application configurations were altered once the experimental 
phase was initiated. 
• ContV3: The machine learning algorithms: 
• Probabilistic classification algorithms: Naïve Bayes and Markov chains algorithms.   
• Association rule mining algorithms: Apriori and Equivalence Class Transformation 
(Eclat) algorithms .  
• ContV4: Implementation of the machine learning algorithms: The same implementation and 
the parameters set for each of the four machine learning algorithms have been maintained 
throughout the experimental phase. This maintenance ensured the validity of the results when 
testing the hypotheses.	 
 
3.3.4 Confounding Variables 
Confound variables are extraneous variables that can impact the dependent and independent variables. 
Below is the confounding variable that was outside the control of the researcher:  
• ConfV1: The acquired honeypot datasets: Since this study was focused on investigating ‘real’ 
adversary interactions, the datasets had been acquired from external sources that deployed 
publicly facing honeypots. The length of the sequence and the commands utilised by an 
adversary within a session was outside the control of the researcher.  
 
3.4 Research Procedure 
The research procedure developed for this study is based on the Cross Industry Standard Process for 
Data Mining (CRISP-DM) framework (SPSS, 2000). The CRISP-DM framework is a common 
framework utilised for machine learning projects. The CRISP-DM framework consists of six phases; 
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business understanding phase, data understanding phase, pre-processing phase, modelling phase, 
evaluation phase and deployment phase.  
1. Business understanding: The business understanding phase is the initial phase of the CRISP-
DM framework. Within this phase, the objectives of the project are identified and understood. 
The objectives identified are referred to throughout the other phases to ensure the project 
requirements are met.  
2. Data understanding: In this phase, an initial exploration of the dataset or datasets is conducted 
to determine if the data is suitable for the project.  
3. Data pre-processing: This phase encompasses multiple steps to clean, format and reduce the 
data preparing it for the modelling phase. Important features that are associated with the 
objectives of the project are selected, this is known as feature selection. The aim of the data 
preparation phase is to structure the data to processed to the modelling phase.  
4. Modelling: The modelling phase is when the prepared data is applied to machine learning 
algorithms to extract knowledge.  
5. Evaluation: In this phase, an analysis of the outcomes is conducted and the precision of the 
model’s outcomes are evaluated and verified, to confirm the objective of the project has been 
achieved. 
6. Deployment: The evaluated model is prepared for production concluding the CRISP-DM 
process.  
 
The research procedure depicted in Figure 3.1 has been designed specifically for this study and consists 
of five phases, unlike the CRISP-DM framework. The development phase of the CRISP-DM framework 
was not applicable for this study as the model developed for the study is not for production purposes. 
The five phases designed specifically for this study are; project understanding phase, data understanding 
phase, pre-processing phase, experimental phase and finally the evaluation and analysis phase. The 
preliminary analysis is comprised of phase one, phase two and phase three. The project understanding 
phase is similar to the business understanding phase in the CRISP-DM framework however the phase 
has been adapted to reflect a research project as opposed to a business project since the goal of the 
current study is to add knowledge to the research domain. The data understanding phase from the 
CRISP-DM and Figure 3.1 share the same goal of conducting initial exploration and analysis of the 
acquired honeypot datasets. In order to determine the suitability of the data to be utilised in this study. 
The pre-processing phase is a critical phase in the research procedure because the datasets are treated 
resulting in the full and the corresponding reduced sequence of commands datasets generated for each 
of the three acquired honeypot datasets.  The experimental phase in Figure 3.1, is the phase the machine 
learning algorithms are applied to extract patterns from the sequence of commands datasets. In the fifth 
phase, the patterns extracted from the sequences of commands datasets are evaluated and analysed. 
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Figure 3.0.1, Illustrates the research procedure designed for this study consisting of five phases. 
 
The process proceeds through all five phases. However, if the desired outcome of the phase is not 
achieved the process iterates back to the previous phase. The desired outcome for each phase must be 
achieved before proceeding further as each phase is designed to assist in answering the research 
questions posed in Section 3.2. Phase three and phase four are critical phases of the research procedure 
if all the steps in each phase are not completed the process is repeated because within these phases the 
pre-processing procedure is conducted and the experiments take place. The phases in the research 
procedure depicted in Figure 3.2 are elaborated further in the following sections. 
 
3.4.1 Phase One, Project Understanding Phase 
Phase one is the initial phase of the research procedure, in this phase the objectives of this study are 
defined as illustrated in Figure 3.3. The goal of this study is to be determined by identifying the gap in 
the knowledge this study intends to fill and is presented in Chapter 2. The resources available and the 
scope of this study are identified to ensure the goal of this study is attainable. The research questions 
that underpin the research can be answered through experimentation. The associated hypotheses should 
be determined as they are used to evaluate the experiment performed by ensuring the research questions 
can be answered. The research questions and associated hypotheses are presented in Section 3.2 and 
subsequently, the research variables are provided in Section 3.3.
Start 1. Project Understanding Phase 
2. Data 
Understanding Phase 
3. Pre-Processing
Phase 4. Experimental Phase 
5. Evaluation and 
Analysis Phase 
End
Preliminary Analysis
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Figure 3.0.2, Illustrates a flowchart showing the process of phase 1, the project understanding phase
Start
Determine the 
goals of the study
Determine the 
hypotheses of the 
study
Determine the 
resources and the 
scope of the study 
Determine the 
research questions 
of the study
Can the goals 
of the study 
be achieve 
with the given 
resources and 
scope?  
End
YesNo Determine the 
research variables
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3.4.2 Phase Two, Data Understanding Phase 
The data understanding phase is where the three honeypot datasets acquired for this study are 
explored and analysed to determine if they are suitable for this study as shown in Figure 3.4. If the 
datasets are not in a readable format they need to be reformatted to allow for initial exploration to be 
conducted. The initial exploration of the datasets consists of identifying the tables or files within the 
dataset and the relationship between each table or feature of the collected data. Upon completion of 
this step, the analysis of the dataset is to be conducted by identifying if the required features are seen 
in the dataset, deeming them suitable for this study. However, if the required features are not seen 
another dataset would need to be acquired. The application of the data understanding phase is 
presented in Section 4.1. 
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Figure 3.0.3, Illustrates a flowchart showing the process of phase 2, the data understanding phase. 
Acquire honeypot dataset
The dataset is deemed 
suitable data for the 
study
Read the data in the 
dataset
Conduct initial 
exploration of datasets
Is the dataset 
readable?
Conduct initial analysis 
of datasets
Start
End
Format the data in the 
dataset
Is the data 
deemed suitable 
for the study?
Record formatted dataset
Honeypot 
dataset
No
No
Yes
Yes
Suitable honeypot 
datasets
Store the identified 
honeypot dataset files 
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3.4.3 Phase Three, Pre-Processing Phase 
The pre-processing phase is a critical phase in the research procedure because in this phase the reduced 
datasets are generated and all the datasets are prepared to be applied it the selected machine learning 
algorithms (Malley et al., 2016). The three dataset files from the previous data understanding phase are 
massaged until the full, and the corresponding reduced sequence of commands datasets, are produced 
as illustrated in Figure 3.5. This phase is initiated by selecting an acquired honeypot dataset. The data 
is filtered by removing redundant, noisy and incomplete data. Once the dataset has been filtered the 
process then proceeds to the data integration step. The tables or files are merged and attributes are 
selected to provide a holistic view of the data as well as resolving conflicting data.  
 
This is followed by the data transformation step where the data is formatted by transforming the source 
data, to allow selected machine learning algorithms to process the sequence of commands datasets. 
Additionally, within the data transformation step, the unique commands are extracted and assigned a 
unique key value. The process does not continue until the data transformation step has been executed 
corrected. 
 
Upon the completion of the data transformations step, a duplicate for the full sequence of command 
dataset is generated, with the data reduction step only applied to the duplicated dataset. The purpose of 
the data reduction step is to represent the full dataset using a reduced sequence of commands dataset. 
The reduced dataset is produced by clustering commands together based on the function of a given 
command. Thereafter each command cluster is assigned a unique key value. The process iterates back 
before an acceptable reduced dataset is recorded. The integrity of the full and associated reduced 
datasets are ensured by generating and storing the MD5 and SHA256 hash sum.  
 
The final step in the pre-processing phase is the data wrangling step. In the data wrangling step, the data 
type is converted according to the machine learning algorithm selected. Therefore the step is conducted 
in the experimental phase before a chosen machine learning algorithm is applied to a dataset.  Once all 
three honeypot datasets have been pre-processed resulting in three full datasets and their associated 
reduced datasets, the process proceeds to the next phase. Section 4.2 illustrates the pre-processing phase 
for the three acquired honeypot datasets.  
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Figure 3.0.4, Illustrates a flowchart showing the process of phase 3, the pre-processing understanding phase.
Filter the data
Start
Integrate the data Transform the dataset
Reduce the dataset
Record the full 
sequence of 
commands dataset
Record the reduced 
sequence of 
commands dataset
Select dataset
Have all the 
datasets 
been 
processed? 
Has the 
dataset been 
transformed 
correctly?
Has the 
dataset been 
reduced 
correctly?
Generate hash 
sums of the full 
and reduced 
sequence of 
commands datasets
End
No
No
No
Yes
YesYes
Suitable honeypot 
datasets
43 
 
 
3.4.4 Phase Four, Experimental Phase 
In the experimental phase illustrated in Figure 3.6, the four machine learning algorithms are applied 
sequentially to the three full and their associated reduced sequence of commands datasets from the 
three-honeypot datasets. The process starts by selecting a pre-processed dataset and a machine learning 
algorithms for pattern extraction. The four machine learning algorithms are; Naïve Bayes, Markov 
chain, Apriori and Equivalence Class Transformation (Eclat). The data wrangling step is the final step 
of the pre-processing phase, the data type of the dataset is verified to suit the selected machine learning 
algorithm.  
 
Once the appropriate data type has been set, if the Naïve Bayes classification algorithm had been 
selected, the chosen dataset is split randomly using R into a 70% train and 30% test set. However, if an 
association rule algorithm or the Markov chain algorithm was selected, the chosen algorithm was 
applied to the whole dataset without splitting it into a train and test set. Association rule algorithms 
extract rules based on the complete dataset and evaluation is based on the strength of each rule. 
Therefore, the need for a train and test set method of evaluation is not necessary instead the extracted 
rules are analysed based on the precision of each rule extracted shown in selection 3.5. The Markov 
chain algorithm was also applied to the complete dataset as the associated transition matrix is used to 
predict the probability of the change in state. For this study, a state is the current command, a change 
in state is the probability of the next command in a sequence occurring. Therefore, the need for train 
and test set method of evaluation thus, the evaluation was conducted on the transition matrix generated 
presented in Section 3.5. 
 
Once the selected algorithm has been applied to the dataset, the test results are recorded. The process 
applied to the chosen dataset process had been repeated 100 times for each of the four machine learning 
algorithms to ensure precision measurements are repeatable, before proceeding to select another dataset. 
Once all datasets have been applied to the four machine learning algorithms, the outputs for all the 
experiments are collated, ready for the evaluation and analysis phase. 
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Figure 3.0.5, Illustrates a flowchart showing the process of phase 4, the experimental phase. 
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all machine 
learning 
algorithms?
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datasets?
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machine learning 
algorithm
End
Record test results
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Yes
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No
No
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Test dataset using 
the selected 
machine learning 
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Full and reduced 
sequence of 
commands datasets
Has a 
probabilistic 
classification 
algorithm 
been chosen?
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3.4.5 Phase Five, Evaluation and Analysis Phase 
In this phase, the outcomes from the tests conducted in the experimental phase are evaluated and 
analysed as shown in Figure 3.7. The first step is to select the test results of the full and the 
corresponding reduced sequence of commands datasets.  
 
Next, the extracted patterns from the datasets by the machine learning algorithms are compared. The 
comparisons are made between the patterns extracted by the probabilistic classification algorithms 
(referring to H1). Followed by comparing patterns in the extracted rule sets by the association rule 
mining algorithms (referring to H2).  
 
Thereafter, the precision of the extracted patterns is evaluated. The precision measurements for Naïve 
Bayes algorithm experiments are determined using the confusion matrix (referring to H3). To evaluate 
the precision (positive predictive rate), accuracy rate, sensitivity (recall or true positive rate) and F1 
score and error rate are calculated as outlined in Section 3.5. The precision measurements for the 
Markov chain experiments are based on the transition matrix generated. The precision of the generated 
transition matrix is established using the mean and standard deviation of the standard error matrix, lower 
endpoint matrix and upper endpoint matrix.  
 
The patterns within the extracted rules by the association rule mining algorithms are evaluated for the 
precision (referring to H4). The precision of the extracted rules are calculated using the; confidence, 
support and lift as outlined in Section 3.5. Once the precision of the extracted patterns from the full and 
the corresponding reduced datasets had been calculated and evaluated the efficiency of the machine 
learning algorithms are calculated.  
 
The efficiency of the machine learning algorithms to process the datasets are measured in milliseconds 
as stated in Section 3.5 (referring to H5 and H6). Once all the extracted patterns of the full, and their 
associated reduced datasets, had been evaluated the outcomes are analysed. The final step is to report 
the findings and observations from the analysed outcomes.  
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Figure 3.0.6, Illustrates a flowchart showing the process of phase 5, evaluation and analysis phase
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3.5 Data Analysis 
Various measurements can be used to evaluate the precision of machine learning algorithms. The Naïve 
Bayes algorithms commonly use the confusion matrix to measure the precision of the classification 
produced by the algorithms. A confusion matrix is a table that shows the instances of correct and 
incorrect objects predicted by the algorithm as illustrated in Table 3.2. The confusion matrix was used 
to calculate the; precision (positive predictive rate, PPR), accuracy rate, sensitivity (recall or true 
positive rate), F1 score and error rate.  
 
Table 3.2, Shows a confusion matrix used to measure the performance of a classification learning algorithm. 
                           Predictive 
A
ct
ua
l 
 Positive Negative 
Positive True Positive (TP) False Negative (FN) 
Negative False Positive (FP) True Negative (TN) 
 
Precision is used to measure the correctness of the classification algorithm when classifying data. The 
accuracy was used to calculate the probability of the classified data truly being classified correctly by 
the algorithm. Sensitivity is also known as the recall, and the true positive rate is the number of objects 
correctly classified as positive the F1 score measures the predictive probability of the classification 
produced by calculating a balanced mean between the precision and sensitivity. The error rate measures 
the rate of incorrectly classified data.  
 !"#$%&%'(	(!'&+%,#	-"#.%$%+,#	"/+#) = 	 2!(2! + 4!) 
 (Eq. 3.1) 5$$6"/$7 = 	 (2! + 28)(2! + 28 + 4! + 48) = 1 − ;""'"	</+# 
(Eq. 3.2) =#(&%+%,%+7	 "#$/>> = 2!(2! + 48) 
(Eq. 3.4) 41	&$'"# = 2 ∙ -"#$%&%'( ∙ &#(&%+%,%+7-"#$%&%'( + &#(&%+%,%+7 	 
(Eq. 3.5) 
 ;""'"	</+# = 4! + 482! + 28 + 48 + 4! = 1 − 5$$6"/($7 
(Eq. 3.5) 
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The precision of the Markov chain algorithm applied to the full and their associated reduced datasets 
are measured based on the transition matrix generated. The mean and standard deviation of the standard 
error matrix, lower endpoint matrix (lower limit) and upper endpoint matrix (upper limit) are used to 
evaluate the generated transition matrix by the Markov chain. A transition matrix is used to predict the 
probability of the change in state. For this study, a state is the current command, a change in state is the 
probability of the next command in a sequence occurring. The standard error matrix shows the error in 
the state change of the transition matrix. The lower endpoint matrix is the lowest bound of the 
confidence interval set at 0.95 for the values with the transition matrix. While the upper endpoint matrix 
is the upper bound for the confidence interval set at 0.95 for the values with the transition matrix. The 
mean and standard deviation values for the lower endpoint and the upper endpoint are calculated and 
compared. The mean is the average value of a set of variables and the standard deviation signifies the 
spread or divergence of the variables from the mean.  A#/( = 	B	 = (∑BD)E  
(Eq. 3.6) Standard	deviation = PQ		 = 	 P√E 
(Eq. 3.7) 
The precision of rules extracted by association rule mining algorithms are measured by the confidence, 
support and lift of each rule extracted. Confidence is determined by how frequent an object will appear 
in a command execution sequence that contains a subsequent object. The support is how often the rule 
appears in each dataset and the lift indicates if objects are independent or dependent on each other. If 
objects are determined to be independent no rules can be formulated however, if the objects are 
dependent a rule can potentially be formulated. Value S represents the transaction that contains the 
object T and U is the number of transactions.  V'(W%.#($#, $	 S → T = P(S ∪ T)P(S) 	
(Eq. 3.8) 
 =6--'"+, &	 S → T = P(S ∪ T)(U)  
(Eq. 3.9) 
 >%W+, >	 S → T = P(S ∪ T)P S 	×	P(T) 
(Eq. 3.10) 
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The efficiency of extracting the patterns by the machine learning algorithms will be measured using 
the R package tictoc in milliseconds. The	tictoc is an R package used to measure the computational 
time taken for an algorithm over multiple steps to be completed. R was used to iterate through the 
application of the machine learning algorithms to process the three full and their associated reduced 
datasets, 100 and 1,000 times, in order to calculate the mean time taken for the algorithms to process 
the datasets, to gain a precise efficiency measurement.  
	
3.6 Equipment and Resources 
3.6.1 Equipment  
Details of the various equipment and resources used as part of this study are presented in this section. 
The hardware specifications used to conduct this study are presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3, Shows the hardware equipment, specification and a description of the task conducted on the device 
used in this study 
 
Name Specification Description 
Desktop Computer OS: Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 
RAM Memory: 15.7Gib 
Processor: AMD FX(The Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet)-8120 Eight-
Core Processor x8 
Graphics: Gallium 0.4 on NVE7 
Experimental phase, training and 
testing selected algorithms on 
adversary datasets and recording 
results. 
MacBook Pro Retina OS: macOS Sierra 10.12.5 
RAM Memory: 16GB 
Processor: 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 
Number of Processors: 1 
Total number of Cores: 2 
Graphics: Intel Iris Graphics 6100 
Preliminary analysis, constructing 
experiments, evaluating and 
analysing results including 
documentation of results. 
 
3.6.2 Resources 
R-Studio, an open-source integrated development environment (IDE) for the statistical programming 
language R, was selected as the primary platform to execute the experiments. R has an assortment of 
machine learning algorithm packages including the package required for the chosen algorithms used in 
this study. The packages used for this study are outlined in Appendix A. R was used throughout the 
preliminary analysis phases along with Microsoft Excel, Bash and Python 2.7. Details of the additional 
software applications utilised in this study are presented in Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4, Shows the software, version and a description of the task conducted using the application within this 
study 
Software Version Description 
R-Studio 1.0.135 An integrated development environment (IDE) for the statistical 
programming language R. Used for preliminary analysis and to 
execute the experiments.   
Microsoft Excel for Mac 15.33 Spreadsheet application developed by Microsoft. Used within 
the pre-processing phase, in particular the data filtering step and 
the data transformation step.  
Python 2.7 2.7.10 A programming language. Particularly used for Dataset two and 
Dataset three in the data understanding phase. As well as the 
data reduction step in the pre-processing phase.  
Bash 3.2.57(L. Bilge, 
Dumitra, & #351) 
A command language. Particularly used for Dataset two and 
Dataset three in the data understanding phase. As well as the 
data integration step in the pre-processing phase. 
 
The honeypot datasets acquired for this study had been obtained from external sources. Dataset one and 
Dataset two had been obtained from Edith Cowan University’s Security Research Institute (ECU SRI) 
while Dataset three has been acquired from an affiliate of ECU SRI. The data obtained by the external 
sources had been capturing adversary interactions for an extended period of time. These provided a 
longitudinal representation of adversary activities as well as capturing “real” adversary activities rather 
than generated attacks. Dataset one consists of data collected between 2012-07-23 and 2016-01-13 a 
period of 1270 days. Data in Dataset two was collected between 2017-05-06 and 2017-09-05 a period 
of 123 days. Dataset three consists of data collected data between 2012-10-27 and 2016-02-23 a period 
of 1215 days.  
 
All three honeypot datasets had been acquired from SSH honeypots. Dataset one and Dataset three are 
acquired from Kippo SSH honeypots. Dataset two was acquired from a Cowrie SSH honeypot, the 
successor to the Kippo SSH honeypot. The Kippo and Cowrie SSH honeypots are medium interaction 
honeypots that feature a subset of the SSH service functionalities as exhibited by a ‘genuine’ system. 
A risk of obtaining data from external sources is the unknown suitability of the datasets for this study. 
Section 4.1 is the data understanding phase in which the data is examined and analysed in order to deem 
it suitable for this study.  
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3.7 Ethical Considerations  
Ethical concerns had been taken into consideration for this study and there are no animal involvement 
nor any human interactions within this study. The data gathered by the honeypots cannot positively 
unequivocally identify a particular adversary. The recorded Internet Protocol (IP) address is only of the 
attacking IP and may not reflect the location of the adversary launching the attack. However, this study 
does not disclose the full attacking IP address, thus protecting the anonymity of the adversary, abiding 
by the limitations approved by Edith Cowan University’s Ethics Approval board. This study was 
undertaken according to the approved ethical declaration. 
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4 Preliminary Analysis  
The preliminary analysis chapter consists of the data understanding phase and the pre-processing 
phase. The project understanding phase is omitted from this chapter as the phase has already been 
presented in Section 3.4.1. The data understanding phase is the initial exploration and analysis of the 
datasets intended to be utilised for this study and is elaborated in Section 4.1. this is followed by the 
pre-processing phase, where the datasets deemed suitable for this study are prepared prior to the 
application of the selected machine learning algorithms, presented in Section 4.2. 
 
4.1 Data Understanding 
In the data understanding phase, the datasets intended to be utilised for this study are presented. An 
initial exploration and analysis were conducted to determine whether the datasets are suitable for this 
study. The procedure for the data understanding phase is outlined in Section 3.4.2. For this study, data 
has been acquired from medium interaction honeypots that emulate a SSH service. The data had been 
gathered by two Kippo SSH honeypots and a Cowrie SSH honeypot. SSH dataset one and SSH dataset 
two have been acquired from Edith Cowan University’s Security Research Institute (ECU SRI) while 
SSH dataset three has been acquired from a source affiliated with the ECU SRI. The three datasets 
intended to be utilised for this study are presented in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1, Shows the three SSH datasets that will be utilised in this study 
Datasets Type of SSH honeypot Acquired from Format 
Dataset one Kippo SSH honeypot ECU SRI .csv 
Dataset two Cowrie SSH honeypot ECU SRI .log 
Dataset three Kippo SSH honeypot An affiliate of ECU SRI .log 
 
As shown in Table 4.1, dataset one was acquired as a set of Comma Separated Values (CSV) files, 
while dataset two and dataset three had been acquired as a set of log files (.log). The log files had been 
acquired as a set of ttylog files, that display the recorded interactions between an adversary and the 
honeypot per unique session. In the proceeding sections, exploration and analysis of the three acquired 
datasets are detailed to determine the suitability of the datasets for this study.  
 
4.1.1 Dataset One 
Dataset one was acquired as a set of CSV files from ECU SRI, where data had been gathered from six 
Kippo SSH honeypots. The six honeypots had been placed in different geographical locations. The 
honeypots referred to as Bronx, Dugite and Goanna had been located in the Netherlands While the 
Bobtail, Magpie and Mopoke honeypots had been located in the United States of America. The 
procedure outlined in Section 3.6.2 was used to setup these six honeypots. The honeypots had been 
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configured to collect and store data tables, auth, client, input, sensor, session and ttylog as presented in 
Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the attributes and the relationship between the six tables that form each honeypot 
dataset and in turn form dataset one. The session table is the central table with a relationship to the other 
five tables. The session table stores the unique session identification created when attempts have been 
made to gain unauthorised access to the honeypots. The auth table is associated with the session table 
and stores the credentials an adversary has used to attempt to gain unauthorised access to the honeypots. 
Once the adversary has successfully authenticated into a honeypot, the interactions the adversary has 
with a honeypot is stored in the input table. The sensor table stores the Internet Protocol (IP) address 
of the honeypot the adversary has attempted to gain access to, while the	client table stores the version 
of the SSH client the adversary has utilised. The ttylog table stores the interaction between the adversary 
and the honeypot for a unique session. The data in the ttylog table can also be saved as a set of log files 
for each unique session. 
 
 
Figure 4.0.1, Illustrates the MySQL dataset structure for Kippo honeypot (Rabadia et al., 2017) 
 
The input tables from each of the honeypots had been selected to be utilised for this study as the 
adversary interaction data per unique session is stored within the table and is the focus of this study. 
The attributes in the input table as shown in Figure 4.1 are, id, session, timestamp, realm success and 
input. The id attribute in the input table stores the unique identification value assigned to each recorded 
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input in order of occurrence. The session attributes correspond to the session the input occurred within. 
The date and time the input recorded are stored in the timestamp attribute. The realm attribute has a 
NULL value recorded for all samples in all six honeypots. The success attribute represents whether the 
input was successful based on a set of acceptable inputs. Adversarial interactions that have occurred 
between the honeypots are recorded within the input attribute. Table 4.2 shows the number of samples 
in each of the input tables of the six honeypots. 
 
Table 4.2, Shows the number of samples in the input table of the six Kippo SSH honeypots combined to form 
SSH dataset one 
Kippo SSH Honeypot Number of samples in the input table 
Bobtail 2,316 
Bronx 1,476 
Dugite 1,692 
Goanna 1,600 
Magpie 581 
Mopoke 6,914 
Total 14,579 
  
The examination and analysis conducted have determined dataset one to be suitable for utilisation in 
this study in particular, the input tables of the six honeypots. The next phase for dataset one is the pre-
processing procedure outlined in Section 4.3.1. In the following section, the examination and analysis 
for dataset two are elaborated.  
 
4.1.2 Dataset Two 
Dataset two has been acquired from ECU SRI as a set of log files. The log files contain ttylog session 
logs from a Cowrie SSH honeypot. In total 5,475 log files have been acquired. The ttylog	files include 
the input commands of the adversary and the corresponding responses of the Cowrie SSH honeypot. 
However, the data firstly needed to be converted to a readable format to determine the suitability of 
dataset two for this study. A Python 2.7 script called playlog.py (Michel Oosterhof, 2018b) was used 
to playback the ttylog	file with the adversary interaction session from start to the end.   
 
Bash was used to iterate the playlog.py Python 2.7 script through the ttylog	file with a grep command 
to extract only the adversary interactions. Thereafter the output was saved to a CSV file along with the 
associated log file name. The log files had been separated into six groups according to the size of the 
log files. The file sizes ranged from 24 bytes to 34 kilobytes. The log files have been separated to 
monitor the convergence process to maintain the integrity of the CSV files produced. Allowing for any 
potential problems to be identified and ratified. The CSV file format had been selected as the file format 
can be accessed across different applications, such as R, WEKA and Sublime.  
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Analysing the six CSV grouped files had shown no adversary interaction data was found in file sizes 
between 24 bytes and 48 bytes. Additional analysis found the log files are created once an adversary 
has successfully authenticated to the honeypot. An adversary can terminate the session without further 
interaction with the host but a log file is still created upon authentication. The log file size is dependent 
on the time taken for the adversary to terminate the session. Out of 5,475 ttylog session files, only 719 
logs contained adversary interaction data across four CSV files. The initial exploration and analysis had 
shown dataset two was suitable to be utilised for this study as the dataset contains 719 sessions of 
adversary interaction data. In the pre-processing phase presented in Section 4.2.2, dataset two is 
massaged and prepared for the chosen machine learning algorithms to be applied. 
	
4.1.3 Dataset Three 
Dataset three was acquired as a set of ttylog files from an affiliate of ECU SRI. The ttylog	files acquired 
as part of dataset three are similar to those in dataset two. Each log file contained the interaction between 
an adversary and the responses of the Kippo SSH honeypot, for a unique session. The same procedure 
applied to dataset two of converting the log files to a readable format was undertaken on dataset three.   
 
The ttylog session files had been split into six files according to the size of the log. The sizes of the log 
files ranged from 85 bytes to 344 kilobytes. Bash was used to iterate the playlog.py (Michel Oosterhof, 
2018b) Python 2.7 script through the log files with a grep command to extract only the adversary 
interactions. Thereafter the output was saved to a CSV file along with the associated log file name. The 
CSV file format had been selected as the file format can be accessed across different applications, such 
as R, WEKA and Sublime. No adversary interaction data had been found in log files 85 bytes in size. 
Similar to the dataset two, a ttylog session log file is created upon correct authentication to the Kippo 
SSH honeypot, even when the adversary did not interact with the honeypot. This resulted in 318 sessions 
adversary interaction sessions from 4,995 log files. After exploration and analyse of the Kippo SSH 
ttylog session files the dataset was determined to be suitable to utilise in this study. Dataset three 
encompasses five files with a total of 318 unique adversary interaction sessions. In the pre-possessing 
phase in Section 4.2.3, dataset three is prepared to allow the selected machine learning algorithms to be 
applied.  
 
4.1.4 Summary of the Data Understanding Phase 
In the data understanding section, the three datasets shown in Table 4.1 have been deemed suitable for 
use in this study. The datasets have been acquired as either a set of CSV files or a set of ttylog session 
files. Dataset one had been acquired as a set of CSV files. Exploration of the dataset identified the data 
in the input table fulfils the requirements of this study. A total of 14,579 input commands had been 
stored within the input tables of the six Kippo SSH honeypots.  
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However, ttylog session files had been acquired for dataset two and dataset three. The ttylog	files	had 
been converted into a readable format and saved as a set of CSV files. Dataset two contained 719 sessions 
of adversary interaction data. While dataset three contained 318 sessions of adversary interaction data. 
Concluding the data understanding phase, the next phase is the pre-processing phase elaborated in 
Section 4.2. 
 
4.2 Pre-Processing  
Data pre-processing is a critical phase in the CRISP-DM model (Malley et al., 2016; SPSS, 2000). In 
the pre-processing phase, the datasets are massaged and prepared to be applied to the selected machine 
learning algorithms. At the conclusion of the phase, the three datasets are organised into the same format 
to allow the selected machine learning algorithms to be tested on the datasets objectively. However, 
there are a combination of steps that can be taken in the pre-processing phase depending on the 
requirements of this study being undertaken and the data collected. Within the literature, there are 
variations of the pre-processing phase (Bramer, 2013; García, 2015; Hackeling, 2014). A pre-
processing procedure with five steps has been developed for this study with the data reduction step also 
taking place in this phase as depicted in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.2 is an overview of the pre-processing 
procedure developed for the study with the flowchart illustrated Figure 3.4 showing the workflow. The 
pre-processed procedure developed for this study was first deployed on dataset one, followed by dataset 
two and then dataset three.  
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Figure 4.0.2, Depicts the five steps in the pre-processing procedure used in this study. The data wrangling step 
is outside the boundary as the step will occur prior to applying a chosen machine learning algorithm. 
 
There are five steps in the pre-processing procedure that follow an iterative process: data filtering, data 
integration, data transformation, data reduction and data wrangling.  
 
In the data filtering step data is sanitised removing any incomplete samples, redundant samples and 
other noisy data. Redundant data is unnecessary duplicates of data. It can be in the form of unnecessary 
duplicates of rows in a table or individual entries in a column. Noisy data can be corrupt data or problem 
data that is meaningless in the current format. Noisy data can cause incomplete samples and impact on 
the integrity of the dataset.  
 
The data integration step is where tables from the same dataset or tables from different datasets are 
combined before relevant attributes are selected and extracted in preparation for the data 
transformations step.  
 
The data transformation step involves transforming the data from the source to allow machine learning 
algorithms to be applied. The three datasets are duplicated before applying the reduction step to the 
duplicated dataset.  
Wrangling
Reduction
Transformation 
Integration
Filtering
Pre-Processing Procedure
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The data reduction step is to represent the data using an evenly distributed reduced dataset. Allowing 
for machine learning algorithms to be applied to the full and corresponding reduced dataset, testing the 
hypotheses in Section 3.2.  
 
Prior to the application of the chosen machine learning algorithms to a dataset the final pre-processing 
step of data wrangling will take place. Hence the data wrangling step is outside of the pre-processing 
phase boundary and is discussed in Section 4.2.4 instead of within Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3. In the data 
wrangling step the data type is verified before the application of the machine learning algorithm. The 
data wrangling step will be discussed at the end of the chapter.  
 
The five pre-processing steps follow an iterative process as previous steps may need to be conducted 
again if the objective of the current step is not achieved upon completion. The pre-processing phase 
depicted in Figure 4.2 had been applied to all three datasets, and are elaborated in the following sections.  
 
4.2.1 Dataset One 
Dataset one was deemed suitable for this study, as explained in the data understanding phase in Section 
4.1.1 the dataset contained adversary interaction data. The initial exploration and analysis of dataset 
one indicated the input table from the six Kippo SSH honeypots are utilised since the data in the input 
tables contained adversary interaction commands. The following sections elaborate through the first 
four steps of the pre-processing procedure as depicted in Figure 4.2 applied to dataset one. 
 
4.2.1.1 Data Filtering, Dataset One 
The first step in the pre-processing phase is the data filtering step. Data filtering consists of removing 
redundant data, incomplete samples and other noisy data. Redundant data is unnecessary duplicates of 
data. It can be in the form of unnecessary duplicates of rows in a table or individual entries in a column. 
In dataset one there was no redundant data seen in the id	columns of the input tables. The data in the 
session, timestamp and input columns of the input tables can have redundant data, as adversaries can 
interact with the honeypots more than once in a session. However, noisy data had been identified in the 
input column of the input tables causing incomplete samples in one of the six Kippo honeypot datasets. 
Noisy data can be corrupt data or problem data that is meaningless in the current format and can cause 
incomplete samples that can impact on the integrity of the data. 
 
When the Mopoke honeypot dataset was loaded into Microsoft Excel and R, input strings leading with 
a dash ‘-’ were taken as incomplete functions in both applications. Out of a total of 6,914 samples, only 
17 samples had been affected, examples of these strings are: ‘-ls’,	‘-sl’,	‘-n’	and	‘-profile’. Six sessions 
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originating from six different IPs had been identified that used a leading dash, four of which originated 
from Turkey, one from Romania and one from Western Australia. In order to clean the samples, the 
leading dash ‘-’ was replaced with ‘(dash)’	removing the noisy data and completing the samples.  
 
4.2.1.2 Data Integration, Dataset One 
In the data integration step, the six honeypot datasets are merged and attributes are selected to provide 
a holistic view of the data as well as resolving conflicting data. Data can be merged with other tables in 
the same format. For example, merging the input tables from the different honeypot datasets. 
Alternatively, relatable tables can be merged such as the input tables and session tables from the same 
honeypot dataset. Once the selected tables had been merged, the relevant attributes identified in the data 
understanding phase can be extracted.  
 
With regards to dataset one, all six input tables had been combined together using the Bash command 
‘cat	*.csv	>>	output.csv’ and loaded into R. The combined input table had been viewed in R to verify 
the six input tables had been combined properly using the Bash command above and the integrity of 
the data had not been compromised. A total of 14,579 samples had been combined and 1,128 unique 
adversary’s sessions had been identified. The input tables from the honeypot datasets had been 
combined as the requirements of this study focused on the adversary command chain per session not 
commands per IP address. As it is difficult to definitively determine only one adversary attacked a given 
honeypot using only one IP address. It is possible multiple adversaries could have utilised the same IP 
address to attack a given honeypot or one adversary could have used multiple IP addresses by utilising 
VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) to route through various locations. For this reason, the command 
chain per session was the focus as opposed to the command chain per IP address. 
 
From the combined dataset attributes selection took place and relevant attributes to this study had been 
identified and extracted. To extract the input command per unique session: id, session, timestamp and 
input	columns from the combined input dataset had been extracted, dropping the realm and success 
columns. The id	attribute had been extracted as it shows the order of the adversary commands as they 
occur since the timestamp attribute only shows when commands had occurred to the nearest second. 
Both attributes are required for ordering the input commands per session. The session	 attribute is 
selected as one session can have multiple input commands. Finally, the input attribute is selected as the 
commands entered by adversaries are recorded in this column. The realm and success attributes had 
been dropped as the columns do not contain any data valuable to this study, the success of the commands 
entered by adversaries are out of scope.   
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4.2.1.3 Data Transformation, Dataset One  
Data transformation is consistently transforming the source data format in preparation for the selected 
machine learning algorithms to be applied. The data transformation step consists of two components: 
transposing the data and tidying the data. Transposing the data involves converting the columns into 
rows and rows into columns. Data tidying is organising the data to show only one observation per row. 
The data transformation step allows for only one observation to be made between the variables and 
ensuring other relationships between multiple variables do not influence the outcome. For the combined 
input table, a typical transposition in R does not have the desired outcome and the dataset would be 
difficult to read, with 1,128 columns and four rows. It was necessary for the combined input table to be 
transposed during the transformation process. 
 
The R package dplyr was used to only transpose the input column, ordering the elements based on the: 
id,	session	and	timestamp. The resulting dataset combined all the input commands for each session into 
one column separated by a comma (,). The Text to Column function in Microsoft Excel was used to 
split the input column base on the comma ‘,’ delimiter. Thereafter the dataset table was tidied by 
dropping the id, and timestamp columns to reduce redundant data as presented in Table 4.3. Table 4.3 
shows the format of the combined input table after transposition had taken place where each record has 
the unique session_id followed by the commands utilised by the adversary in order. 
 
From the newly transposed and tided input table the average adversary commands per session for 
dataset one was ~13 (12.92) commands in length, with the longest command chain 177 commands in 
length. To improve the performance of the selected machine learning algorithms, each unique command 
was assigned a unique key value in the format “comXX”. For example replacing 
‘wget:http://127.0.0.1:8080/User2’	 with	 “com316”.	 A total of 2,960 unique commands had been 
identified and extracted. Python 2.7 was used to extract the unique commands and assign a unique key 
value to each command. The resulting file was then merged with the combined file from the data 
integration step then iterated back through the data transformation step. A sample of the resulting 
formatted, transposed and tided dataset is shown in Table 4.4, concluding the data transformation step.  
 
Table 4.3, Shows a sample of the transposed and tidied dataset 
 
session_id C1 C2 C3 C4 
0089a2d625ff11e589ef3787aa29d241 ./32 
& 
chmod 
0777 
32 
exit wget 
http://127.0.0.1:8080/32 
00c8b5522d4811e5a518757947861b68 ./32 
& 
chmod 
0777 
32 
wget 
http://127.0.0.1:8080/32 
wget 
http://127.0.0.1:8080/32 
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Table 4.4, Shows a sample of the formatted, transposed and tidied dataset 
session_id C1 C2 C3 C4 
0089a2d625ff11e589ef3787aa29d241 Com6 Com108 Com154 Com381 
00c8b5522d4811e5a518757947861b68 Com6 Com108 Com381 NA 
 
4.2.1.4 Data Reduction, Dataset One  
The purpose of the data reduction step is to represent a full dataset using an evenly distributed reduced 
dataset. Prior to the application of the data reduction step, dataset one was duplicated and the data 
reduction step was applied only to the duplicated dataset. The focus of this study was to investigate 
whether a reduced dataset can be used to extract comparable patterns that are precise and the process 
of extraction is efficient compared to the related full dataset, as outlined in Section 3.2. Below the data 
reduction process for dataset one is elaborated and the combination and permutation of Full Dataset 
One (FD1) and the associated Reduced Dataset One (RD1) are calculated to highlight the variance in 
the volume of data.  
 
To achieve a reduced dataset a clustering technique was developed, as the focus of this study was on 
the sequence of the commands in a chain as opposed to the sequence of individual commands entered. 
A total of 2,960 unique commands had been identified and extracted. Python 2.7 was used to generalise 
all 2,960 commands according to the function of the command forming clusters. Thereafter each cluster 
was assigned a unique key value with the output saved to a file. For example: 
‘wget:http://127.0.0.1:8080/User2’	was clustered to ‘wget:http://ip:port/file’	and assigned a unique 
key value	of	“eve316”. Each unique key value is in the format “eveXX”. The resulting file was then 
merged with the combined file from the data integration step then iterated back through the data 
transformation step. The number of unique commands had been reduced from 2,960 in FD1 to 406 in 
the associated RD1 a reduction of 86.284%.  
 
Provided below are the combination and permutation values for FD1 and RD1, to quantify the variance 
in the volume of data to show the reduction in the size of the reduced dataset. To calculate the possible 
x number of combinations occurring from a set of n objects, the combination equation (Eq 4.1) was 
utilised. For FD1 n was assigned 2,960 as it is the number of unique commands in the dataset. x was 
assigned 13, as it is the average number of adversary commands per chain. Resulting in a combination 
value of ~ 2.094 quintrigintillion (2.094360976 E+35) for FD1.   
 
As for the associated RD1, n was assigned 405 as it is the number of clustered commands in the dataset. 
The average adversary number of commands per chain had not altered, hence x was assigned 13. The 
result was a combination value of ~1.043 quattuorvigintillion (1.042603223E+24) for RD1.  
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Combination	=	 _!a! _ba !	
(Eq 4.1) 
 
Permutation is used to calculate the number of n objects in a set arranged in order of x per group. The 
permutation equation (Eq 4.2) utilised the same assigned values for n and x as the combination 
calculations for FD1 and RD1. The permutation value for FD1 was ~1.304 quinquardragintillion 
(1.304162936E+45) whereas the permutation value for RD1 was ~6.492 tretrigintillion 
(6.492311959E+33).  
	 Permutation	=		 _!_ba !	
(Eq 4.2) 
 
The combination and permutation values for FD1 and RD1 show the variances in the volume of data. 
In the experimental phase elaborated in Section 3.5.4, the selected machine learning algorithms are 
applied to FD1 and RD1. Testing whether RD1 can be used to extract comparable patterns that are 
precise and the process of extraction is efficient compared to the related full dataset. 
 
The four steps of the pre-processing phase had been completed for dataset one resulting in a full and 
reduced representation of dataset one. The final step of data wrangling is conducted prior to the 
application of the chosen machine learning algorithms. In the following sections, the first four pre-
processing steps are applied to dataset two. 
 
4.2.2 Dataset Two 
The pre-processing phases illustrated in Figure 4.2 are also applied to dataset two however, the data 
filtering step differs from the steps applied to dataset one in Section 4.2.1. As dataset two had been 
acquired as a set of ttylog session files. Nevertheless, at the completion of the pre-processing phase, 
dataset two would be organised to resemble the processed FD1 and RD1. 
 
In the previous data understanding phase in Section 4.1.2, the log files had been grouped according to 
the size of the file. The adversary interaction data from the ttylog files along with the associated log file 
name had been extracted and collated into a CSV file for each group of files using Bash. A total of 719 
adversary interaction sessions had been recorded across four files for dataset two.  
 
In the following data filtering step the CSV files have been sanitised removing noisy data. In the data 
integration step the four CSV files are merged allowing for the data to be transposed and transformed in 
the data transformation step. This is followed by producing a reduced dataset of the Full Dataset Two 
(FD2) in the data reduction step. Finally, in the data wrangling step the data types are converted to the 
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required type according to the machine learning algorithm to be applied. The data wrangling step had 
been conducted prior to the application of the chosen machine learning algorithm. 
 
4.2.2.1 Data Filtering, Dataset Two 
Within the data filtering step, the dataset is sanitised, removing all redundant data, incomplete samples 
and other noisy data. Unlike the data filtering step of dataset one in Section 4.2.1.1, there are three 
stages to the data filtering step. The stages are illustrated in Figure 4.5 shows, the four CSV files of the 
dataset two had noisy data as seen in stage one, a single column containing the log name and the shell 
prompt command along with the adversary interaction commands. At the completion of the data 
filtering step, the four CSV files resembled stage 3 of Figure 4.5. The log name and adversary input 
commands had been separated into different columns and the shell prompt data was removed because 
it was noisy data.  
 
To get the four CSV files from the stage one format to the stage two format shown in Figure 4.5, the 
Text to Column function in Microsoft Excel was used to separate the column by the hash ‘#’ delimiter. 
The adversary interaction commands had been separated from the shell prompt by splitting the column 
based on the hash ‘#’	delimiter. Any data after the hash ‘#’	delimiter was the adversary interaction data.  
 
Thereafter the shell prompt data was removed and the logid	was assigned to the corresponding adversary 
interaction data. Additionally, an id was assigned to each of the samples to ensure the order of the input 
data would be maintained. Converting the four CSV files from stage two to the format shown in stage 
three of Figure 4.5 concluding the data filtering step for dataset two. An observation was made regarding 
one of the four CSV files, out of 719 unique adversary interaction sessions, 675 of these unique sessions 
had the same sequence of the input commands. Dataset two predominantly consisted of duplicate data 
suggesting a script was utilised to interact with the honeypot. The processing step is the data integration 
step for dataset two.  
 
  
64 
 
 
 
Figure 4.0.3, Depicts the three stages of data massaging in the data filtering step of the pre-processing procedure 
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4.2.2.2 Data Integration, Dataset Two 
Within the data integration step, data is merged and attributes are selected to provide a holistic view of 
the dataset. For dataset two, a decision was taken to merge all four CSV files, despite one of the	CSV 
files containing a possible script. This study focused on investigating whether a reduced dataset can be 
used to extract comparable patterns that are precise and the process of extraction is efficient compared 
to the related full dataset, as outlined in Section 3.2. Hence, a dataset that comprised predominantly of 
a possible script would not affect the focus of this study.   
 
The same Bash command ‘cat	*.csv	>>	output.csv’ used in the data integration step for dataset one was 
used to merge the four CSV files for dataset two to be loaded into R. In total dataset two comprised of 
11,015 adversary interaction commands throughout 719 unique sessions.  Attribute selection for dataset 
two unlike dataset one was not required as the three attributes: id,	Logid	and	input are required for this 
study, concluding the data integration step.  
 
4.2.2.3 Data Transformation, Dataset Two 
Data transformation is consistently transforming the source data format in preparation for the selected 
machine learning algorithms to be applied. A typical transformation results in a data frame with 719 
columns and three rows and was not the desired outcome. The R package dplyr used to transpose dataset 
one was also applied to transpose dataset two. Unlike dataset one, the timestamp attribute was absent 
from dataset two therefore the id attribute was used to order the input attribute for each session. 
  
The resulting dataset combined all the commands for each session into one column separated by a 
comma (,). The Text to Column function in Microsoft Excel was used to split the input column base on 
the comma ‘,’	delimiter. Thereafter, the dataset was tidied by dropping the id column. At this point 
dataset two was presented in the format shown in Table 4.3, each unique Logid	value was followed by 
the order the sequences of commands utilised by the adversary. The recently transposed and tided 
dataset revealed the average command chain to be ~15 (15.312) commands in length, with the longest 
command chain at 45 commands in length. Similar to dataset one each unique command was assigned 
a unique key value in the format “comXX”. For example, replacing ‘wget:http://127.0.0.1:8080/User2’	
with	“com316”,	in order to improve the performance of the selected machine learning algorithms. A 
total of 81 unique adversary commands had been identified and extracted. Python 2.7 was used to 
extract the unique commands and assign a unique key value to each unique adversary command. The 
subsequent file was then merged with the combined file from the data integration step then iterated back 
through the data transformation step. A sample of the resulting formatted, transposed and tided dataset 
is shown in Table 4.4, concluding the data transformation step for dataset two.  
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4.2.2.4 Data Reduction, Dataset Two 
The purpose of the data reduction step is to represent FD2 using an evenly distributed reduced dataset. 
Similar to dataset one prior to the application of the data reduction step dataset two was duplicated, the 
data reduction step was applied only to the duplicated dataset. Since the focus of this study was to 
investigate whether a reduced dataset can be used to extract comparable patterns that are precise and 
the process of extraction is efficient compared to the related full dataset, as outlined in Section 3.2. 
Below the data reduction process for dataset two is elaborated and the combination and permutation of 
FD2 and associated Reduced Dataset Two (RD2) are calculated to highlight the variance in the volume 
of data. 
 
The clustering technique deployed on dataset one was utilised to reduce dataset two as the focus of this 
study was on the sequence of the commands in a chain as opposed to the sequence of individual 
commands entered. A total of 81 unique adversary commands had been identified and extracted. Python 
2.7 was used to generalise all 81 commands according to the function of the command forming clusters. 
Thereafter each cluster was assigned a unique key value with the output saved to a file. For example: 
‘wget:http://127.0.0.1:8080/User2’	was clustered to ‘wget:http://ip:port/file’	and assigned a unique 
key value	of	“eve316”. Each unique key value is in the format “eveXX”. The resulting file was then 
merged with the combined file from the data integration step then iterated back through the data 
transformation step. The number of unique commands had been reduced from 81 in FD2 to 45 for RD2, 
a reduction of 44.444%.  
 
The combination and permutation values have been calculated to quantify variance in the volume of 
data in FD2 and RD2. The combination equation shown in Eq 4.1 is used to calculate the possible x 
number of combinations that can occur from a set of n objects. Eq 4.2 is the equation used to calculate 
the permutation value. Permutation is used to calculate the number of n objects arranged in order of x 
per group. To calculate the combination and permutation values of FD2, n was assigned 81 as it is the 
number of unique commands in dataset two. While x was assigned 15 as it is the average number of 
adversary commands per chain. FD2 has a combination value of ~8.144 quindecillion 
(8.144022047E+15) and a permutation value of ~1.065	octovigintillion (1.064972888E+28).  
 
After the data reduction step was applied, by clustering the commands based on the function, n was 
assigned 46 as it is the number of unique adversary commands in RD2. While x was assigned 15 as the 
average adversary number of commands per chain had not altered. The commination value of ~3.449 
undecillion (3.448674255E+11) was calculated for RD2 and a permutation value of ~4.510 
trevigintillion (4.509742927E+23).  
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The combination and permutation values for FD2 and RD2 show the variation in the volume of data. 
The four steps of the pre-processing phase had been completed for dataset two, resulting in a full and 
reduced representation of dataset two. The final step of data wrangling is conducted prior to the 
application of the chosen machine learning algorithms. In the experimental phase elaborated in Section 
3.5.4, the selected machine learning algorithms are applied to FD2 and RD2. Testing whether a reduced 
dataset can be used to extract comparable patterns that are precise as well as evaluating the process of 
extraction for efficiency compared to that of the related full dataset. In the following sections, the first 
four pre-processing steps are applied to dataset three. 
 
4.2.3 Dataset Three 
For dataset three to resemble the processed dataset one and dataset two along with their associated 
reduced datasets, the pre-processing procedure illustrated in Figure 4.2 was applied to dataset three. 
The data filtering step was similar to that of dataset two as both datasets had been acquired as a set of 
ttylog session files.  
 
In Section 4.2.3 the data understanding phase for dataset three was conducted. The initial exploration 
and analysis of dataset three grouped the log files according to size. The adversary interaction data from 
the ttylog files along with the associated log file name then collated into a single CSV file for each group 
of files using Bash. A total of 318 adversary interaction sessions had been recorded across five files for 
dataset three.  
 
As per Figure 4.2, the pre-processing procedure applied to dataset three is elaborated in the following 
sections. However, the data wrangling step had been conducted before the application of the machine 
learning algorithms to the datasets, ensuring the data type is appropriate for the selected algorithm. The 
data wrangling step is discussed at the end of the chapter. The following sections elaborate the first four 
steps of the pre-processing procedure applied to dataset three.  
 
4.2.3.1 Data Filtering, Dataset Three 
In the data filtering step, the dataset is sanitised, removing redundant data, incomplete samples and 
other noisy data. Dataset three had two forms of noisy data. The first form of noisy data was the presence 
of control characters. Additionally, like dataset two, the shell prompt data was seen along with the 
adversary interaction data in a single column as shown in stage 1 of Figure 4.5.  
 
Control characters are non-printable ASCII characters. Some applications such as the command 
terminal can read the control characters as intended. Whereas other applications such as R have issues 
interpreting the control characters due to the encoding of the file (R Studio, 2015). These issues include 
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inserting new incomplete samples, line breaks and the merging of cells. For these reasons, control 
characters can impact the integrity of a dataset. For example, the control character ‘\b’ indicates a 
backspace, it will erase or overwrite the last character causing incomplete samples. The control 
character ‘\t’	will add spacing to the right while ‘\n’, will insert a new line, causing a line break. For 
these reasons the samples containing control characters had been removed. A text editor called Sublime 
was used to find and remove the regular expression ‘ESC’	and ‘[**’ that represent the control characters 
in the encoding of the file. A total of 2,424 control characters had been identified and removed. 
 
The second form of noisy data seen was the shell command prompt along with adversary interaction 
data. To get the five CSV files from the stage one format to the stage two format as shown in Figure 4.5 
the Text to Column function in Microsoft Excel was utilised to separate the column by the hash ‘#’ 
delimiter. The hash ‘#’ delimiter was the last character of the command prompt, thereafter the data was 
adversary interaction data as shown in stage two of Figure 4.5. 
 
In order to get the CSV files from stage two to stage three the shell prompt data was removed and the 
appropriate logid was assigned to the corresponding adversary interaction data. Additionally, an id was 
assigned to each sample to ensure the order of the input data would be maintained. Upon completing 
the data filtering step a total of 318 unique adversary interaction sessions had been recorded for dataset 
three.  
 
4.2.3.2 Data Integration, Dataset Three  
Similar datasets or tables are merged and attributes are selected to provide a holistic view of the data in 
the data integration step. The data integration step for dataset three involved merging the five CSV files. 
The selection of attributes for dataset three was irrelevant as the, id, logid and input attributes are already 
seen in the dataset.  
 
The same Bash commands ‘cat	*.csv	>>	output.csv’ used to merge data in the previous datasets was 
utilised to merge the five CSV files of dataset three. The merged dataset had then been loaded into R to 
verify the dataset had been merged correctly and the integrity of the data was not impacted. A total of 
2,314 adversary interaction commands spread over 318 unique sessions had been recorded for dataset 
three.  
 
4.2.3.3 Data Transformation, Dataset Three 
In the data transformation step, the source data format is consistently transformed in preparation for 
machine learning algorithms to be applied. A typical transformation in R would result in a dataset with 
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318 columns and three rows and where not the desired outcome. The R package dplyr was used to 
transpose the previously processed datasets was used to transpose dataset three as well. Similar to 
dataset two, the timestamp attribute was absent therefore the id attribute was used to sort the input 
commands in order of occurrence for each session.  
 
The resulting dataset combined all commands for each session into one column separated by a comma 
(,). The Text to Column function in Microsoft Excel was used to split the input column based on the ‘,’ 
delimiter. Next, the dataset was tidied by dropping the id column. Dataset three presented in the same 
format as shown in Table 4.3, each unique Logid	value was followed by the order the sequences of 
commands utilised by the adversary. The recently transposed and tided dataset three revealed the 
average command chain to be ~7 (7.28) commands in length with the longest command chain at 220 
commands in length. Similar to dataset two each unique command was assigned a unique key value in 
the format “comXX”. For example, replacing ‘wget:http://127.0.0.1:8080/User2’	with	 “com316”,	 in 
order to improve the performance of the selected machine learning algorithms. A total of 748 unique 
adversary commands had been identified and extracted. Python 2.7 was used to extract the unique 
commands and assign a unique key value to each unique adversary command. The subsequent file was 
then merged with the combined file from the data integration step then iterated back through the data 
transformation step. A sample of the resulting formatted, transposed and tided dataset is shown in Table 
4.4, concluding the data transformation step for dataset three. 
 
4.2.3.4 Data Reduction, Dataset Three 
The purpose of the data reduction step is to represent a full dataset using an evenly distributed reduced 
dataset. Prior to the application of the data reduction step, dataset three was duplicated and the data 
reduction step was applied only to the duplicated dataset. The focus of this study was to investigate 
whether a reduced dataset can be used to extract comparable patterns that are precise and the process 
of extraction is efficient compared to the related full dataset, as outlined in Section 3.2. Below the data 
reduction process for dataset three is elaborated and the combination and permutation of the Full Dataset 
Three (FD3) and Reduced Dataset Three (RD3) are calculated to highlight the variance in the volume 
of data. The data reduction step was the same for all three datasets. 
	
To achieve a reduced dataset the developed clustering technique was deployed, as the focus of this 
study was on the sequence of the commands in a chain as opposed to the sequence of individual 
commands entered. A total of 748 unique commands had been identified and extracted. Python 2.7 was 
used to generalise all 748 commands according to the function of the command forming clusters. 
Thereafter each cluster was assigned a unique key value with the output saved to a file. For example: 
‘wget:http://127.0.0.1:8080/User2’	was clustered to ‘wget:http://ip:port/file’	and assigned a unique 
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key value	of	“eve316”. Each unique key value is in the format “eveXX”. The subsequent file was then 
merged with the combined file from the data integration step then iterated back through the data 
transformation step. The number of unique adversary commands had been reduced from 748 in FD3 to 
338 for RD3, a reduction of 54.813%.  
	
To quantify the reduction of dataset for FD3 and RD3, the combination and permutation of the datasets 
were calculated. Combination Eq 4.1 was used to calculate the possible x number of combinations 
occurring from a set of n objects. Whereas Eq 4.2 is used to calculate the permutation value. Permutation 
is used to calculate the number of n objects arranged in order of x per group. For FD3 n was assigned 
748 and x was assigned 7. The combination value for FD3 was ~2.527 sexdecillion (2.527274515E+16) 
while the permutation value was ~1.274 vigintillion (1.273746355E+20). RD3 was assigned an n value 
of 338 as it is the number of clustered commands in the dataset while the average adversary number of 
commands per chain had not altered, hence x was assigned 7. The combination value for RD3 was 
~9.394 tredecillion (9.393532302E+13) and a permutation value of ~4.734 septendecillion 
(4.73434028E+17). The combination and permutation values for FD3 and show variances in the volume 
of data. 
 
All three datasets have been organised into consistent formats and the associated reduced datasets have 
been generated. In the experimental phase, elaborated in Section 3.5.4, the selected machine learning 
algorithms are applied to the full datasets and associated reduced datasets. Testing whether a reduced 
dataset can be used to extract comparable patterns that are precise and the process of extraction is 
efficient compared to the related full dataset. The final pre-processing step of data wrangling step was 
applied to the datasets prior to the application of the machine learning algorithms. However, as the data 
wrangling step is part of the pre-processing procedure it is elaborated below. 
 
4.2.4 Data Wrangling 
The final step in the pre-processing phase is the data wrangling step although it was applied to the three 
full datasets and associated reduced datasets prior to the use of the selected machine learning algorithms. 
It is still part of the pre-processing procedure as outlined in Figure 4.2 as such is discussed below.  
 
In the data wrangling step a dataset is formatted to allow for the improved performance of the machine 
learning algorithms to process the data. Each machine learning technique has a particular data type, 
such as nominal for the association rule class of techniques however, the FP-growth association rule 
algorithm requires a binary data type. For this reason the data wrangling step has been conducted prior 
to the application of the selected machine learning algorithm. Additionally, the data wrangle step 
includes replacing empty cells with ‘NA’	to indicate the cell has no assigned value.  
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Data is classified into different classes called data types. Within the domain of machine learning there 
are four main data type classes (Hackeling, 2014): 
• Nominal: Data is categorised into sets, with the user required to select an element from the 
given set. An example of nominal data is eye colour (blue, brown, green, hazel).  
• Ordinal: The ordinal data type allows for data to be scaled and compared. An example is student 
exam ranking, 1st, 2nd, 3rd etc.  
• Interval: Observations are made using the distances between data points. With interval data 
type, a value of zero can be assigned. For example: measuring temperature in degree Celsius.  
• Ratio: Ratio is similar to the interval data type, in allowing for observations to be made between 
data points. However, unlike the interval data type, ratio data types cannot be assigned a value 
of zero. For example, height or weight.  
 
The data type class can vary between applications. WEKA, classes data into four different data types: 
nominal, numeric, string and dates. The nominal data type categories data into sets (a, b, c.) Numerical 
data type only consists of numbers (0-9) and is similar to the interval data type. Whereas the string data 
type can be alphanumeric (alphabet and numeric values) and have special characters. It is comparable 
to the ratio data type. The date data type uses the default ISO-8601 date time format (yyyy-MM-
dd‘T’HH:mm:ss) and is similar to the ordinal data type (Ian Witten, Eibe Frank, Mark Hall, & Pal, 
2016).  
 
R has five data type categories: logical, numerical, integer, complex and characters. Logical data types 
are Boolean values (true, false and yes, no). Numerical data types are real and decimal point numbers 
(0.00-9.99). Integer data type is a whole number (0-9) and complex data types are unknown values and 
equations (5x + 3 = y). Character data types are simpler to the string data type in WEKA, consisting of 
alphanumeric (alphabet and numeric values) and special characters.  
 
The data type is also determined by the machine learning technique and algorithm selected. For 
example, the association rule class of machine learning techniques requires data to be in the nominal 
data type in WEKA, and the character data type with a factor data structure in R. The classification class 
of machine learning techniques commonly use numeric or string format in WEKA and character format 
in R.  
	
4.3 Summary of the Preliminary Analysis 
Section 4.1 data understanding phase is an initial exploration and analysis of the three acquired datasets 
in order to determine the suitability of use within this study. Once the three datasets had been deemed 
suitable for this study, the pre-processing phase was applied. The pre-processing procedure developed 
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consisted of five steps the data filtering, data integration, data transformation, data reduction and data 
wrangling steps. The aim of the pre-processing phase in Section 4.2 was to prepare the datasets to be 
applied to the selected machine algorithms, as well as organising the three datasets in the same format. 
Additionally, producing a reduced version of the full dataset to test whether a reduced dataset can be 
used to extract comparable patterns that are precise as well as evaluating the process of extraction for 
efficiency compared to that of the related full dataset. After the first four steps of the pre-processing 
procedure had been applied resulting in three full and their associated reduced datasets. It was observed 
FD2 and RD2 predominantly consisted of duplicated sequences of commands. While FD3 and RD3 
predominantly consisted of distinct sequences of commands. The final data wrangling step was applied 
prior to the application of each machine learning algorithm. 
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5 Results  
In Chapter five the results obtained from the experiments conducted on the reduced datasets and their 
respective full datasets are presented. The experiments had been developed to test the hypotheses of 
this study, as outlined in Section 3.2. Section 5.1 presents the results from applying the Naïve Bayes 
and Markov chain probabilistic classification algorithms to the datasets. In Section 5.2 the results from 
applying the Apriori and Eclat association rule mining algorithms to the datasets are presented. The 
aggregated results obtained from Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 are presented in Section 5.3, along with 
the corresponding hypotheses tested. 
 
5.1 Probabilistic Classification Algorithms 
Probabilistic classification algorithms are machine learning algorithms that commonly utilise 
supervised learning techniques to extract patterns from a given dataset. Probabilistic classification 
algorithms use classified features to assess the probability of an instance occurring based on 
observations made within the given dataset. The probabilistic classification algorithms that had been 
selected for this study are the Naïve Bayes and Markov chain algorithms. The hypotheses that are tested 
in this section are H1, H3 and H5. The probabilistic classification algorithms are applied to the datasets 
to access whether, additional class patterns can be extracted from the reduced datasets compared to 
those class patterns extracted from their respective full datasets (corresponding to H1). The precision 
of the patterns extracted from the datasets are also compared, to assess whether more precise patterns 
can be extracted from the reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets (corresponding to 
H3). Along with experiments conducted to assess the efficiency of the algorithms to process the reduced 
datasets compared to their respective full datasets (corresponding to H5). Elaborated below are the sets 
of experimental results conducted using the Naïve Bayes algorithm shown in Section 5.1.1, followed 
by the experimental results conducted using the Markov chain algorithm presented in Section 5.1.2. 
 
5.1.1 Naïve Bayes Algorithm 
The experiments conducted in this section apply the Naïve Bayes algorithm to the three reduced datasets 
and their respective full datasets to test the H1, H3 and H5 hypotheses outlined in Section 3.2. Prior to 
applying the Naïve Bayes algorithm to the datasets, the data type was verified to ensure the data was 
presented as nominal data type (a factor data type in R). As well as ensuring any empty cells are 
represented using NA (not applicable) to indicate there is no data within the cell to be processed, whereas 
an empty cell indicates data is missing. Concluding the pre-processing phase elaborated in Section 4.2. 
 
A train and test model was implemented to evaluate the performance of the trained Naïve Bayes 
classifier. The R package naivebayes implementation of the Naïve Bayes algorithm was used in this 
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study. The Naïve Bayes algorithm experiments began by randomly shuffling the datasets using a seed 
value of 123, before splitting up the shuffled dataset into a 70% training set and 30% testing set. The 
training feature chosen for each dataset varied depending on the average sequence of commands for the 
given datasets. The length of the commands within the reduced datasets had not been altered by the 
clustering process consequently, both the full datasets and their associated reduced datasets had the 
same average sequence of commands. Once the classifier was trained based on the chosen feature, it 
was applied to the test set (30% of the given dataset). A confusion matrix shown in Table 3.2, was used 
to evaluate the performance of the trained Naïve Bayes classifier to classify instances in the test dataset.  
 
A confusion matrix shows the number of correct and incorrect instances classified by the trained 
classifier. The trained classifier uses patterns within the given dataset to classify instances. To evaluate 
whether additional class patterns can be extracted from the reduced datasets compared to those class 
patterns extracted from their respective full datasets, the True Positive (TP) rate was compared as it is 
the rate of correctly classified instances (responding to H1).  
 
The confusion matrix is also used to calculate the precision of the trained classifier to classify instances. 
The precision (Eq. 3.1), accuracy (Eq. 3.2), sensitivity or recall (Eq. 3.3), F1 score (Eq. 3.4) and error 
rate (Eq. 3.5) for reduced datasets and their respective full datasets are calculated and compared 
(responding to H3). Further explanation is provided in Section 3.5.  
 
The processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process the reduced datasets and 
their respective full datasets had been ascertained, by iterating the training and testing process 100 and 
1,000 times. The process was iterated 100 times as opposed to 1,000 times, as evaluating the precision 
for the algorithm for 1,000 iterations would be computationally intensive. Thereafter, the mean 
processing time was calculated once the outliers had been removed, to achieve a precise efficiency 
measurement to be assessed (responding to H5). The sections below shows the results from applying 
the Naïve Bayes algorithm to the three reduced datasets and their respective full datasets, to test the 
hypotheses associated with this study.   
   
5.1.1.1 Naïve Bayes algorithm applied to Datasets One  
In this section, the Naïve Bayes algorithm is applied to Reduced Dataset One (RD1) and the respective 
Full Dataset One (FD1). Both datasets contain a total of 1,128 sessions of adversary interactions. The 
longest sequence of adversary commands was 177 commands in length. The 13th command in the 
sequence was computed to train the Naïve Bayes classifier as it is the average length of a command 
sequence for both datasets. Both datasets had been randomly shuffled using a seed value of 123, then 
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split into a 70% (790 sessions) training set and 30% (338 sessions) a testing set. The results obtained 
from the experiments conducted to test hypotheses H1, H3, H5 are presented below.  
 
A classification algorithm mines for patterns within a dataset based on the chosen feature. Inferring true 
patterns are seen if the classification algorithm can predict instances within a given dataset, irrespective 
of whether the instances are correctly classified. The trained classifier was applied to the test set of both 
datasets, to verify whether the instances or commands had been classified correctly by the trained 
classifier. For purpose of this study, the TP rate was used to determine if additional class patterns can 
be extracted from the RD1 compared to those class patterns extracted from FD1 (responding to H1). 
The confusion matrix was used to calculate the TP rates. The TP rate for FD1 was 71.623% (53/74) 
while the TP rate for RD1 was 77.027% (57/74). RD1 had a greater TP rate suggesting additional 
patterns can be extracted from RD1 compared to those extracted from FD1. 
 
The precision of the classified instances was also calculated using the confusion matrix. The values in 
Table 5.1 are on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is the greatest value given. Precision is used to 
measure the correctness of the classification algorithm when classifying data. The precision 
measurement for the Naïve Bayes classifier of FD1 was greater at 0.660 compared to that of RD1 
recorded at 0.646, a difference of 0.014. Sensitivity is also known as the recall (true positive rate), 
represents the number of objects correctly classified as either a true positive or true negative. Similar to 
the precision value, the sensitivity value for RD1 was greater, recorded at 0.461. Compared to the 0.429 
sensitivity value for FD1. The F1 score measures the predictive probability of the classification 
produced by calculating a balanced mean between the precision and sensitivity. The F1 score was also 
greater for FD1 compared to the associated RD1, with a difference of 0.032. With the F1 scores for 
FD1 recorded at 0.543 and 0.515 for RD1. 
 
However, the accuracy rate is used to measure the probability of the truly classified data was greater 
for RD1 at 0.770 compared to the 0.716 accuracy rate recorded for FD1, a difference of 0.054. The 
error rate measures the error of incorrect classified data with a lower error rate desirable, FD1 recorded 
an error rate of 0.284 while RD1 recorded a lower error rate of 0.230. From the results presented in 
Table 5.1, the accuracy and error rate are greater in RD1. Though the precision, sensitivity and F1 
scores are greater for FD1 (responding to H2). 
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Table 5.1, Shows the precision, accuracy, sensitivity, F1 score and error rate of the classified instances using 
the trained Naïve Bayes algorithm for RD1 and FD1. Calculated using the confusion matrices for each dataset, 
the measurements are on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is the highest. 
Naïve Bayes FD1 RD1 
Precision 0.660 0.646 
Accuracy 0.716 0.770 
Sensitivity (Recall) 0.461 0.429 
F1 Score 0.543 0.515 
Error Rate 0.284 0.230 
 
To evaluate the efficiency of the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process RD1 and FD1, the training and 
testing stages had been iterated 100 and 1,000 times and the processing time for each iteration recorded 
in seconds(s) (responding to H5). The black lines seen in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, represent the mean 
processing time once the outliers had been removed. The Figure 5.1, shows the processing time of the 
Naïve Bayes algorithm applied to the datasets iterated 100 times. The Naïve Bayes algorithm processed 
RD1 more efficiently compared to FD1. The highest processing time recorded for Figure 5.1 was 
recorded for FD1 at 2.340s. While the highest recorded processing time for RD1 was recorded at 2.023s. 
The lowest recorded processing time for Figure 5.1 was for RD1 was 1.771s. With the lowest processing 
time for FD1 was recorded at 2.070s.  
 
A total of 11 outliers had been identified and removed before a mean processing time for FD1 was 
calculated at 2.103s. Whereas the mean processing time for the RD1 was recorded at 1.805s after 
removing five outliers, there is a difference of 0.299s between the mean processing time for both 
datasets. Suggesting the Naïve Bayes algorithm is more efficient at processing RD1 compared to FD1.  
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the processing time for RD1 and FD1 by the Naïve Bayes algorithm with the process 
iterated 1,000 times. As seen in Figure 5.1, the algorithm was efficient in processing RD1 compare to 
FD1 and is also observed in Figure 5.2. The processing time of FD1 ranged between 2.042s and 2.369s. 
Whereas the processing time for RD1 was ranged between 1.763s and 1.824s.  
 
A total of 83 outliers had been removed before calculating the mean processing time of 2.097s for FD1. 
The mean processing time for RD1 was calculated at 1.805s after 49 outliers had been removed. The 
mean processing time for both datasets are represented by the black lines illustrated in Figure 5.2. There 
is a difference of 0.292s between the mean processing time for FD1 and RD1. The aggregated results 
are presented in Section 5.3 along with the corresponding hypotheses tested. In the following section 
the results from applying the Naïve Bayes algorithm to Reduced Dataset Two (RD2) and the respective 
Full Dataset Two (FD2).  
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Figure 5.0.1, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process RD1 and 
FD1. The process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the 
datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
 
	
Figure 5.0.2, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process RD1 and 
FD1. The process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the 
datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
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5.1.1.2 Naïve Bayes algorithm applied to Datasets Two 
The results from applying the Naïve Bayes probability classification algorithm to RD2 and FD2 are 
presented in this section. Both datasets have a total of 719 sessions of adversary interactions, with the 
longest sequence of adversary commands recorded at 45 distinct commands in length. The Naïve Bayes 
algorithm was applied to the datasets using a train and test model. Prior to organising the datasets into 
the train and test sets, the datasets had been randomly shuffled using a seed value of 123. With 70% 
(503 sessions) of the datasets used to train the Naïve Bayes classifier. The feature used to train the 
datasets was the 15th adversary command in the sequence. The 15th command in the sequence was 
selected as it is the average command length observed for both datasets. Once the classifier had been 
trained using the 70% training set, it was applied to the testing set. The test sets comprised of the 
remaining 30% (216 sessions) of both complete datasets, to test the probability of the trained classifier 
to correctly classifying instances from the test sets. In the following section, the results obtained from 
the experiments conducted to test hypotheses H1, H3, H5 are presented below. 
 
Classification algorithms use patterns within a given dataset to classify instances, inferring any 
classified instances are a result of identified patterns within the given dataset by the algorithm. The 
trained classifier was applied to the test set of both datasets, to verify whether the instances or 
commands had been classified correctly by the trained classifier. For the purposes of this study, the TP 
rate was used to determine if additional class patterns can be extracted from the RD2 compared to FD2 
(responding to H1). The confusion matrix was also used to calculate the TP rates along with the 
precision of the trained Naïve Bayes classifier to classify instances in the test sets. The TP rates for the 
RD2 and FD2 had been calculated at 99.505%. In the pre-processing phase (presented in Section 4.2.2), 
93.880% of the datasets contained the predominant duplicated sequences of adversarial commands, 
providing evidence of a script being implemented to interact with the Cowrie SSH honeypot. 
Subsequently, there are resemblances between RD2 and FD2. The resemblances are also seen between 
the precision measurements for both datasets as presented in Table 5.2. 
 
The precision of the classified instances are evaluated using the confusion matrix. Table 5.2 shows the 
precision, accuracy sensitivity, F1 score and error rate values for the Naïve Bayes algorithm applied to 
the RD2 and FD2. The values in Table 5.2 are on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is the greatest value 
given. Repeatedly, the precision measurements presented in Table 5.2 are the same for both datasets. 
The precision value used to measure the correctness of the classified instances are greater than the 
accuracy value used to measure the number of truly classified instances. The accuracy value as seen in 
Table 5.2 had been recorded at 0.995 while the precision value for both datasets, had been recorded at 
0.998. The F1 Score measures the predictive probability of the classified instances had been recorded 
at 0.799 for both datasets (responding to H3). 
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Table 5.2, Shows the precision, accuracy, sensitivity, F1 score and error rate of the classified instances using 
the trained Naïve Bayes algorithm for RD2 and FD2. Calculated using the confusion matrices for each dataset, 
the measurements are on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is the highest. 
Naïve Bayes FD2 RD2 
Precision 0.998 0.998 
Accuracy 0.995 0.995 
Sensitivity (Recall) 0.667 0.667 
F1 Score 0.799 0.799 
Error Rate 0.005 0.005 
 
Along with the precision of the classified instances, the efficiency of the Naïve Bayes algorithm was 
assessed by iterating the train and test procedure applied to the datasets 100 times as shown in Figure 
5.3 and 1,000 times as presented in Figure 5.4 (responding to H5). The mean for both datasets are 
represented by the black lines after the outliers had been removed. Examining the processing time in 
seconds(s) for both datasets in Figure 5.3, the processing times are similar with the minimum processing 
time for FD2 was 0.323s and the minimum recorded processing time for RD2 was lower at 0.326s. That 
is a difference of 0.003s between the processing times. The maximum processing time for FD2 is 0.697s 
as seen in Figure 5.3. Whereas, the maximum processing time for RD2 was recorded at 0.468s, a 
difference of the 0.229s between the maximum recorded processing time for both datasets. To ascertain 
the mean processing time for the datasets the outliers had been removed prior to calculating the mean 
processing time for each dataset. A total of nine outliers had been removed before the mean processing 
time for FD2 was calculated at 0.357s, as shown in Figure 5.3. However, after removing three outliers 
from the RD2, a mean processing time for Figure 5.3 was calculated at 0.365s. That is a difference of 
0.008s as seen in Figure 5.3 for 100 iterations. 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process RD2 
and FD2, iterated 1,000 times. As seen in Figure 5.4 the processing time for both datasets are similar. 
The maximum processing time recorded for the FD2 was 0.610s and the maximum processing time for 
RD2 was greater at 0.616s, as seen in Figure 5.4. A difference of 0.006s. Likewise, the minimum 
processing time recorded for FD2 was 0.320s and the minimum processing time recorded for RD2 was 
also greater 0.325s. A difference of 0.005s. To ascertain the mean processing time for both datasets, the 
outliers had been removed to gain a precise efficiency measurement, as represented by the black lines 
in Figure 5.4. A total of 23 outliers had been removed from FD2 resulting in a mean processing time of 
0.337s ascertained. While 36 outliers had been removed from RD2 and a greater mean processing time 
of 0.348s was calculated, with a difference of 0.011s between both means. The aggregated results are 
presented in Section 5.3 along with the corresponding hypotheses tested. In the following section the 
results from applying the Naïve Bayes algorithm to Reduced Dataset Three (RD3) and the respective 
Full Dataset Three (FD3).  
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Figure 5.0.3, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process RD2 and 
FD2. The process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the 
datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.4, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process RD2 and 
FD2. The process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the 
datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
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5.1.1.3 Naïve Bayes algorithm applied to Datasets Three  
In this section, the results from applying the Naïve Bayes algorithm to the RD3 and FD3. Both datasets 
consisted of 318 sessions of adversary interactions and are randomly shuffled using a seed value of 123, 
before splitting both datasets into a 70% training set and 30% testing set. The training sets consisted of 
223 (70% of the complete datasets) sessions. The feature selected to train the classifier was the 8th 
adversary command in a sequence, as this was the average length of the adversary command chain for 
both datasets. Once the classifier had been trained on the training set it was applied to the test set 
consisting of the remaining 95 (30% of the complete datasets) sessions. The trained classifier would 
classify the instances in the test set and display the result in a confusion matrix. The confusion matrix 
was used to assess the identification and precision of the patterns extracted by the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm from both datasets. The results obtained from the experiments conducted to test hypotheses 
H1, H3, H5 are presented below. 
 
A classification algorithm mines for patterns within a dataset based on the chosen feature. Inferring true 
patterns are seen if the classification algorithm can predict instances within a given dataset, irrespective 
of whether the instances are correctly classified. The trained classifier was applied to the test set of both 
datasets, to verify whether the instances or commands had been classified correctly by the trained 
classifier. For purpose of this study, the TP rate was used to determine if additional class patterns can 
be extracted from the RD3 compared to FD3 (responding to H1). The TP rate for RD3 and FD3 was 
recorded at 11.111% for both datasets.  
 
To evaluate the precision of the identified patterns by the Naïve Bayes algorithm, a confusion matrix 
was used to calculate the measurements as presented in Table 5.3, (responding to H3). The values in 
Table 5.3 are on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is the greatest value given. The precision value for 
RD3 was recorded at 0.161 and was greater than the precision value recorded for FD3 at 0.099, with a 
difference of 0.008. While the accuracy values of 0.111 recorded and an error rate values of 0.889 
recorded for same both datasets. Still, the sensitivity and F1 Score values for RD3 are greater than those 
recorded for FD3. The variance between the sensitivity values for both datasets was 0.032, and a 
difference of 0.044 for the F1 score. The variance between the F1 score values is the greater at 0.044, 
this measurement assesses the predictability of the trained classifier applied to the test dataset.  
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Table 5.3, Shows the precision, accuracy, sensitivity, F1 score and error rate of the classified instances using 
the trained Naïve Bayes algorithm for RD3 and FD3. Calculated using the confusion matrices for each dataset, 
the measurements are on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is the highest. 
Naïve Bayes FD3 RD3 
Precision 0.099 0.161 
Accuracy 0.111 0.111 
Sensitivity (Recall) 0.087 0.119 
F1 Score 0.092 0.137 
Error Rate 0.889 0.889 
 
The following section assesses the processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to 
process RD3 and FD3 (responding to H5). Figure 5.5 depicts 100 iterations of the algorithm processing 
RD3 than FD3, the process encompasses the implemented training and testing model of the classifier. 
As seen in Figure 5.5, the Naïve Bayes algorithm is efficient at processing the RD3 compared to 
processing time for FD3. The greatest recorded processing time recorded was for FD3 at 0.981s. The 
processing time for FD3 ranged from 0.981s to 0.682s while the range for RD3 was between 0.717s 
and 0.645s, showing FD3 has a greater distribution in the recorded processing time. The black line 
represents the mean processing time for both datasets after the outliers had been removed. The mean 
processing time ascertained for FD3 after removing six outliers was recorded at 0.719s. RD3 has a mean 
processing time of 0.670s once five outliers had been removed, a difference of 0.049s between the 
means for the datasets. The observations made from Figure 5.5, suggest the Naïve Bayes algorithm is 
0.049s efficient at processing the RD3 compared to FD3.  
 
Figure 5.6 depicts the processing time in seconds (s) for 1,000 iterations of the Naïve Bayes algorithm 
applied to the RD3 and FD3. As seen in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 the algorithm is efficient at processing 
RD3 than FD3. The greater recorded processing time as shown in Figure 5.6, was for FD3 at 0.937s. 
The distribution of the processing time for FD3 for 1,000 iterations as recorded between 0.937s to 
0.677s, with a mean processing time of 0.707s recorded after 27 outliers had been removed. The 
distribution of RD3 in Figure 5.6 was greater than that observed in Figure 5.5, ranging between 0.907s 
and 0.641s. A total of 17 outliers had been removed before a mean processing time of 0.673s was 
ascertained. The mean for each dataset is represented by the black line shown in Figure 5.6. There is a 
difference of 0.034s between the means for both datasets. The aggregated results are presented in 
Section 5.3 along with the corresponding hypotheses tested. In the next section, the results obtained 
from applying the Markov chain model to the three full and their associated reduced datasets are 
presented.  
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Figure 5.0.5, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process RD3 and 
FD3. The process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the 
datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.6, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to process RD3 and 
FD3. The process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the 
datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
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5.1.2 Markov Chain Algorithm  
A Markov chain algorithm determines the probability of a state transition based on the Markov Property 
of the given dataset. The Markov Property is based on a stochastic process, were the conditional 
probability of a state transition is based on the past and current states, not the sequences states observed. 
As the datasets utilised for this study are of sessions of adversary interactions, the states are the 
adversary commands. The state transition is the probability of the change in the state from the current 
command to the next command. The state transition is presented in a square matrix format called the 
transition matrix. The experiments in the following sections had been developed to test the hypotheses, 
H1, H3 and H5 as outlined in Section 3.2  
 
The R package markovchain implementation of the Markov chain algorithm was applied to the datasets 
to allow a true transition matrix to be generated. Prior to applying the Naïve Bayes algorithm to the 
datasets, the data type was verified to ensure the data was presented as nominal data type (a factor data 
type in R). As well as ensuring any empty cells are represented using NA (not applicable) to indicate 
there is no data within the cell to be processed, whereas an empty cell indicates data is missing. 
Concluding the pre-processing phase elaborated in Section 4.2. 
 
The Markov chain algorithm uses patterns within the dataset to generate the transition matrix. In order 
to, assess whether additional patterns can be extracted from the reduced datasets compared to those 
extracted from their respective full datasets, the degree of freedom was calculated for each dataset. The 
degree of freedom is the number of independent values observed within a dataset before a subsequent 
value can be predicted (responding H1).  
 
The precision of the transition matrix was used to evaluate the patterns extracted by the Markov chain 
algorithm. The mean and standard deviation of the standard error matrix, lower endpoint matrix (lower 
limit) and upper endpoint matrix (upper limit) was used to assess the transition matrix generated by the 
Markov chain algorithm. The standard error matrix presents the error rate within the transition matrix. 
The lower endpoint matrix along with the upper endpoint matrix are the lower limit and upper limit of 
the confidence interval for the transition matrix set at 95%. The difference between the upper limit and 
lower limit signifies the range where 95% of the calculated probability is true and should not be rejected 
(responding to H3).  
 
The processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the transition matrices 
for the full and their associated reduced datasets had been iterated 100 and 1,000 times, to ascertain a 
precise mean efficiency measurement (responding to H5). The process was iterated 100 times as 
opposed to 1,000 times, as evaluating the precision for the algorithm for 1,000 iterations would be 
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computationally intensive. The convergence of a transition matrix occurs when the probability of a state 
transition is at an equilibrium and the stated probabilities do not change. Presented below are the results 
obtained from applying the Markov chain algorithm to the reduced datasets and their respective full 
datasets.  
 
5.1.2.1 Markov Chain algorithm applied to Datasets One 
In this section, the Markov chain algorithm was applied to RD1 and FD1. The Markov chain algorithm 
was applied to both of the complete datasets to allow the generated transition matrix to truly reflect 
their relevant datasets. The results obtained from the experiments conducted to test hypotheses H1, H3, 
H5 are presented below. 
 
For the Markov chain algorithm to determine the probability of the next state or command, a transition 
matrix needs to be formulated. The matrix presents the current state with the probability of the next 
state occurring. A transition matrix uses patterns identified within a given dataset to determine the 
probability of the next command occurring. To evaluate if additional patterns can be extracted by the 
Markov chain algorithm the degree of freedom for RD1 and FD1 are compared (responding to H1). The 
degree of freedom is the number of independent values within a dataset before a subsequent value can 
be predicted. The lower the degree of freedom, the lower the number of independent values required 
for a subsequent value to be predicted. The degree of freedom for FD1 as 1.419e+14, while the degree 
of freedom for RD1 was 1.279e+14. There is a difference of 1.394e+13 between the degree of freedom 
values for the RD1 and FD1. Signifying less independent values in a sequence are required for a 
subsequent value to be predicted, suggesting patterns can be observed between fewer values. 
 
The precision of the transition matrix is presented in Table 5.4. Table 5.4, shows the mean and standard 
deviations of the standard error rate, lower endpoint matrix and upper endpoint matrix (responding to 
H3). The standard error matrix shows the error in the state change for the transition matrix. The mean 
value indicates the average value of a set of variables, while the standard deviation signifies the spread 
or divergence of the values from the mean, a low standard deviation denotes the data points are closer 
to the mean and the dataset has a low probability distribution. The mean standard error rate was greater 
for FD1 compared to RD1, with a variance of 161.022. The difference in the mean values for the datasets 
are attributed to a 2,960 square transition matrix generated for FD1 compared to a 405 square transition 
matrix generated for RD1. The square transition matrix value is determined by the number of possible 
commands that could occur or the number of unique commands within the dataset. The standard 
deviations of the standard error rate show the distribution of the error rate from the mean. As seen in 
Table 5.4, FD1 has a greater standard deviation error rate at 2.026 compared to RD1 that had a recording 
of 1.257. A difference 0.768 indicates RD1 had a lower spread of data compared to FD1.   
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Table 5.4, Shows the mean and standard deviation values for the standard error matrix, lower endpoint matrix 
and upper endpoint matrix of the transition matrices generated by the Markov chain algorithm for RD1 and 
FD1. 
Markov chain FD1 RD1 
Standard Error 
matrix 
Mean 181.758 20.736 
Standard Deviation 2.026 1.257 
Lower endpoint 
matrix 
Mean 181.072 20.130 
Standard Deviation 0.338 0.415 
Upper endpoint 
matrix 
Mean 182.060 21.448 
Standard Deviation 3.014 2.455 
 
The lower endpoint matrix is the lower limit of the confidence interval (set at 0.95) for the transition 
matrices. The mean values of the lower endpoint matrices are also impacted by the square transition 
matrices generated for both datasets, with a difference of 160.942 between the mean values. While the 
standard deviation values for the lower endpoint matrix for FD1 was 0.338 and 0.419 for RD1, a 
difference of 0.082. Indicating the lower endpoint matrix for RD1 is distributed further compared to 
FD1. The upper endpoint matrix shows the upper limit of the confidence interval (set at 0.95) for the 
transition matrices. The mean for FD1 is greater compared to RD1, with a difference of 160.613. 
However, unlike the standard deviation for the lower limit, the upper limit standard deviation value is 
lower for RD1 as seen in Table 5.4, with a difference of 0.558. Indicating the spread of the upper limit 
of the confidence value is closer to the mean for RD1. The difference between the upper limit and lower 
limit signifies the range where 95% of the calculated probability is true and should not be rejected. The 
difference between the means for the upper limit and lower limit for FD1 was calculated at 0.989. While 
a greater variance between the mean values for RD1 was calculated at 1.318. Suggesting RD1 has a 
greater range where 95% of calculated probabilities are true. The observations made from Table 5.4, 
suggest the transition matrix for RD1 is precise compared to that of FD1. The following figure depicts 
the processing time for the Markov chain algorithm to generate a converged transition matrix process 
iterated 100 and 1,000 times.  
 
Figure 5.7 depicts the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to generate the 
converged transition matrices for the RD1 and FD1. The process was iterated 100 and 1,000 times to 
ascertain a precise efficiency measurement (responding to H5). Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 are scaled to 
log10 as the difference between the processing time for RD1 and FD1 is significant. The processing time 
for RD1 on a non-scaled graph (seen in Appendix B and Appendix C respectively), is not depicted due 
to the significant difference between the processing times for both datasets. The black lines represent 
the mean processing time after the outlines had been removed. As seen in Figure 5.7, FD1 has a greater 
processing time compared to RD1. The greatest recorded processing time for FD1 was recorded at 
144.358s compared to the greatest recorded processing time of 3.606s for RD1. While the lowest 
processing time recorded for RD1 was recorded at 3.288s and the lowest recorded processing was 
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recorded at 153.005s for FD1. It is also reflected in the mean values for the datasets. A total of 20 
outliers had been removed before a mean processing time of 147.179s was calculated for FD1. Whereas, 
four outliers had been removed from RD1 before a mean processing time of 3.366s was calculated. The 
finding suggests the Markov chain algorithm efficient at processing RD1 compared to FD1.  
 
 
Figure 5.0.7, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for the RD1 and FD1, scaled to log10. The process was iterated 100 times, with the black 
lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
 
Figure 5.8 depicts 1,000 iterations of the Markov chain algorithm converging the transition matrices for 
RD1 and FD1. The processing time for FD1 ranges between the greatest times of 148.368s and the 
lowest processing time of 152.606s. While the processing time for RD1 ranges between the greatest 
time of 3.605s and the lowest processing time of 2.881s. The black line represents the mean processing 
time after the outliers had been removed. The mean processing time for FD1 was 147.002s once 186 
outliers had been removed and the mean processing time ascertained for RD1 was 3.370s after removing 
48 outliers. The observations from Figure 5.7 are the same as the observations seen in Figure 5.8, 
suggesting the Markov chain algorithm is efficient at processing RD1 compared to FD1. The aggregated 
results are presented in Section 5.3 along with the corresponding hypotheses tested. In the following 
section the results from applying the Markov chain algorithm to RD2 and FD2. 
 
88 
 
 
 
Figure 5.0.8, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for RD1 and FD1, scaled to log10. The process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines 
represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
 
5.1.2.2 Markov Chain algorithm applied to Datasets Two 
Within this section, the results from applying the Markov chain algorithm to RD2 and FD2. The 
assessments are based on the transition matrix generated by the Markov chain algorithm. Therefore, 
both of the complete datasets had been used to generate the transition matrices to truly reflect their 
relevant datasets. The results obtained from the experiments conducted to test hypotheses H1, H3, H5 
are presented below. 
 
The degree of freedom had been used to evaluate whether additional patterns can be extracted from 
RD2 compared to those extracted from FD2 (responding to H1). As a transition matrix uses patterns 
identified within a given dataset to determine the probability of the next command occurring. The 
degree of freedom is the number of independent values within a dataset before a subsequent value can 
be predicted. The degree of freedom for FD2 was 778,688,000 and the degree of freedom for RD2 was 
667,627,624. With a variance of 111,060,376, even though in the pre-processing phase in Section 4.2.2, 
it was established datasets two had evidence of a script being utilised to interact with the honeypot. The 
lower the degree of freedom for RD2 suggests that a pattern has been determined between few 
commands than FD2. Signifying less independent values are required for a subsequent value to be 
predicted, suggesting patterns can be observed between fewer commands. 
89 
 
Table 5.5 shows the measurements used to evaluate the precision of the transition matrix for the datasets 
(responding to H3). The standard error matrix shows the error rate for the state transition from the 
current to the next state or command. The mean standard error rate for FD2 was greater than that of 
RD2 as seen in Table 5.5, with a difference of 0.224. The difference between the means for both datasets 
can be attributed to the dimensions of the transition matrices generated. A square transition matrix of 
81 was generated for FD2 while a square transition matrix of 45 was generated for RD2. The dimensions 
of the square transition matrices are determined by the number of possible commands that could occur, 
this is the same as the number of unique commands within the datasets. The standard deviation value 
is the spread of the data from the mean, a low standard deviation denotes the data points are closer to 
the mean and the dataset has a low probability distribution. The standard deviation for RD2 was lower 
at 0.548 compared to 0.726 for FD2, a difference of 0.179. 
 
Table 5.5, Shows the mean and standard deviation values for the standard error matrix, lower endpoint matrix 
and upper endpoint matrix of the transition matrices generated by the Markov chain algorithm for RD2 and 
FD2. 
Markov chain FD2 RD2 
Standard Error 
matrix 
Mean 6.653 6.429 
Standard Deviation 0.726 0.548 
Lower endpoint 
matrix 
Mean 6.156 6.355 
Standard Deviation 0.351 0.421 
Upper endpoint 
matrix 
Mean 7.123 7.045 
Standard Deviation 0.840 0.714 
 
The confidence interval of 0.95 was set for the transition matrix where the lower limits were shown in 
the lower endpoint matrix and the upper limits were shown in the upper endpoint matrix. FD2 has a 
lower mean for the lower endpoint matrix compared to the RD2 as seen Table 5.5, with a difference of 
0.199. Additionally, the standard deviation value for the lower endpoint matrix for FD2 at 0.352 is 
lower than the 0.421 value for RD2, a difference of 0.069. The observation was also seen for the 
application of the Markov chain algorithm on the datasets one in Section 5.1.2.1. The mean value for 
the upper limit of the confidence interval for the transition matrix was greater for the FD2 compared to 
RD2, as seen Table 5.5, with a difference of 0.078. The standard deviation for FD2 was greater at 0.840 
compared to 0.714 for RD2, a difference of 0.126. The variance between the upper limit and lower limit 
signifies the range where 95% of the calculated probability is true and should not be rejected. The 
variance between the means for the upper limit and lower limit for FD2 was 0.966, while a greater 
variance between the means for RD3 was calculated at 0.690. Suggesting the RD1 has a greater range 
where 95% of calculated probabilities are true.  
 
The time in seconds (s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the transition matrix for RD2 and 
FD2 had been iterated 100 times as illustrated in Figure 5.9 (responding to H5). The greatest processing 
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time was recorded for FD2 at 0.861s and the greatest processing time for RD2 was recorded at 0.713s. 
While the lowest processing time was recorded for RD2 at 0.409s and the lowest recorded processing 
time for FD2 was recorded at 0.500s. The black line represents the mean processing time once the 
outliers have been removed. The process was iterated 100 times to ascertain a precise mean processing 
time. A total of three outliers had been removed from FD2 and a mean of 0.533s was calculated. 
Whereas two outliers had been removed from RD2 with a mean processing of 0.422s, a difference of 
0.111s. The observation made from Figure 5.9 shows the Markov chain algorithm is efficient at 
processing RD2 compared to FD2.  
 
Figure 5.10 depicts the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to process RD2 
and FD2, iterated 1,000 times (responding to H5). The greatest recorded processing time for FD2 was 
0.865s and the lowest recorded processing time was 0.500s. Whereas, the greatest processing time 
recorded for RD2 was recorded at 0.714s and 0.409s as the lowest recorded processing time. The black 
lines represent the mean processing after the outliers have been removed. A total of 36 outliers had been 
removed and the mean processing time of 0.525s was ascertained for FD2. The mean processing time 
of 0.409s was ascertained for RD2 and a total of 28 outliers has been removed. The observations seen 
in Figure 5.10 are also seen in Figure 5.9, where the Markov chain algorithm is efficient at processing 
RD2 compared to FD2. The aggregated results are presented in Section 5.3 along with the 
corresponding hypotheses tested. In the following section the results from applying the Markov chain 
algorithm to RD3 and FD3. 
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Figure 5.0.9, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for RD2 and FD2. The process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the 
mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.10, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for the RD2 and FD2. The process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent 
the mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
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5.1.2.3 Markov Chain algorithm applied to Datasets Three   
The results of applying the Markov chain algorithm to RD3 and FD3 are presented in this section. The 
assessments are based on the transition matrix generated by the Markov chain algorithm. Therefore, 
both of the complete datasets had been used to generate the transition matrices to truly reflect their 
relevant datasets. The results obtained from the experiments conducted to test hypotheses H1, H3, H5 
are presented below. 
 
The Markov chain algorithm identifies patterns within the given dataset to calculate the probability of 
the next state or in the case of this study a command occurring (responding to H1). The probabilities of 
the state transitions are presented in a transition matrix. To investigate whether additional patterns can 
be extracted from RD3 compared to those extracted from FD3, the degree of freedom was analysed. 
The degree of freedom is the number of independent variables required before a subsequent variable 
can be predicted. A lower degree of freedom indicates a lower number of independent variables required 
before a pattern is formulated. The degree of freedom for FD3 was 1.943e+15 and was greater than the 
degree of freedom for RD3 at 3.070e+14, this is a difference of 1.636e+15. From the results calculated 
the degree of freedom, RD3 requires less independent values to formulate a pattern to predict the 
subsequent values. The precision of the transition matrices calculated using the patterns identified in 
the datasets by the Markov chain algorithm is presented in Table 5.6.  
 
Table 5.6 shows the precision of the transitions matrices generated for the datasets (responding to H3). 
A standard error matrix encompasses the error rate from the converged transition matrix, showing the 
probability of the next command occurring based on the current command. As observed in Table 5.6 
and Table 5.6 the full dataset has a greater mean value for the standard error matrix, lower endpoint 
matrix and upper endpoint matrix, this can be attributed to a 748 square transition matrix generated for 
the dataset. The dimension of the transition matrix is determined by the number of unique commands 
within the dataset. A 338 square transition matrix was generated from RD3. The standard deviation of 
the standard error matrix for FD3 was 2.623. The standard deviation is the spread of data within a given 
dataset, a low standard deviation denotes the data points are closer to the mean and the dataset has a 
low probability distribution.  
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Table 5.6, Shows the mean and standard deviation values for the standard error matrix, lower endpoint matrix 
and upper endpoint matrix of the transition matrices generated by the Markov chain algorithm for RD3 and 
FD3. 
Markov chain FD3 RD3 
Standard Error 
matrix 
Mean 77.831 36.778 
Standard Deviation 2.626 1.863 
Lower endpoint 
matrix 
Mean 77.009 36.024 
Standard Deviation 0.112 0.110 
Upper endpoint 
matrix 
Mean 78.108 37.299 
Standard Deviation 3.652 3.010 
 
As seen in Table 5.6, the standard deviation for the standard error matrix is lower for RD3 at 1.863. 
The lower endpoint matrix and upper endpoint matrix is the lower limit and upper limit of the 
confidence interval set at 0.95 of the transition matrices generated. The variance between the upper 
limit and lower limit signifies the range where 95% of the calculated probability is true and should not 
be rejected. The variance between the means for the upper limit and lower limit for FD3 was 1.099 
while a greater variance between the means for RD3 was calculated at 1.275. Suggesting the RD3 has 
a greater range where 95% of calculated probabilities are true. The standard deviation of the lower 
endpoint matrix and upper endpoint matrix for RD3 was lower than FD3, as seen in Table 5.6. Indicating 
the data points are closer to the mean values and the dataset have a low probability distribution. A 
comparison of the values shows RD3 has a lower mean value for the standard error matrix, lower 
endpoint matrix and upper endpoint matrix. However, the variance between the standard deviation for 
the lower endpoint matrix and upper endpoint matrix show RD3 has a greater range where 95% of the 
calculated probabilities can be considered true. Along with the precision of the transition matrix, the 
efficiency of the Markov chain algorithm to converge the transition matrices for the datasets are 
assessed and presented in Figure 5.9 Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.11 shows the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for RD3 and FD3, iterated 100 times (responding to H5). The processing time for 
all 100 iterations for FD3 are greater than RD3, with the greatest processing time at 3.021s recorded for 
FD3. Whereas, the greatest recorded processing time for RD3 was 0.952s. The lowest recorded 
processing time was recorded for RD3 at 0.593s and 2.456s for FD3. To ascertain a precise processing 
time for both datasets the outliers had been removed before the mean processing time was calculated. 
The mean processing time for both datasets are represented by the black lines shown in Figure 5.11. A 
total of three outliers had been removed from FD3 before a mean of 2.575s was ascertained. While six 
outliers had been removed from RD3 and a mean value of 0.616s was calculated. From the ascertained 
mean processing time, it can be stated that the Markov chain algorithm is 1.959s efficient at converging 
the transition matrix for RD3 compared to FD3. 
94 
 
The processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to process the RD3 and FD3 had 
been iterated 1,000 times as illustrated in Figure 5.12 (responding to H5). The greatest processing time 
recorded for FD3 was 3.021s and 2.451s was recorded as the lowest processing time. Whereas, the 
greatest recorded processing time for RD3 was 0.956s and 0.598s as the lowest recorded processing 
time. A total of 237 outliers had been removed from FD3 before a mean of 2.510s was ascertained. The 
mean processing time for RD3 was recorded at 0.433s after 28 outliers had been removed. The 
aggregated results are presented in Section 5.3 along with the corresponding hypotheses tested. In the 
following section, the results from applying the association rule mining algorithms to the reduced 
datasets and their respective full datasets are presented. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.11, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for RD3 and FD3. The process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the 
mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
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Figure 5.0.12, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for RD3 and FD3. The process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the 
mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed. 
 
5.2 Association Rule Mining 
Within this section, the results obtained from applying the association rule mining algorithms to the six 
pre-processed datasets are presented. The selected association rule mining algorithms are Apriori and 
the Equivalence Class Transformation (Eclat) algorithms, both calculate the probability of a sequence 
of objects occurring based on the frequency they appear in the given dataset. The extracted sequence of 
objects and the probability of the occurrence are formulated into rules. Each rule has three values of 
interest used to determine the probability of the extracted rule occurring, the values are support, 
confidence and lift.  
 
The support value determines the probability of a rule occurring in the given dataset (Eq. 3.9). A support 
value between 0 ≤ 1 is given to each rule. Whereby a support value of 1 suggests the rule is relevant in 
the given dataset, whereas a support value of 0 infers a low probability of the rule occurring in the given 
dataset.  
 
The confidence of a rule measures the probability of observing an object within a sequence, based on 
the presences of an initial object/s (Eq. 3.8). For example, if the initial object !	is observed within a 
dataset, the confidence is the probability of # occurring in the sequence if !	is represents. Similar to 
the support values, the confidence of a rule is measured on a scale between 0 ≤ 1. A confidence value 
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of 1 denotes # will be observed in a sequence if ! is represents and a confidence value of 0 suggests # 
will not be observed in a sequence with !.  
 
The lift value given to a rule measures the relationship between the objects within a sequence (Eq. 3.10). 
Traditionally, a lift value between 0 ≤ 1 is given to a rule where, a lift value of 1 suggest objects within 
the rule are dependent on each other, inferring the sequence of objects observed in the given rule is not 
random. While a lift value of 0 signifies the objects in the sequence are independent from each other 
and the rule may not be applicable. However, the R implementation of the arules package used for the 
Apriori and Eclat algorithms has a lift value between 0 ≤ ∞ (infinity) for each rule. A lift leaves near to 
1 indicates the ! and # objects in a rule are certain to appear together in a sequence.  
 
A transaction form dataset is commonly applied to association rule algorithms, for this study the objects 
in the pre-processed datasets are commands utilised by adversaries, while the sequences are the chain 
of commands used by adversaries. The rules extracted by the association rule algorithms are the patterns 
identified in the chain of adversary’s commands. Experiments in this section are related to hypotheses 
H2, H4 and H6 (elaborated in Section 3.2.) 
  
Patterns are identified through the extraction of rules by the association rule mining algorithms when 
applied to the reduced datasets and their respective full datasets. The association rule mining algorithms 
mine for frequent item sets or instances within a dataset to formulate rules. To ascertain if additional 
patterns can be extracted by the algorithms from the reduced datasets compared to their respective full 
datasets, the redundant rules had been removed the number of rules remaining had been compared 
(responding to H2).  
 
The precision of each rule is determined based on the strength of the rules extracted (responding to H4). 
The values of interest are support, confidence and lift. These values are used to determine the precision 
of the patterns extracted. Once the redundant rules have been removed, the strongest 50 rules based on 
the support value had been extracted and their precision evaluated, based on the three values of interest. 
The strongest 50 rules are based on the support value since the support value is used to determine the 
applicability of the rule to the given dataset.  
 
The efficiency of the association rule mining algorithms to extract the rules from the reduced datasets 
and their respective full datasets are tested through comparing the time in seconds(s), for the extraction 
process to occur (responding to H6). To ensure the efficiency of the algorithms to process the datasets 
are representative, the process was iterated 100 and 1,000 times. The process was iterated 100 times as 
opposed to 1,000 times, as evaluating the precision for the algorithm for 1,000 iterations would be 
computationally intensive. The mean of the interactions had been taken after removing any outliers. 
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Thereafter the means had been compared between the reduced datasets and their respective full datasets. 
In the subsequent sections, the results obtained from the test conducted on utilising the Apriori and 
Eclat machine learning algorithms to the three reduced datasets and their respective full datasets are 
presented. 
 
5.2.1 Apriori algorithm 
The results obtained from applying the Apriori algorithm to the three reduced datasets and their 
respective full sequence of commands datasets are presented. There are two main stages to the Apriori 
implementation in R. The first is extracting the rules from the datasets, followed by trimming the rule 
set by removing the redundant rules from the extracted rule sets. The R package arules implementation 
of the Apriori algorithm was used for this study. Prior to executing the Apriori algorithm on the datasets, 
the format of the dataset was checked to ensure the dataset was in a factor or a nominal format, then 
shuffled using a random seed of 123. 
 
As each of the three acquired databases are distinct the default parameters had been adjusted based on 
the dataset presented. The default parameters for the Apriori implementation in R to mine rules are as 
followed, a minimum support value of 0.1, minimum confidence value of 0.8 and a maximum length 
of rules with 10 objects. An initial assessment was conducted on a randomly selected 25% of entries 
from the three full datasets, to determine the parameters of the values of interest. These parameters 
would also be applied to their associated reduced datasets. The parameters for each value of interest for 
each dataset is presented in Table 5.7.  
 
As shown in Table 5.7, the minimum length of a rule was to be set at 2 as there ought to be more than 
one command in an extracted rule. The maximum length of a rule was to be set at 10, which is the 
default value for the parameter. The initial assessment of FD1 showed the support and confidence was 
to be set at 0.05 as this was the minimum support and confidence values for the sampled data. The 
initial assessment for FD2 showed the minimum support and confidence parameters for the extracted 
rules was to be set at 0.8. While the initial experiment for FD3 showed the support and confidence 
values was to be set at 0.01. The parameters for the values of interest as shown in Table 5.7, had been 
applied to the three reduced datasets and their respective full sequence of commands datasets. The 
results obtained are presented below.  
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Table 5.7, Shows the results from the initial analysis conducted on the three distinct datasets, in order to 
determine the minimum support and confidence values to be set along with the length of the rules to be 
extracted. 
Dataset Number of samples 
taken, 25%  
Minimum 
Support 
Minimum 
Confidence 
Maximum 
length  
Minimum 
length  
Dataset one (1128) 282  0.05 0.05 10 2 
Dataset two (719) 180  0.90 0.90 10 2 
Dataset three (318) 80  0.01 0.01 10 2 
 
5.2.1.1 Apriori algorithm applied to Datasets One 
In this section, the results of applying the Apriori algorithm to RD1 and FD1 are presented below. Both 
datasets have a total of 1,128 recorded sessions of adversary interactions with a maximum sequence 
length of 177 commands. The initial assessment conducted on a random 25% sample of the FD1, 
showed the minimum support and confidence was to be set at 0.05. Table 5.8, shows the number of 
extracted rules for dataset one and the number of unique rules within the extracted rule set using the 
defined parameters in Table 5.8 (responding H2). 1,016 rules had been extracted from FD1 with 98 
unique rules, that was 90.354% reduction in the number of rules. Whereas the reduced dataset had a 
99.577% reduction in the number of rules after removing the duplicated rules. A total of 447,538 rules 
had been extracted from the RD1 and 1,893 unique rules remained after removing the duplicate rules.  
 
Table 5.8, Shows the total number of rules extracted, number of unique rules after removing the duplicate rules 
and the percentage of duplicate rules extracted by the Apriori algorithm applied to RD1 and FD1. 
Apriori algorithm FD1 RD1 
Total number of rules extracted 1,016 447,538 
Number of unique rules after removing the duplicated rules  98 1,893 
Percent of duplicate rules 90.354% 99.577% 
 
Figure 5.13, is a scatter plot showing the support and corresponding confidence values for each of the 
unique rules extracted from FD1. The lift is represented by the colour scale of the data points, the darker 
the colour the greater the lift. From Figure 5.13 of the FD1 the unique rules are in the cluster within the 
rule predominantly having a low support value, but varying values of confidence. With the confidence 
value of the rules cluster about confidences value of 1, 0.7 and 0.5. Compared to Figure 5.14 a scatter 
plot of the unique rules extracted from the RD1. Where the rule rules cluster around a support value of 
0.6 and a confidence value between 1 and 0.8. The mean support value for Figure 5.13 is 0.073 and a 
mean confidence value of 0.842. While the mean support value for Figure 5.14 is lower at 0.071 and a 
greater mean confidence value of 0.874 compared to the FD1. The mean lift is greater for Figure 5.13 
is 10.119 and 9.178 for Figure 5.14.  
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Figure 5.0.13, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Apriori algorithm from FD1. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.14, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Apriori algorithm from RD1. 
 
100 
 
To analysis the precision of the rules extracted by the Apriori algorithm on RD1 and FD1, the top 50 
unique rules based on the support are evaluated. As shown in Figure 5.15, the top 50 unique support 
based rules extracted from the FD1, range in support between 0.07 and 0.14. However, the is rules have 
a greater confidence rate with a cluster between 0.9 and 1, but the associated support is 0.07. Figure 
5.16 shows the top 50 unique support rules for the RD1, with the support ranging between 0.01 and 0.1 
yet the confidence is more scattered compared to Figure 5.15. Table 5.9 shows the support, confidence 
and lift of the top 50 rules based on the support value. Comparing the distribution of the rules by 
considering at the minimum, first quartile, medium, mean, third quartile and maximum values for RD1 
and FD1 (responding to H4). 
 
 
Figure 5.0.15, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based rule set 
extracted by the Apriori algorithm from FD1. 
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Figure 5.0.16, Illustrates a scatter plot of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from RD1. 
 
As represented in Table 5.9, the RD1 has the greater support measurements compared to the FD1. 
However, FD1 has a greater first quartile measurement at 0.711 compared to the 1st quartile value of 
0.699 for RD1. As well as a greater medium confidences value of 1 compared to 0.914 of the RD1. 
Additionally, the confidence value of the third quartile of the FD1 has a greater with a value of 1 
compared to 0.987 of the RD1. Yet the RD1 has a greater confidence mean value of 0.846 compared to 
the FD1 confidence mean of 0.844 and a greater minimum of 0.492 compared 0.263 of the FD1. When 
considering the lower the lift, the objects or commands with an extracted rule are dependent on one 
another. The RD1 has lower lift values for all measurements, inferring the commands in the rules are 
likely to occur together when compared to the full dataset.  
 
Table 5.9, Shows the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 support based rules 
extracted by the Apriori algorithm applied to RD1 and FD1. 
Apriori algorithm applied to the 
first datasets 
Support Confidence Lift 
Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Minimum 0.069 0.099 0.263 0.492 3.469 3.301 
First quartile 0.069 0.110 0.711 0.699 3.748 3.704 
Medium 0.070 0.115 1.000 0.914 7.277 5.303 
Mean 0.077 0.124 0.844 0.846 7.848 5.515 
Third quartile 0.071 0.136 1.000 0.987 9.322 7.184 
Maximum 0.137 0.180 1.000 1.000 14.462 9.322 
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The top 50 unique support rules extracted from RD1 and FD1, are visually illustrated in Figure 5.17 
and Figure 5.18 respectively. The confidence levels of the rules are represented by the arrows 
connecting the commands and nodes. The connections represent the sequence of commands within the 
extracted rules. The size of the nodes represents the support for the rule, the larger the size the greater 
the support for that particular rule. While the colour of the nodes represents the lift of the rule, the darker 
the colour the greater the lift. From the graphical representation of the top 50 support rules, in Figure 
5.17 for the FD1 shows the rules are interconnected with four key commands in eight different sequence 
placements forming the rules. However, the graphical representation of the top 50 support rules in 
Figure 5.18, shows there are four clusters of commands sequences for the RD1. There are ten key 
commands in 15 different sequence placements producing the top 50 rules. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.17, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from FD1. 
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Figure 5.0.18, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from RD1. 
 
To verify a representative efficiency measurement of the Apriori algorithm to process RD1 and FD1, 
the process was iterated 100 and 1,000 times (responding to H6). Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 show the 
processing time in seconds for each loop number measure for 100 and 1,000 iterations respectively. The 
black line shows the mean processing time for RD1 and FD1, after removing the outliers.  
 
All recorded data points for the FD1 in Figure 5.19 to process the dataset have a greater processing time 
compared to those recorded for the RD1. The greatest recorded process time for FD1 was 0.210s and 
0.079s for the RD1. While 0.174s was recorded as the lowest processing time for full datasets one and 
0.051s for RD1.  For Figure 5.19 a total of six outliers had been removed from FD1 with a mean of 
0.183s. Two outlying data points had been removed in Figure 5.19 for the RD1 with a recorded mean 
of 0.058s. The data points illustrated in Figure 5.19 RD1 is efficient then FD1 when applied to the 
Apriori association rule mining algorithm.   
 
The observations made from Figure 5.19 are applicable to Figure 5.20 illustrating the processing time 
of 1,000 data points. All data points recorded for FD1 in Figure 5.20 had a greater processing time 
recorded compared to the recorded processing time of RD1. Particularly four data points spread evenly 
had recorder greater than expected processing time for FD1. With the greatest recorded processing time 
at 0.431s with the RD1 recording 0.094s. The lowest recorded processing for FD1 in illustrated in 
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Figure 5.20 was 0.173s, while the reduced dataset recorded 0.048s. 51 outliers from the 1,000 iterations 
for FD1 had been removed resulting in a mean of 0.184s compared to 0.058s recorded for RD1 with 46 
outliers removed. The aggregated results are presented in Section 5.3 along with the corresponding 
hypotheses tested. In the following section the results from applying the Apriori algorithm to RD2 and 
FD2. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.19, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Apriori algorithm process RD1 and FD1. The 
process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the 
outliers had been removed. 
 
105 
 
 
 
Figure 5.0.20, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Apriori algorithm process RD1 and FD1. The 
process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after 
the outliers had been removed. 
 
5.2.1.2 Apriori algorithm applied to Datasets Two 
In this section, the results obtained from applying the Apriori algorithm to RD2 and FD2 are presented. 
Both datasets two have a total of 719 recorded sessions of adversary interactions with the longest 
sequence at 45 commands in length. The initial assessment conducted on a random 25% sample of FD2 
showed the minimum support and confidence was to be set at 0.9 as stated in Table 5.7. From the pre-
processing phase in Section 4.2.2, acquired dataset two had evidence of a script utilised by an adversary 
to interact with the Cowrie SSH honeypot consequently, there are similarities between RD2 and FD2. 
Yet, there was a 36.450% reduction in the number of unique commands from RD2 and FD2 by utilising 
the clustering technique mentioned in Section 4.2.2.4. However, when applying the Apriori algorithm 
to RD2 and FD2, the total number of extracted rules was 445,168 for both datasets as shown in Table 
5.10 (responding H2). As well as 240 unique rules identified after removing the duplicated rules, a 
reduction of 99.946% for both datasets.  
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Table 5.10, Shows the total number of rules extracted, number of unique rules after removing the duplicate 
rules and the percentage of duplicate rules extracted by the Apriori algorithm applied to RD2 and FD2. 
Apriori algorithm FD2 RD2 
Total number of rules extracted 445,168 445,168 
Number of unique rules after removing the duplicated rules  240 240 
Percent of duplicate rules 99.946% 99.946% 
 
Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22 show the support and confidence of each of the unique 240 rules for RD2 
and FD2. The lift is represented by the shade of each data point. Both Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22 
shows three clusters of rules, one cluster has a relatively low support and confidence values compared 
to the other clusters. There is also a cluster of rules with a low support value but high confidence value 
equating to 1. While the remaining cluster has a relative high support and high confidence value 
compared to the other clusters. Figures 5.21 and Figure 5.22 both depict, the unique rule set have an 
overall high support value, as reflected in the mean support of 0.936. Indicating the rules are consistent 
in both datasets. The confidence values for the unique rule sets are also high with the mean confidence 
value for RD2 and FD2 recorded at 1, signifying the commands within the rule sets are likely to appear 
together. The mean lift values for both datasets are 1.068, suggesting a dependence between the 
commands within the extracted rule sets. The compilation of the observations seen in Figure 5.21 and 
Figure 5.22 show comparable patterns can be extracted between the rules set between RD2 and FD2. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.21, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Apriori algorithm from FD2. 
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Figure 5.0.22, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Apriori algorithm from RD2. 
 
To evaluate the precision of the extracted rules by the Apriori algorithm, the top 50 unique support 
based rules are examined (responding to H4). Figure 5.23 shows the support, associated confidence and 
lift values for the top 50 unique support based rules extracted from FD2. Figure 5.24 shows the top 50 
rules for the unique support based rules extracted from RD2 and is similar to Figure 5.23. There is a 
likeness between the top 50 extracted rules displayed in Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22 with three clusters 
of rules seen and those shown in Figure 5.23 and Figure 5.24. Table 5.11, shows the distribution of the 
top 50 unique support based rules from RD2 and FD2. The support, confidence and lift values are the 
same for RD2 as those of FD2. The distribution of the support values of the top 50 rules has a low 
spread from 0.936 as the minimum and a maximum of 0.937 as seen in Table 5.11. The low spread in 
the distribution of the top 50 rules also continuous for the confidence values, with a minimum of 0.999 
and a maximum of 1, whilst the spread in the distribution of the lift is between 1.067 and 1.068. 
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Figure 5.0.23, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based rule set 
extracted by the Apriori algorithm from FD2. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.24, Illustrates a scatter plot of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from RD2. 
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Table 5.11, Shows the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 support based rules 
extracted by the Apriori algorithm applied to RD2 and FD2. 
Apriori algorithm applied to the 
second datasets 
Support Confidence Lift 
Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Minimum 0.936 0.936 0.999 0.999 1.067 1.067 
First quartile 0.936 0.936 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
Medium 0.936 0.936 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
Mean 0.936 0.936 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
Third quartile 0.936 0.936 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
Maximum 0.937 0.937 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
 
The similarities seen between RD2 and FD2 have also seen in the visual representation of the top 50 
unique support based rules in Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26. The arrows connecting the command and 
nodes represent the confidence between the extracted commands in a rule. The support is represented 
through the size of the nodes, the larger the node size the higher the associated support value. While the 
shade of the nodes symbolises the lift values of the commands within the extracted rule set, the darker 
the shade the higher the lift. As in previous figures, the top 50 support based rules for full datasets two 
illustrated in Figure 5.25 is similar to Figure 5.26 showing the top 50 rules for reduced datasets two. 
Both Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26 illustrate 14 key interconnected commands in 16 different sequence 
placements forming the top 50 support based rule set. Suggesting the comparable patterns can be 
extracted from the rule set for RD2 and FD2.  
 
 
Figure 5.0.25, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from FD2. 
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Figure 5.0.26, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from RD2. 
 
The efficiency in seconds(s) of the Apriori algorithm to process RD2 and FD2 was also tested 
(responding to H6). As with the application of the Apriori algorithm on datasets one, the Apriori process 
was iterated 100 and 1,000 times. The black lines indicate the mean processing time after the outliers 
had been removed.  Figure 5.27 shows the processing time for 100 iterations of the Apriori algorithm 
applied to RD2 and FD2. While Figure 5.28 showing the outcomes of 1,000 iterations of the Apriori 
algorithm applied to RD2 and FD2. 
 
The processing time for RD2 is greater compared to FD2 as seen in Figure 5.27. Although the previous 
results of the extracted rules for RD2 and FD2 are similar, the efficacy of the Apriori algorithm to 
process the datasets are distinct. The greatest recorded processing time for FD2 was 5.346s while RD2 
recorded 3.879s. With the lowest recorded processing time for FD2 recorded at 4.581s and 3.570s for 
RD2. Four outliers had been identified and removed from the results of the FD2 before calculating the 
mean processing time of 4.871s. While five outliers had been identified and extracted from the results 
from RD2 before calculating the mean processing time of 3.798s. The black lines in Figure 5.27 
represent the mean processing time for both RD2 and FD2. Indicating the Apriori algorithm is on 
average 1.073s efficient at processing RD2 compared to FD2. 
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Figure 5.0.27, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Apriori algorithm process RD2 and FD2. The 
process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the 
outliers had been removed. 
 
Figure 5.28 depicts the results of 1,000 iterations of the application of the Apriori algorithm to process 
RD2 and FD2. Similar to Figure 5.27, FD2 has a greater processing time compared to RD2, as seen in 
Figure 5.28. The greatest recorded processing time for FD2 using the Apriori algorithm was 8.111s. 
While the RD2 recorded 4.561s as the greatest recorded processing time. The lowest processing time 
for FD2 is 4.358s and 3.475s for RD2. The mean processing time for FD2 was calculated after 66 
outliners had been removed resulting in the mean value of 4.9236s represented as a black line in Figure 
5.28. A total of 143 outliers had been removed from RD2 and a mean value of 3.786s was calculated. 
There is a difference of 1.137s between both means, indicating the Apriori algorithm is efficient at 
processing RD2. The aggregated results are presented in Section 5.3 along with the corresponding 
hypotheses tested. In the following section the results from applying the Apriori algorithm to RD3 and 
FD3. 
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Figure 5.0.28, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Apriori algorithm process the RD2 and FD2. 
The process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets 
after the outliers had been removed. 
 
5.2.1.3 Apriori algorithm applied to Datasets Three 
Within this section, the results of applying the Apriori algorithm to RD3 and FD3 are presented below. 
A total of 318 sessions of adversary interactions had been recorded for datasets three, with the longest 
sequence at 220 commands in length. Based on the initial assessment conducted on a random 25% 
sample of FD3, 0.01 was the minimum support and confidence parameter values to be set as mentioned 
in Table 5.7. The pre-processing phase in Section 4.2.3 showed FD3 had a total of 748 unique 
commands identified after applying the clustering technique, RD3 contained 338 unique commands, 
that is a reduction of 45.19%. Table 5.12 shows the total number of rules extracted using the Apriori 
algorithm for FD3 was 526 while a total of 568 rules had been extracted from RD3 (responding to H2). 
After the duplicated rules had been removed 125 unique rules remained for FD3, a reduction of 
76.236%. Compared to 170 unique rules remaining for RD3 a reduction of 70.070%. The increased 
number of total rules extracted and the number of unique rules for RD3 compared to FD3, could suggest 
addition patterns have been extracted.  
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Table 5.12, Shows the total number of rules extracted, number of unique rules after removing the duplicate 
rules and the percentage of duplicate rules extracted by the Apriori algorithm applied to RD3 and FD3. 
Apriori algorithm FD3  RD3 
Total number of rules extracted 526 568 
Number of unique rules after removing the duplicated rules  125 170 
Percent of duplicate rules 76.236% 70.070% 
 
The 125 unique rules extracted from FD3 are depicted in Figure 5.29 and the 170 unique rules extracted 
from RD3 are shown in Figure 5.30. Figure 5.29 and Figure 5.30 both show RD3 and FD3 have an 
overall low support value, with the majority of the rules having a support value between 0.01 and 0.02. 
The unique rule set extracted from FD3 have a mean support value of 0.016. While a mean support 
value of 0.016 was recorded for the unique rule set extracted from RD3. There are two rules that have 
a support value of around 0.09 and a low associated lift value seen in both Figure 5.29 and Figure 5.30. 
The mean lift value for FD3 was 30.659 and the mean lift value for RD3 was 23.685. Although the 
unique rule sets have a low support rate the confidence value ranges between 0 and 1. As seen in Figure 
5.29 and Figure 5.30 the rules that have a confidence value of 1 have a low support rate of 0.01. The 
mean confidence value for the unique rule set extracted from FD3 was 0.616, while RD3 had a mean 
support value of 0.572 for the unique rule set extracted.  
 
 
Figure 5.0.29, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Apriori algorithm from FD3. 
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Figure 5.0.30, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Apriori algorithm from RD3. 
 
The precision of the rule sets extracted by the Apriori algorithm from RD3 and FD3 evaluated based 
on the top 50 unique support based rules. The support value was selected as it measures the probability 
of the rules occurring in the datasets. Figure 5.31 depicts the top 50 unique support based rules of FD3. 
Figure 5.32 illustrates the top 50 unique support based rules for RD3. Figure 5.31 shows the extracted 
rules have fewer rules with a greater lift value compared to Figure 5.32. Figure 5.32 has four data points 
with a greater associated lift value, while FD3 depicted in Figure 5.31 has two data points with a greater 
associated lift value. The lift value represents the dependence between the commands in the rules, the 
lower the lift the more dependence there is between the commands. Additionally, as seen in Figure 5.29 
and Figure 5.30 the confidence for the rules range between 0 and 1, while the support values for the 
extracted rule sets shown in Figure 5.31 and Figure 5.32 predominantly are between 0.01 and 0.04. The 
precision of the extracted rules are based on the distribution of the of rule sets provided in Table 5.13.  
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Figure 5.0.31, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based rule set 
extracted by the Apriori algorithm from FD3. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.32, Illustrates a scatter plot of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based rule 
set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from RD3. 
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The distribution of the top 50 unique support based rule sets for RD3 and FD3 are presented in Table 
5.13 (responding to H4). The distribution of the rule sets are used to evaluate the precision of the 
extracted rules using the Apriori algorithm. The support distribution between RD3 and FD3 are similar, 
with the same minimum, first quartile, third quartile and the maximum. However, the medium support 
value of 0.019 for RD3 is greater compared to the medium support value of 0.015 for FD3. The mean 
support value is also greater for RD3 at 0.023, compared to the mean support value of 0.022 for FD3. 
Consequently, the trend also continues in the distribution of the confidence values, with RD3 having a 
greater medium, mean as well as third quartile value compared to the corresponding values for FD3. 
Apart from the mean, the third quartile and maximum lift vales had been the same for RD3 and FD3. 
RD3 has a lower mean lift value at 5.499 compared to 5.679 for FD3. As well as a lower third quartile 
lift value at 2.544 for RD3 compared to 4.533 for FD3.   
 
Table 5.13, Shows the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 support based rules 
extracted by the Apriori algorithm applied to RD3 and FD3. 
Apriori algorithm applied to the 
third datasets 
Support Confidence Lift 
Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Minimum 0.015 0.015 0.040 0.040 1.048 1.048 
First quartile 0.015 0.015 0.056 0.056 1.590 1.590 
Medium 0.015 0.019 0.414 0.531 2.126 2.126 
Mean 0.022 0.023 0.440 0.454 5.679 5.499 
Third quartile 0.022 0.022 0.762 0.770 4.533 2.544 
Maximum 0.097 0.097 1.000 1.000 63.600 39.750 
 
Figure 5.33 is a visual representation of the top 50 unique support based rules for FD3 and Figure 5.34 
is the visual representation for RD3. Figure 5.33 depicts a single cluster of rules, while Figure 5.34 has 
two clusters of rules and a central cluster. The confidence values of the rule sets are represented by the 
arrows connecting the commands along with the nodes and the support values are represented by the 
size of the node, the greater the support the larger the node. The shade of the nodes corresponds to the 
lift value of the rules. Figure 5.33 illustrates FD3 with 12 key interconnected commands in 23 different 
sequence placements. While Figure 5.34 depicts the top 50 unique support based rules for RD3, with 
14 key interconnected commands in 24 different sequence placements. Indicating, additional patterns 
can be extracted from the rule set between RD3 and FD3.  
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Figure 5.0.33, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from FD3. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.34, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Apriori algorithm from RD3. 
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The efficiency of the Apriori algorithm was verified by applying the algorithm to RD3 and FD3 iterated 
100 and 1,000 times (responding to H6). Figure 5.35 shows results of the Apriori algorithm iterated 100 
times and Figure 5.36 shows the application of the algorithm iterated 1,000 times. The black link shows 
the mean for the RD3 and FD3 after the outliers have been removed. 
 
From Figure 5.35 the Apriori algorithm is efficient at processing RD3 and FD3. The greatest recorded 
process time for FD3 was 1.044s and the lowest recorded process time for RD3 was 0.475s. While the 
greatest recorded process time for RD3 was 0.897s and the lowest recorded process time was 0.581s as 
seen in Figure 5.35. After removing 14 outliers the mean processing time for FD3 was calculated at 
0.488s. Additionally, a total of 9 outliers had been removed before the mean value of 0.596s was 
calculated for RD3. The mean values are represented by the black lines in Figure 5.35. The data 
presented in Figure 5.35 suggest the Apriori algorithm is efficient in processing FD3 compared to RD3. 
 
Figure 5.36 shows FD3 is efficient compared to RD3 as the Apriori algorithm was applied to the 
datasets. Figure 5.36 displays the same outcome as Figure 5.35. However, there are incremental data 
points that have a greater processing time. The greatest recorded processing time recorded for FD3 was   
0.771s and 1.041s was the greatest recorded processing time for RD3. In Figure 5.36, the lowest 
recorded processing time for FD3 was 0.471s and 0.577s was the greatest recorded processing time for 
RD3. A total of 50 outliers had been removed from both datasets. The mean processing time for FD3 
is presented by the black link is 0.4896s and the mean processing time for RD3 is 0.597s. The 
aggregated results are presented in Section 5.3 along with the corresponding hypotheses tested. In the 
following section the results from applying the Eclat algorithm to the three reduced datasets and their 
respective full datasets. 
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Figure 5.0.35, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Apriori algorithm process RD3 and FD3. The 
process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the 
outliers had been removed. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.36, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Apriori algorithm process RD3 and FD3. The 
process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after 
the outliers had been removed. 
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5.2.2 Eclat algorithm 
Eclat is an association rule mining algorithm similar to the Apriori algorithm. The Eclat algorithm 
focuses on the frequency of objects occurring within a given dataset, by utilising a depth-first search. 
The algorithm is typically efficient at processing a given dataset compared to the Apriori algorithm. 
The R package arules implementation of the Eclat algorithm was used for this study. The support 
parameters used for the Apriori algorithm presented in Table 5.7 are also used for the application of 
Eclat algorithm. As the Eclat algorithm extracts item sets are based on the support parameter, before 
formulating the rule sets.  
 
With the Eclat algorithm, frequent objects are extracted before the rules are formulated. The extracted 
rules have been used to determine whether additional patterns had been extracted from the rule sets for 
reduced datasets and their respective full datasets (responding to H2). The precision of the extracted 
rule sets are evaluated using the top 50 formulated rules based on the support value, by comparing the 
distribution of the rule sets (responding to H4). The efficiency of the Eclat algorithm to process the 
datasets are measured by iterating the process 100 and 1,000 times (responding to H6). Thereafter, the 
outliners had been removed to identify the mean processing time for the Eclat algorithm to process the 
reduced datasets and their respective full datasets. 
 
5.2.2.1 Eclat algorithm applied to Datasets One 
In this section, the results of applying the Eclat algorithm to RD1 and FD1 are presented. Datasets one 
had a total of 1,128 recorded sessions of adversary interactions recorded. The pre-processing phase in 
Section 4.2.1 of dataset one showed FD1 had a total of 2,960 unique commands. While the clustering 
process resulted in RD1 containing a total of 406 unique commands. The initial assessment for datasets 
two suggests the minimum support value should be set to 0.05 as stated in Table 5.7. Unlike the Apriori 
algorithm, where the rules extracted from a dataset before removing the duplicate rules from the rule 
set. The Eclat algorithm extracts item sets, these are sets of frequent items within the given dataset 
before the rule sets are formulated then the duplicate rules are removed. 
 
The Eclat algorithm extracted 259 item sets from FD1 and formulating 977 rules as seen in Table 5.14 
(responding H2). Item sets are extracted are frequent command sets occurring within the given dataset.  
The rules are formulated based on the extracted item sets before the duplicate rules are removed. As 
shown in Table 5.14, a total of 59,201 item sets had been extracted from RD1 and 446,465 rules had 
been formulated. Upon removing the duplicated rules, 64 unique rules remain for FD1 and 1,441 unique 
rules remain for RD1 (responding to H2). The unique rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm are less 
than those extracted by the Apriori algorithm, as shown in Table 5.8. The support, confidence and lift 
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of the unique rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to FD3 in Figure 5.37 and RD3 in Figure 
5.38. 
 
Table 5.14, Shows the total number of rules extracted, number of unique rules after removing the duplicate 
rules and the percentage of duplicate rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to RD and FD1. 
Eclat algorithm FD1  RD1  
Total number of item sets extracted  259 59,201 
Number rules formulated 977 446,465 
Number of unique rules after removing the duplicated rules  64 1,441 
 
Figure 5.37 shows the scatter plot of the unique rules by the Eclat algorithm on FD1, a total of 64 rules 
are depicted. The support and associated confidence and lift of the extracted rules are displayed in 
Figure 5.37. Predominantly the rules have a low support around 0.07 but these rules have a confidence 
value ranging between 0.97 and 1. The lift values vary, with a cluster of rules with a low support value 
and greater confidence value, having an associated increased lift value. The increase in the lift value 
signifies the commands in the extracted rules are likely to be independent. Figure 5.38 shows the 1,441 
unique rules extracted from the Eclat algorithm applied to RD1. There is a cluster of rules with a support 
rate between 0.06 and 0.1 with the greater confidence value between 0.8 and 1. Figure 5.38 shows the 
increase in the number of unique rules extracted between RD1 and FD1. The mean support value was 
0.072 for Figure 5.37 and 0.992 as the mean confidence value. Figure 5.38 has a lower mean support 
value of 0.070 compared to Figure 5.37 as well as a lower mean confidence value of 0.953. However, 
the mean lift value of the formulated rules for FD1 was 11.451 while the mean lift value for RD1 was 
9.802. In order the evaluate the precision of the rules extracted, the top 50 support based rules are 
evaluated in the following sections.  
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Figure 5.0.37, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Eclat algorithm from FD1. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.38, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Eclat algorithm from RD1. 
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The precision of the unique extracted rules is evaluated using the top 50 support based rules. Figure 
5.39 shows the top 50 support based rules for FD1, the support of the rule sets is predominantly low at 
0.07, while the confidence values ranging from 0.96 to 1. There is a single data point that had a support 
value exceeding 0.13. On the other hand, Figure 5.40 shows the top 50 support based rules of RD1. The 
support values predominantly range between 0.1 and 0.14 and the confidence value ranges between 
0.85 and 1. Figure 5.39 shows the rules are scattered compared to that of Figure 5.40. The distribution 
of the top 50 unique support based rule sets are presented in Table 5.15, that shows the minimum, first 
quartile, medium, mean, third quartile and maximum value for the support, confidence and lift 
parameters. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.39, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based rule set 
extracted by the Eclat algorithm from FD1. 
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Figure 5.0.40, Illustrates a scatter plot of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from RD1. 
 
The distribution of the top 50 support based rules formulated using the Eclat algorithm applied to RD1 
and FD1 are presented in Table 5.15 (responding H4). The support distribution of RD1 is greater than 
the support distribution for FD1. The mean support value for RD1 is 0.070 while the mean support 
value for FD1 was greater at 0.072. The support values represent the applicability of the unique rule 
sets to the given dataset. The maximum support value was the only value greater for RD1 at 0.180 
compared to FD1 at 0.137. The mean confidence value of 0.953 was recorded for RD1 and is lower 
compared to the mean confidence value of 0.992 recorded for FD1. The confidence value for a rule 
suggests the commands in the rule set are likely to appear together within the given dataset. As for the 
lift values seen in Table 5.15, the RD1 has a greater distributed value compared to the lift distribution 
of FD1. However, the mean lift value for FD1 was greater at 11.451 compared to the mean lift value of 
9.802 for RD1. A lower lift value suggests the commands in the rule sets are dependent on each other. 
A visual representation of the top 50 support based rules are presented in Figure 5.41 for FD1 and 
Figure 5.42 illustrates the top 50 support based for RD1.  
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Table 5.15, Shows the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 support based rules 
extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to RD1 and FD1. 
Eclat algorithm applied to the 
first datasets 
Support Confidence Lift 
Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Minimum 0.069 0.051 0.909 0.802 3.469 3.165 
First quartile 0.069 0.064 0.987 0.923 7.277 7.185 
Medium 0.069 0.067 1.000 0.973 14.100 10.071 
Mean 0.072 0.070 0.992 0.953 11.451 9.802 
Third quartile 0.069 0.069 1.000 1.000 14.278 12.357 
Maximum 0.137 0.180 1.000 1.000 14.462 15.841 
 
Figure 5.41 is a visual representation of the top 50 support base rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm 
from full data one. The confidence of the rule sets is represented by the arrows connecting the nodes 
and commands together. The support values are represented by the size of the nodes, the large the node 
the greater the support value, while the lift is presented by the colour of the node the darker the shade 
the greater the associated lift. The rules in Figure 5.41 are organised into a single cluster. There are four 
key interconnected commands, in eight different key placements. While as seen in Figure 5.42 there 
three clusters of rules, with 10 key interconnected commands, in 16 different key placements.  
 
 
Figure 5.0.41, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from FD1. 
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Figure 5.0.42, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from RD1. 
 
The efficiency of the Eclat algorithm to process RD1 and FD1 is assessed by iterating the Eclat process 
100 and 1,000 times (responding to H6). Figure 5.43 illustrates the processing time in seconds (s) for 
the Eclat algorithm to process RD1 and FD1 iterated 100 times. While Figure 5.44 shows the processing 
time in seconds (s) for the Eclat algorithm to process the RD1 and FD1 iterated 1,000 times. The black 
lines seen in Figure 5.43 and Figure 5.44 represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the 
outliers had been removed.  
 
In contrast to Figure 5.19 that shows the efficiency of the Apriori algorithm applied to RD1 and FD1, 
Figure 5.43 shows the Eclat algorithm is efficient at processing FD1 compared to RD1. The greatest 
recorded processing time for FD1 was 0.235s while 5.342s was greatest recorded processing time for 
RD1. Additionally, the lowest recorded processing time for FD1 was 0.191s and 4.384s for RD1. The 
mean processing time of 0.207s was calculated for FD1 was calculated after a single outlier was 
removed. Whereas, three outliers had been removed from RD1 before a mean processing time of 4.946s 
was calculated. The increased processing time can be attributed to the additional item sets extracted, 
rules formulated along with the duplicated rules removed from RD1. Similar observations are seen in 
Figure 5.44.  
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Figure 5.0.43, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Eclat algorithm process RD1 and FD1. The 
process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the 
outliers had been removed. 
 
Figure 5.44 illustrates, the processing time in seconds(s) for the Eclat algorithm to process RD1 and 
FD1 iterated 1,000 times. As seen in Figure 5.44, the Eclat algorithm is efficient at processing FD1 
compared to RD1. The greatest recorded processing time for FD1 was 0.437s while RD1 recorded 
5.934s as the greatest recorded processing time. The lowest recorded processing time for FD1 was 
0.185s and 4.279s for RD1. A total of 36 outliers had been removed from FD1, resulting in a mean 
processing time of 0.205s. In addition, a total of 57 outliers had been removed from RD1, resulting in 
a mean processing time of 4.921s. Inferring, the Eclat algorithm is efficient at processing FD1 compared 
to RD1. The aggregated results are presented in Section 5.3 along with the corresponding hypotheses 
tested. In the following section the results from applying the Eclat algorithm to RD2 and FD2. 
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Figure 5.0.44, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Eclat algorithm process RD1 and FD1. The 
process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after 
the outliers had been removed. 
 
5.2.2.2 Eclat algorithm applied to Datasets Two 
In this section, the results from the application of the Eclat algorithm to the RD2 and FD2 is presented 
below. The preliminary analysis of datasets two showed evidence of a script being utilised to interact 
with the Cowrie SSH honeypot. Although there was a reduction of 36.45% in the number of unique 
commands between RD2 and FD2. The initial assessment for datasets two suggests the minimum 
support value should be set to 0.9 as stated in Table 5.7. Unlike the Apriori algorithm, where the rules 
extracted from a dataset before removing the duplicate rules from the rule set. The Eclat algorithm 
extracts item sets, these are sets of frequent items within the given dataset before the rule sets are 
formulated then the duplicate rules are removed.  
 
Table 5.16 presents the outcomes of the application of the Eclat algorithm to RD2 and FD2 (responding 
to H2). A total of 58,650 item sets had been extracted from the RD2 and FD2, formulating 445,168 
rules. A total of 240 rules remained after the duplicate rules had been removed. The number of rules 
formulated and duplicated rules removed by the application of the Eclat algorithm are the same as the 
total number of rules extracted by the Apriori algorithm as presented in Table 5.10. Figure 5.45 and 
Figure 5.46 represent the total number of formulated rules, along with the support, confidence and the 
associated lift values.  
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Table 5.16, Shows the total number of rules extracted, the number of unique rules after removing the duplicate 
rules and the percentage of duplicate rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to RD2 and FD2. 
Eclat algorithm FD2 RD2  
Total number of item sets extracted  58,650 58,650 
Number rules formulated 445,168 445,168 
Number of unique rules after removing the duplicated rules  240 240 
 
Figure 5.45 and Figure 5.46 show the 240 unique rules extracted from RD2 and FD2. There are three 
clusters of rules. One cluster of rules have a greater support and associated confidence value. While 
another cluster has a relatively low support and confidence values compared to the other rule clusters 
seen in Figure 5.45 and Figure 5.46. The remaining cluster has a relatively low support value but a 
greater confidence value. The mean support values are the same for both Figure 5.45 and Figure 5.46 
recorded at 0.936 as well as the mean confidence values recorded at 1. There is a low lift value for the 
clustered rules ranging from 0 to 1.068. The lift values can range from 0 to infinity, a low lift indicates 
the commands in the chain are dependent on one another. The mean lift values for both Figures are 
1.068. These observations are the same as the observations made in Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22 that 
show the application of the Apriori algorithm on RD2 and FD2. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.45, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Eclat algorithm from FD2. 
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Figure 5.0.46, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Eclat algorithm from RD2. 
 
The precision of the mined rules are based on the top 50 support based rules, since the support value is 
the primary parameter used to extract the item sets utilised by the Eclat algorithm (responding to H4). 
Additionally, the support parameter was chosen as the value indicates the applicability of the rule in the 
given dataset, as well as the support value being used to extract the top 50 rules with the Apriori 
algorithm. Figure 5.47 shows the top 50 support based rules mined using the Eclat algorithm on FD1. 
Figure 5.48 illustrating the top 50 support based rules mining for using the Eclat algorithm on RD2. 
Both Figure 5.47 and Figure 5.48 are similar to the associated Figure 5.45 and Figure 5.46. displaying 
three clusters of rules. The distribution of the top 50 support based rules for RD2 and FD2 are presented 
in Table 5.17. 
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Figure 5.0.47, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based rule set 
extracted by the Eclat algorithm from FD2. 
 
  
Figure 5.0.48, Illustrates a scatter plot of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from RD2. 
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The similarities continue between RD2 and FD2 as seen in Table 5.17. The mean support value for both 
RD2 and FD2 is 0.936. Indicating the extracted top 50 support based rules are applicable to RD2 and 
FD2. There is a low distribution of the support value of the rules, ranging between 0.936 and 0.937. 
The mean confidence values remain at 1, as seen in Figure 5.47 and Figure 5.48. The distribution of the 
confidence values for both datasets are 0.001 between the minimum and maximum. The confidence 
value represents the probability of the commands within a rule set appearing together. While the mean 
lift values of 1.068 represent the dependency of the commands in the extracted rules. The outcomes 
seen in Table 5.17 are similar to those seen in Table 5.11. Figure 5.49 and Figure 5.50 are the visual 
representation of the top 50 support based rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm from RD2 and FD2.   
 
Table 5.17, Shows the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 support based rules 
extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to RD2 and FD2. 
Eclat algorithm applied to the 
second datasets 
Support Confidence Lift 
Full Reduced  Full Reduced  Full Reduced  
Minimum 0.936 0.936 0.999 0.999 1.067 1.067 
First quartile 0.936 0.936 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
Medium 0.936 0.936 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
Mean 0.936 0.936 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
Third quartile 0.936 0.936 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
Maximum 0.937 0.937 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.068 
 
A visual representation of the top 50 support based rules is presented in Figure 5.49 for FD2 and Figure 
5.50 for RD2. Both figures depict the same rule set but are represented in an in different orientations. 
The arrows connecting the nodes and commands represent the confidence of the rule sets, with the size 
of the node denoting the support for each rule. The greater the support value on the scale between 0.936 
and 0.937 the larger the node. While the lift values of the rules are shown by the shade of the nodes, the 
darker the node the greater the lift value on a scale of 1.067 to 1.068. As seen in Figure 5.49 and Figure 
5.50 there are two nodes that have a greater support value of 0.937, and a lower lift value of the rules 
at 1.067. There are 14 key interconnected commands in 16 different placement sequence forming the 
top 50 support based rules. Figures 5.49 and Figure 5.50 are equivalent to the Figures 5.25 and Figure 
5.26 from the application of the Apriori algorithm to RD2 and FD2. 
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Figure 5.0.49, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from FD2. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.50, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from RD2. 
134 
 
The efficiency of the Eclat algorithm to process RD2 and FD2 are presented in Figure 5.51 and Figure 
5.52. Figure 5.51 shows the processing time in seconds(s) for RD2 and FD2 iterated 100 times 
(responding to H6). The greatest processing time for FD2 was 4.269s while 4.315s was the greatest 
processing time for RD2. The lowest processing time for FD2 was 3.069s and the lowest processing 
time for RD2 was 3.043s. The black lines represent the mean values for both datasets after the outliers 
had been removed. No outliers had been removed for both datasets. The mean processing time in 
seconds(s) for FD2 was 3.464s and 3.692s was the mean processing time for RD2.  
 
 
Figure 5.0.51, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Eclat algorithm process RD2 and FD2. The 
process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the 
outliers had been removed. 
 
Figure 5.52, shows the efficiency of the Eclat algorithm processing RD2 and FD2 iterated 1,000 times 
(responding to H6). The greatest recorded processing time was 4.896s for FD2. The greatest reduced 
processing time for RD2 recorded 5.284s. The lowest recorded processing time for FD2 was 3.053s and 
3.017s for RD2. The data points for both datasets overlap, however predominantly the data points for 
FD2 are lower than 3.5s, while the data points for RD2 are greater than 4.0s. The mean processing time 
for FD2 in Figure 5.52 was 3.53s after one outlier was removed. While the mean processing time for 
RD2 was 3.635s after four outliers had been removed. The aggregated results are presented in Section 
5.3 along with the corresponding hypotheses tested. In the following section the results from applying 
the Eclat algorithm to RD3 and FD3.  
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Figure 5.0.52, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Eclat algorithm process RD2 and FD2. The process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent 
the mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed.
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5.2.2.3 Eclat algorithm applied to Datasets Three 
In this section, the results from the application of the Eclat algorithm on RD3 and FD3 are be presented. 
The pre-processing phase in Section 4.2.3 of dataset three showed FD3 had a total of 748 unique 
commands within a dataset of 318 sessions. While the clustering process resulted in RD3 containing a 
total of 338 unique commands within a dataset of 318 sessions. Table 5.18 presents the extracted item 
sets, the number of rules formulated and the number of unique rules after duplicated rules have been 
removed for t RD3 and FD3 (responding to H2). The support parameter for the Eclat algorithm was set 
at 0.01, as stated in Table 5.7.  
 
FD3 had 239 item sets extracted, while 285 item sets had been extracted from RD3, as seen in Table 
5.18. Item sets are extracted are frequent command sets occurring within the given dataset.  The rules 
are formulated based on the extracted item sets before the duplicate rules are removed. A total of 460 
rules had been formulated before 400 duplicated rules had been removed from FD3 compared to 125 
unique rules mined by the Apriori algorithm. The number of item sets extracted from the RD3 was 
greater than FD3 at 285. But 459 rules had been formulated from RD3 before 397 duplicated rules had 
been removed, leaving 62 unique rules as mentioned in Table 5.18. Compared to 170 unique rules 
mined by the Apriori algorithm. The support, confidence and lift values of the unique rules extracted 
by the Eclat algorithm applied to FD3 are presented in Figure 5.53 and for RD3 are presented in Figure 
5.54. 
 
Table 5.0.18, Shows the total number of rules extracted, number of unique rules after removing the duplicate 
rules and the percentage of duplicate rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to RD3 and FD3. 
Eclat algorithm FD3 RD3 
Total number of item sets extracted  239 285 
Number rules formulated 460 459 
Number of unique rules after removing the duplicated rules  60 62 
 
Figure 5.53 shows the 60 unique rules mined by the Eclat algorithm on FD3, while Figure 5.54 shows 
the 62 unique rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm from RD3. Both Figures are similar, with the 
support values of the mined rules between 0.01 and 0.1. Though, as seen in Figure 5.53, much of the 
rules depicted have a support value are between 0.01 and 0.02, it is reflected in the mean support value 
of 0.015. The mean support value for RD3 depicted in Figure 5.54 was also 0.015.  However, the 
associated confidence values for the mined rule sets are between 0.8 and 1, the mean confidence value 
for the rule set depicted in Figure 5.53 was 0.971. Although the mean confidence value of Figure 5.54 
was 0.933. The lift values for the rules range between 0 and 80. A lower lift value indicates the 
dependency of the commands within an extracted rule. The mean lift value for FD3 shown in Figure 
5.53 was 58.459 compared to the mean lift value for RD3 depicted in Figure 5.54 at 43.602. In the 
forthcoming section, the top 50 support based rules are extracted.  
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As presented in Table 5.18, a total of 60 unique rules had been extracted by the Eclat algorithm from 
FD3. Consequently, the top 50 unique support based rules are depicted in Figure 5.55 are similar to 
Figure 5.53. Furthermore, there had been 62 unique rules extracted from RD3 by the Eclat algorithm. 
Figure 5.56 of the top 50 unique support based rules for RD3 is similar to Figure 5.54 depicting the 
extracted 62 unique rules as seen in Table 5.18. The distribution of the rule sets depicted in Figure 5.55 
of FD3 and Figure 5.56 of RD3 are presented in Table 5.19. The distribution of the rule sets is used to 
evaluate the precision of the patterns in the extracted rule sets by the Eclat algorithm from the RD3 and 
FD3.  
 
 
Figure 5.0.53, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Eclat algorithm from FD3. 
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Figure 5.0.54, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the total rule set extracted by the 
Eclat algorithm from RD3. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.55, Illustrates a scatter plot of support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based rule set 
extracted by the Eclat algorithm from FD3. 
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Figure 5.0.56, Illustrates a scatter plot of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from RD3. 
 
Table 5.19 presents the top 50 unique support based rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to 
RD3 and FD3 (responding to H4). As seen in Table 5.19, the distribution of the support value for the 
rule sets is the same for RD3 and FD3, with the mean support value recorded at 0.015. The mean support 
value in Table 5.19 was lower than the mean support value of 0.022 for FD3 and 0.023 for RD3 as 
presented in Table 5.13 for the Apriori algorithm. The distribution of the confidence values of the top 
50 support based rules is between the minimum of 0.8 and a maximum of 1, for RD3. The support value 
indicates the applicability of the mined rules to the given datasets. However, the confidence value 
distribution of FD3 rules presented in Table 5.19 ranged between 0.833 and 1. Furthermore, the mean 
confidence values are greater for FD3 at 0.981 compared to 0.949 for RD3, this was also observed in 
Figure 5.53 and Figure 5.54 depicting the total extracted unique rule sets. The confidence of a rule 
indicates the probability of a command occurring based on the presence of a given command in the 
sequence. Yet the mean lift value for RD3 was 50.870 compared 63.530 for FD3. A visual 
representation of the top 50 unique support based rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to RD3 
and FD3 are presented in Figure 5.57 and Figure 5.58 respectively.  
  
140 
 
 
Table 5.19, Shows the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 support based rules 
extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to RD3 and FD3. 
Eclat algorithm applied to the 
third datasets 
Support Confidence Lift 
Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Minimum 0.013 0.013 0.833 0.800 2.120 2.120 
1st quartile 0.013 0.013 1.000 0.862 79.500 34.310 
Medium 0.013 0.013 1.000 1.000 79.500 58.300 
Mean 0.015 0.015 0.981 0.949 63.530 50.870 
3rd quartile 0.013 0.013 1.000 1.000 79.500 79.500 
Maximum 0.097 0.097 1.000 1.000 79.500 79.500 
 
Figure 5.57, is a visual depiction of the top 50 unique support based rules extracted by the Eclat 
algorithm applied to the full dataset. The confidence values of the rules are represented by the arrows 
connecting the commands and nodes together. While the size of the nodes represents the support value 
of the rules, ranging between 0.013 and 0.097. As seen in Figure 5.57 there is a single large node 
denoting the maximum support of 0.098 seen in Table 5.19. The lift values of the rules are represented 
through the colour of the nodes, nodes with a greater lift are illustrated in a darker shade. From Figure 
5.57, each rule cluster has a varying associated lift value. The lift values range from 2.12 and 79.5. The 
largest cluster of rules has the greater associated lift value. Figure 5.58 visually depicts the top 50 unique 
support based rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to the RD3. As seen in Figure 5.57, there 
is a single larger node representing the maximum support value of 0.098 seen in Table 5.19. There are 
four clusters of rules that form the top 50 rule set. Unlike Figure 5.57 the largest cluster of rules in 
Figure 5.58 has nodes with varying lift values, between 2.12 and 79.5. There is a total of 16 
interconnected commands that form the top 50 rule set depicted in Figure 5.57, in 20 different sequence 
placements. Yet depicted in Figure 5.58, there are a total of 17 interconnected commands in 22 varying 
placements in a sequence. 
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Figure 5.0.57, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from FD3. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.58, is a visual representation of the support, confidence and lift values of the top 50 support based 
rule set extracted by the Eclat algorithm from RD3. 
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Figure 5.59 displays the efficiency of the Eclat algorithm to process RD3 and FD3. The process was 
iterated 100 times, with the time in seconds(s) for the Eclat algorithm to process the datasets (responding 
to H6). The greatest recorded time was 0.444s for FD3 and 0.290s for RD3. The lowest recorded 
processing time for the full dataset was 0.175s with RD3 recording 0.207s. After removing three outliers 
from both datasets, the mean value for both datasets had been calculated and are illustrated by the black 
lines. The mean processing time for FD3 was 0.209s while the mean processing time for RD3 was 
0.230s. 
 
 
Figure 5.0.59, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Eclat algorithm process RD3 and FD3. The 
process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after the 
outliers had been removed. 
 
Figure 5.60 shows the processing time of the Eclat algorithm applied to RD3 and FD3 iterated 1,000 
times (responding to H6). The greatest recorded processing time was 0.449s for FD3 and 0.473s for 
RD3. The lowest processing time for the full dataset was 0.174s with RD3 recorded at 0.205s. After 
removing 13 outliers from FD3 and 30 from RD3, the mean for both datasets had been calculated and 
are illustrated by the black lines. The mean processing time for FD3 was 0.206s while the mean 
processing time for RD3 was 0.231s. The aggregated results are presented in Section 5.3 along with the 
corresponding hypotheses tested 
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Figure 5.0.60, Illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) of the Eclat algorithm process RD3 and FD3. The 
process was iterated 1,000 times, with the black lines represent the mean processing time for the datasets after 
the outliers had been removed. 
 
5.3 Aggregation of Results 
Upon completing the experiments, the results are aggregated according to the hypotheses they answer. 
Analysis of the results is conducted within the Discussion Chapter 6. The chosen machine learning 
algorithms are the Naïve Bayes, Markov chain, Apriori and the Eclat algorithms. The results from 
applying machine learning algorithms to the reduced datasets and their respective full datasets are 
presented in this section.  
 
The probabilistic classification algorithms chosen to be applied to the datasets are the Naïve Bayes and 
Markov chain algorithms. The association rule mining algorithms chosen are the Apriori and Eclat 
algorithms. The assessments had been based on whether additional patterns can be extracted from the 
reduced datasets and their respective full datasets. As well as evaluating whether the extracted patterns 
from the reduced datasets are more precise compared to those patterns extracted from their relevant full 
datasets. Along with assessing the efficiency of the algorithms to extract the patterns from the reduced 
datasets and their respective full datasets. The hypotheses and associated research questions are 
evaluated in the subsequent Discussion Chapter 6. The experimental results to test the six hypotheses 
of this study as outlined in Section 3.2 are elaborated below.  
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5.3.1 Hypothesis One  
H1: More class patterns can be extracted from the reduced sequence of commands datasets, compared 
to those extracted from their respective full datasets by the selected probabilistic classification 
algorithms.   
 
Hypothesis one (H1), states more class patterns can be extracted from the reduced datasets by the 
selected probabilistic classification algorithms compared to the number of class patterns extracted from 
their respective full datasets. To assess whether additional patterns can be extracted from the reduced 
datasets compared to their respective full datasets, the True Positive (TP) rate was compared. Since the 
Naïve Bayes algorithm identifies patterns within a given dataset based on the selected feature. Inferring 
true patterns are seen if the classification algorithm can predict instances within a given dataset, 
irrespective of whether the instances are correctly classified.  
 
Table 5.20, shows the TP rates obtained from applying the Naïve Bayes algorithms to the reduced 
datasets and their respective full datasets. As seen in Table 5.20, RD1 has a higher TP rate than FD1. 
While RD2 and RD3 have the same TP rate as their respective full datasets. Depending on the dataset 
presented it can be suggested additional patterns can be extracted by the Naïve Bayes algorithm from 
the reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets.  
 
Table 5.20, Shows the aggregated True Positive (TP) rate of the trained Naïve Bayes classifier applied to the 
test sets of the three reduced datasets and their respective full datasets, along with the difference between the 
rates. 
Naïve Bayes RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
TP Rate 77.027% 71.623% 99.505% 99.505% 11.111% 11.111% 
  
To assess whether additional patterns can be extracted from the reduced datasets compared to their 
respective full datasets by the Markov chain algorithm, the degree of freedom of the datasets are 
compared. A Markov chain algorithm determines the probability of the next state or command occurring 
with the probability values presented as a transition matrix. To evaluate if additional patterns can be 
extracted by the Markov chain algorithm the degree of freedom for the reduced datasets and their 
respective full datasets are compared. The degree of freedom is the number of independent values within 
a dataset before a subsequent value can be predicted.  
 
Table 5.21, Shows the degree of freedom values calculated for the three reduced datasets and their 
respective full datasets. Table 5.20 shows for both the full and reduced datasets two and three the TP 
rate is the same. In contrast, the results shown in Table 5.21 all three reduced datasets had a lower 
degree of freedom compared to their respective full datasets, suggesting additional patterns can be 
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extracted by the Markov chain algorithm from the reduced datasets compared to their respective full 
datasets. Resulting in the acceptance of hypothesis H1. 
 
Table 5.21, Shows the aggregated degree of freedom for reduced datasets and their respective full datasets 
calculated by the Markov chain algorithm. 
Markov chain RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
Degree of freedom 1.279e+14 1.419e+14 667,627,624 778,688,000 3.070e+14 1.943e+15 
 
5.3.2 Hypothesis Two 
H2: More patterns can be extracted from the rule sets of the reduced sequence of commands datasets, 
compared to those extracted from their respective full datasets by the selected association rule mining 
algorithms. 
 
Hypothesis two (H2) states more rule sets can be extracted from the reduced datasets by the selected 
association rule mining algorithms compared to the number of class patterns extracted from their 
respective full datasets. An association rule mining algorithm calculates the probability of a sequence 
of instances occurring based on the frequency they appear in the given dataset to formulate rules.  
 
To assess whether additional patterns can be extracted by the Apriori algorithm from the reduced 
datasets and their respective full datasets, the number of rules remaining once the redundant rules had 
been removed are compared. As the extracted rules are formulated based on patterns identified between 
the mined frequent items within the datasets. Table 5.22, Shows the number of rules remaining once 
the redundant rules had been removed from the reduced datasets and their respective full datasets by 
the Apriori algorithm. As seen in Table 5.22, the number of remaining rules for RD1 and RD3 are 
greater compared to the number of remaining rules for their respective full datasets. However, the 
number of the number of remaining rules for RD2 and FD2 is the same, as also seen with the Naïve 
Bayes algorithm.  
 
Table 5.22, Shows the aggregated unique rule sets for the reduced datasets and their respective full datasets 
after the duplicated rules had been removed by the Apriori algorithm 
Apriori RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
Number of unique rules after the 
duplicated rules had been removed 1,893 98 240 240 170 125 
 
To assess whether additional patterns can be extracted from the reduced datasets and their respective 
full datasets by the Eclat algorithm, the number of rules remaining once redundant rules had been 
removed is compared. As the extracted rules are formulated based on patterns identified between the 
frequent items within the datasets. The Eclat algorithm uses a depth-first search technique. Table 5.23 
presents the number of rules remaining once the redundant rules had been removed for the reduced 
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datasets and their respective full datasets by the Eclat algorithm. As seen in Table 5.23, RD1 and RD3 
have a greater number of rules remaining once the redundant rules had been removed compared to their 
respective full datasets. While RD2 and FD2 had the same number of rules remaining, as was also seen 
with the Naïve Bayes and Apriori algorithms. Resulting in the acceptance of hypothesis H2.  
 
Table 5.23, Shows the aggregated unique rule sets for the reduced datasets and their respective full datasets 
after the duplicated rules had been removed by the Eclat algorithm 
Eclat RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
Number of unique rules after the 
duplicated rules had been removed 1,441 64 240 240 62 60 
 
5.3.3 Hypothesis Three 
H3: The class patterns extracted by the probabilistic classification algorithms from the reduced 
sequence of commands datasets are more precise, compared to those extracted from their respective 
full datasets. 
 
Hypothesis three (H3) states the class patterns extracted by the probabilistic classification algorithms 
from the reduced datasets are more precise compared to those extracted from their respective full 
datasets. The precision of the class patterns extracted by the Naïve Bayes algorithm is assessed using a 
confusion matrix. The precision, accuracy, sensitivity, F1 score and error rate of the classified instances 
are used to evaluate the overall precision of the class pattern extracted by the algorithm. As outlined in 
Section 5.1.1 the training feature selected to train the classifier was the same for the reduced datasets 
and their respective full datasets.  
 
Table 5.24 shows the results for the precision, accuracy, sensitivity, F1 score and Error rate of the 
trained classifiers for each dataset. 
 
Table 5.24 shows the precision of the Naïve Bayes classifier for the reduced datasets and their respective 
full datasets. The precision is used to measure the correctness of the classification algorithm when 
classifying data. The results show FD1 has a greater precision rate compared to RD1, with a difference 
of 0.014 between the values. In contracts, RD3 has a greater precision rate compared to FD3, with a 
difference of 0.062 between the values. While the precision rate is the same for RD2 and FD2. 
 
The accuracy rate shown in Table 5.24 is used to measure the probability of the truly classified data. 
Unlike the precision rate, RD1 has a greater accuracy rate compared to FD1. However, the accuracy 
rate for the RD2 and RD3 are the same as their respective full datasets.  
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Sensitivity is also known as the recall (true positive rate), this is the number of objects correctly 
classified as positive. As seen in Table 5.24, FD1 has a greater sensitivity rate compared to RD1, with 
a difference of 0.032 between the values. Yet RD3 recorded a greater sensitivity rate compared to FD3. 
The sensitivity rates obtained for the RD2 and FD2 had been the same.  
 
Table 5.24 shows the F1 score used to measure the predictive probability of the classification produced 
by calculating a balanced mean between the precision and sensitivity. The F1 score for FD1 is greater 
compared to the F1 score obtained for RD1, with a difference of 0.028 between the values. Whereas 
the F1 score obtained for RD3 is greater compared to FD3. While the F1 score obtained for the RD2 
and FD2 are the same.  
 
The error rate measures the rate of incorrectly classified data, a lower error rate is desirable. Table 5.24, 
shows RD1 has a lower error rate compared to FD1. While the error rate for RD2 and RD3 are the same 
as their respective full datasets. 
 
Table 5.24, Shows the aggregated precision of the trained Naïve Bayes classifier applied to the three reduced 
datasets and their respective full datasets 
Naïve Bayes RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
Precision 0.646 0.660 0.998 0.998 0.161 0.099 
Accuracy 0.770 0.716 0.995 0.995 0.111 0.111 
Sensitivity (Recall) 0.429 0.461 0.667 0.667 0.119 0.087 
F1 Score 0.515 0.543 0.799 0.799 0.137 0.092 
Error Rate 0.230 0.284 0.005 0.005 0.889 0.889 
 
A Markov chain algorithm determines the probability of the next state or command occurring and is 
presented as a transition matrix. To assess whether class patterns extracted by the Markov chain 
algorithm are more precise from the reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets, the 
mean and standard deviation values of the standard error matrices, lower endpoint matrices and upper 
endpoint matrices are compared, as shown in Table 5.25.  
 
The mean value indicates the average value of a set of variables, with the standard deviation signifying 
the spread of the values from the mean. For this study, a lower standard deviation is desirable, as it 
denotes the values within the dataset are closer to the mean inferring the dataset has a low probability 
distribution rate. The standard error matrix shows the error rate of the state transitions in the transition 
matrix. The lower endpoint matrix is the lower limit and the upper endpoint matrix is the upper limit of 
the confidence interval (set at 0.95) for the transition matrix generated by the Markov chain algorithm. 
The difference between the mean value for the upper limit and lower limit signifies the range where 
95% of the calculated probabilities are true and should not be rejected. 
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As shown in Table 5.25 the values are the mean standard error rate for the transition matrix, a lower 
mean is desirable. All reduced datasets have a lower mean value compared to their respective full 
datasets. The greatest difference between the mean values for the datasets is between RD1 and FD1, 
followed by RD3 and FD3. The lower mean standard error rate value recorded for the reduced datasets 
suggest the error rate for the associated transition matrices are lower compared to those for their full 
datasets.  
 
Table 5.25 shows the difference between the mean upper endpoint matrix and lower endpoint matrix 
for the three full datasets and their associated reduced datasets, as presented in Section 5.1.2. As seen 
in Table 5.25, RD1 and RD3 have a higher variance between the respective mean upper endpoint matrix 
and lower endpoint matrix, compared to their respective full datasets. Indicating the range where 95% 
of the calculated probabilities are true and should not be rejected. However, FD2 has a higher variance 
between the mean upper endpoint matrix and lower endpoint matrix, compared to RD2.  
 
The standard deviation represents the spread of the data from the mean value. Table 5.25 presents the 
standard deviation values for the standard error matrix for the RD3 and FD3. All three reduced datasets 
have a lower standard deviation value for the standard error matrices compared to their respective full 
datasets. For this study, a lower standard deviation is desirable, as it denotes the values within the set 
are closer to the mean and the dataset has a low probability distribution. 
 
Table 5.25, shows the standard deviation values of the lower endpoint matrices of the transition matrix 
for the three reduced datasets and their respective full datasets. The standard deviation values for RD1 
and RD2 are greater compared to those for their respective full datasets. Indicating the lower limit 
matrices are spread further from the mean compared to their respective full datasets. Whereas, Table 
5.25 indicates the lower limit matrix for FD3 is spread further from the mean compared to RD3.  
 
Table 5.25 shows the standard deviation values for the upper endpoint matrices are lower for the 
reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets. Indicating the spread of the upper limits of 
the transition matrix are closer to the mean values for the reduced datasets compare to those of their 
respective full datasets. The results from Table 5.25 indicate the reduced datasets are closer to the mean 
confidence interval of the transition matrices and have a low probability distribution compared to their 
respective full datasets. Resulting in the acceptance of hypothesis H3. 
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Table 5.25, Shows the mean and standard deviation values for the standard error matrix, lower endpoint matrix 
and upper endpoint matrix of the transition matrices generated by the Markov chain algorithm for the three 
reduced datasets and their respective full datasets. 
Markov chain RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
Standard Error matrix Mean 20.736 181.758 6.429 6.653 36.778 77.831 Standard Deviation 1.257 2.026 0.548 0.726 1.863 2.626 
Lower endpoint matrix Mean 20.130 181.072 6.355 6.156 36.024 77.009 Standard Deviation 0.415 0.338 0.421 0.351 0.110 0.112 
Upper endpoint matrix Mean 21.448 182.060 7.045 7.123 37.299 78.108 Standard Deviation 2.455 3.014 0.714 0.840 3.010 3.652 
Range were 95% of 
calculated probabilities 
are true 
Spread of the upper 
and lower endpoint 
matrix 
2.040 2.676 0.293 0.489 2.900 3.540 
 
5.3.4 Hypothesis Four 
H4: The patterns extracted from the rule sets by the association rule mining algorithms from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets are more precise, compared to those rule sets extracted from 
their respective full datasets. 
 
Hypothesis four (H4) states the rule sets extracted by the association rule mining algorithms are more 
precise from the reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets. An association rule mining 
algorithm calculates the probability of a sequence of instances occurring based on the frequency they 
appear in the given dataset. The extracted sequences of objects and the probability of the occurrence 
are formulated into rules. Each rule has three values of interest used to determine the probability of the 
extracted rule occurring, the values are support, confidence and lift. The support value determines the 
probability of a rule occurring in the given dataset. The confidence value measures the probability of 
observing an object within a sequence, based on the presence of an initial object/s. The lift value given 
to a rule measures the relationship between the objects within a sequence. A lower lift value is desirable 
as it signifies the objects within a sequence are dependent and a pattern can be extracted. 
 
To evaluate the precision of the extracted rules by the algorithms, the top 50 support based rules had 
been assessed. The support value was selected, as the value represents the applicability of the rule 
occurring in the given dataset. The distribution of the top 50 rules extracted by the Apriori algorithm is 
presented in Table 5.26. Followed by the distribution of the top 50 rules extracted by the Eclat algorithm 
is presented in Table 5.27.  
 
Table 5.26 shows RD1 has an overall greater support distribution and mean support value than FD1. 
While FD1 has a greater confidence distribution values for the, first quartile, medium and third quartile 
compared to RD1. Whereas, RD1 has a greater confidence distribution for the minimum and mean 
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values compared to FD1. Table 5.26 shows RD1 has the desirable lower lift distribution compared to 
FD1.  
 
As seen in Table 5.26 the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 rules are 
the same for RD2 and FD2. 
 
Table 5.26 shows RD3 has a greater medium, mean and maximum support values compared to the 
values for FD3, while the remaining support distribution values are the same for both datasets. The 
confidence distribution of the medium, mean and third quartile values are greater for RD3 compared to 
FD3. The mean, third quartile and maximum lift distribution values are greater for RD3 compared to 
FD3, while the minimum, first quartile and medium values are the same for both datasets.  
 
Table 5.26, Shows the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 support based rules 
extracted by the Apriori algorithm applied to the three reduced datasets and the respective full datasets. 
Apriori RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
Support 
 
Minimum 0.099 0.069 0.936 0.936 0.015 0.015 
First quartile 0.110 0.069 0.936 0.936 0.015 0.015 
Medium 0.115 0.070 0.936 0.936 0.019 0.015 
Mean 0.124 0.077 0.936 0.936 0.023 0.022 
Third quartile 0.136 0.071 0.936 0.936 0.022 0.022 
Maximum 0.180 0.137 0.937 0.937 0.097 0.097 
Confidence 
Minimum 0.492 0.263 0.999 0.999 0.040 0.040 
First quartile 0.699 0.711 1.000 1.000 0.056 0.056 
Medium 0.914 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.531 0.414 
Mean 0.846 0.844 1.000 1.000 0.454 0.440 
Third quartile 0.987 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.770 0.762 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Lift 
Minimum 3.301 3.469 1.067 1.067 1.048 1.048 
First quartile 3.704 3.748 1.068 1.068 1.590 1.590 
Medium 5.303 7.277 1.068 1.068 2.126 2.126 
Mean 5.515 7.848 1.068 1.068 5.499 5.679 
Third quartile 7.184 9.322 1.068 1.068 2.544 4.533 
Maximum 9.322 14.462 1.068 1.068 39.750 63.600 
 
Similar to the Apriori algorithm the precision of the Eclat algorithm is measured based on the extracted 
top 50 rules. The distribution of the support, confidence and lift values of the rules are presented in 
Table 5.27. 
 
Table 5.27 shows the support distributions values for RD1 are greater for the third quartile and 
maximum values compared to FD1. The minimum, first quartile, medium and mean confidence 
distribution values are greater for FD1 compared to RD1. The distribution of lift values for RD1 are 
desirably lower than for FD1.  
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Similar to Table 5.26, the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 rules 
extracted by the Eclat algorithm are the same for RD2 and FD2 as seen in Table 5.27.  
 
Table 5.27, shows the distribution of the support values for the extracted Eclat rules are the same for 
the RD3 and FD3. While FD3 has a greater minimum, first quartile and mean confidence distribution 
values compared to RD3. Yet the lift distribution values for FD3 are greater for the first quartile, 
medium and mean values compared to RD3. Resulting in the acceptance of hypothesis H4. 
 
Table 5.27, Shows the distribution of the support, confidence and lift values for the top 50 support based rules 
extracted by the Eclat algorithm applied to the three reduced datasets and the respective full datasets. 
Eclat RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
Support 
 
Minimum 0.051 0.069 0.936 0.936 0.013 0.013 
First quartile 0.064 0.069 0.936 0.936 0.013 0.013 
Medium 0.067 0.069 0.936 0.936 0.013 0.013 
Mean 0.070 0.072 0.936 0.936 0.015 0.015 
Third quartile 0.069 0.069 0.936 0.936 0.013 0.013 
Maximum 0.180 0.137 0.937 0.937 0.097 0.097 
Confidence 
Minimum 0.802 0.909 0.999 0.999 0.800 0.833 
First quartile 0.923 0.987 1.000 1.000 0.862 1.000 
Medium 0.973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Mean 0.953 0.992 1.000 1.000 0.949 0.981 
Third quartile 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Lift 
Minimum 3.165 3.469 1.067 1.067 2.120 2.120 
First quartile 7.185 7.277 1.068 1.068 34.310 79.500 
Medium 10.071 14.100 1.068 1.068 58.300 79.500 
Mean 9.802 11.451 1.068 1.068 50.870 63.530 
Third quartile 12.357 14.278 1.068 1.068 79.500 79.500 
Maximum 15.841 14.462 1.068 1.068 79.500 79.500 
 
5.3.5 Hypothesis Five 
H5: The probabilistic classification algorithms are more efficient at extracting patterns from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets, compared to their respective full datasets. 
 
Hypothesis H5 states the probabilistic classification algorithms are more efficient at extracting patterns 
from the reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets. The processing time in seconds(s) 
for the Naïve Bayes algorithms to train and test the classifier for each dataset was iterated 100 and 1,000 
times, to ascertain a precise efficiency measurement allowing a comparison to be formulated. Table 
5.28, shows the mean processing time for the Naïve Bayes algorithms to process the reduced datasets 
and their respective full datasets, iterated 100 times (Test 1) and 1,000 times (Test 2).  
 
Table 5.28 shows the Naïve Bayes algorithms were more efficient at processing RD1 and RD3 
compared their respective full datasets in both Test 1 and Test 2. However, results show the Naïve Bayes 
algorithms was 2.241% more efficient at processing RD2 in Test 1 and 0% more efficient in Test 2. 
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The mean processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the transition 
matrix for the datasets are also presented in Table 5.28. As seen in Table 5.28, the Markov chain 
algorithms are efficient at processing the reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets in 
both Test 1 and Test 2. It was observed the Markov chain algorithm was 97.713% more efficient at 
processing RD1 compared to respective FD1 in Test 1 and 97.711% more efficient in Test 2. This was 
the greatest improvement in the efficiency among all the tests shown in Table 5.28. Resulting in the 
acceptance of hypothesis H5. 
 
5.3.6 Hypothesis Six 
H6: The association rule mining algorithms are more efficient at extracting patterns from the rule set 
for the reduced sequence of commands datasets compared, to their respective full datasets. 
 
Hypothesis H6 states the association rule mining algorithms are more efficient at extracting patterns 
from the rule sets for the reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets. The processing 
time in seconds(s) for the association rule mining algorithms to extract rules from the reduced datasets 
and their respective full datasets had been iterated 100 time (Test 1) and 1,000 times (Test 2). In order 
to ascertain a precise efficiency measurement allowing a comparison to be formulated. The results are 
presented in Table 5.28.  
 
Table 5.28 shows the Apriori algorithm is more efficient at processing RD1 and RD2 compared to their 
respective full datasets. Whereas, the Apriori algorithm is more efficient at processing FD3 compared 
to RD3, with a difference between the mean values at 0.101s in Test 1 and of 0.107s in Test 2. 
 
Table 5.28, shows unlike the processing time for the Apriori algorithm, the Eclat algorithm was more 
efficient at processing the full datasets compared to their associated reduced datasets for both Test 1 
and Test 2. The greatest difference was between the processing time between FD3 and RD3, recording 
a difference 95.794% in Test 1 and 95.834% in Test 2 less efficient. 
 
Although the results suggest the Apriori algorithm is more efficient at extracting patterns from the 
reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets, the same cannot be said of the Eclat 
algorithm. Resulting in the rejection of hypothesis H6. 
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Table 5.28, Shows the mean processing time in seconds(s) for the Naïve Bayes, Markov chain, Apriori and Eclat 
algorithms to process reduced datasets and their respective full datasets iterated 100 times (Test 1) and 1,000 
times (Test 2) 
Algorithms RD1 FD1 RD2 FD2 RD3 FD3 
Naïve Bayes Test 1 1.804s 2.103s 0.365s 0.357s 0.670s 0.719s Test 2 1.805s 2.097s 0.337s 0.337s 0.673s 0.707s 
Markov chain Test 1 3.366s 147.179s 0.432s 0.533s 0.616s 2.575s Test 2 3.370s 147.200s 0.433s 0.525s 0.433s 2.510s 
Apriori Test 1 0.058s 0.183s 3.798s 4.872s 0.589s 0.488s Test 2 0.058s 0.184s 3.786s 4.924s 0.597s 0.490s 
Eclat Test 1 3.692s 3.464s 0.230s  0.209s 4.946s 0.207s Test 2 3.635s 3.530s 0.231s 0.206s 4.921s 0.205s 
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6 Discussion and Findings 
6.1 Outcomes of Research Questions 
In this section, the results obtained from this study are discussed, with a summary of the results 
presented in Table 6.1. The research questions and the associated hypotheses tested to address these 
questions are also presented. Along with whether the results support the rejection or acceptance of the 
hypotheses. 
	
6.1.1 RQ1:  Is there an increase in the number of patterns extracted from the 
reduced datasets by the machine learning algorithms, compared to the number 
of patterns extracted from their respective full datasets? 
Appropriately pre-processing a dataset can improve the selection of features from a dataset, thereby 
enhancing the performance of a machine learning algorithm (De la Hoz et al., 2015). The pre-processing 
procedure developed for this study included a data reduction step that clustered each command based 
on the function of that command. Hypothesis one (H1) and Hypothesis two (H2) had been formulated 
to answer research question one (RQ1), with the data supporting the acceptance of both the hypotheses 
for H1 and H2.  
 
The results from this study indicate the Naïve Bayes algorithm can be utilised to extract patterns from 
sequential adversarial Secure Shell (SSH) commands, as supported by the studies conducted by Abd-
Eldayem (2014) and Najafabadi et al. (2015). As further investigated in this study, the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm can extract additional patterns from a reduced dataset with the condition the datasets do not 
consist of predominantly duplicated or discrete sequences of commands. As the reduced datasets reflect 
the full datasets, any reoccurring sequences of commands result in a similar prior probability value, as 
the same commands appear within a sequence throughout both datasets. Datasets that consist 
predominantly of discrete sequences of commands affect the prior probability value, as there is a low 
possibility of the commands appearing together in the dataset. Therefore, the prior probability value is 
similar for both datasets. The findings from this study can be applied to other knowledge domains such 
as malicious software detection.  
	
The results from this study and along with the studies conducted by Caselli et al. (2015) and Hofstede 
et al. (2014) have provided evidence that the Markov Chain algorithm can be used to extract patterns 
from adversarial activities. The findings from this study show the Markov Chain algorithm was the best 
performing algorithm for extracting additional patterns from a reduced dataset. Unlike the other 
algorithms tested in this study, the Markov Chain algorithm could extract more patterns from a dataset 
consisting predominantly of duplicated sequences of commands. This is likely due to a fewer number 
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of unique commands within the reduced dataset, resulting in the number of states in the transition matrix 
to be fewer compared to the transition matrix for the respective full dataset. The clustering technique 
applied to the reduced datasets grouped commands with similar functions together allowing for 
additional patterns to be extracted in the reduced datasets. From this result, this study has shown the 
Markov Chain algorithm can be used to extract more patterns from an appropriately reduced dataset. 
The findings from this study suggest the additional extracted patterns by the Markov Chain algorithm 
could be applied to a pattern-based intrusion detection approach to detect adversarial activities.   
 
The results presented in this study provide evidence that the Apriori and the Eclat algorithms can be 
used to extract patterns from sequential adversarial activities, supporting the findings from the studies 
conducted by Jin et al. (2017) and Khalili and Sami (2015). Unlike the Naïve Bayes algorithm, the 
findings show the Apriori and the Eclat algorithms can extract additional patterns from a reduced 
dataset, even when the dataset consists predominantly of discrete sequences of commands. This is likely 
due to the presence of fewer unique commands in the reduced datasets, as is similar in the Markov 
Chain algorithm. The clustering technique applied to the reduced datasets grouped together commands 
with similar functions, resulting in an increase in the frequency of the clustered commands appearing 
together in the dataset. However, the Apriori and Eclat algorithms had been affected by the dataset that 
consists predominantly of duplicated sequences of commands. This could be attributed to the method 
by which the association rule mining algorithms use to extract patterns from a dataset. As a repetitive 
sequence results in the same sequence of commands reoccurring throughout both the full and reduced 
datasets, the frequency of the commands appearing together is the same. The observations made suggest 
that the additional patterns extracted by the Apriori and the Eclat algorithms could be used for a pattern-
based intrusion detection approach.  
 
6.1.2 RQ2: Are the extracted patterns from the reduced datasets by the machine 
learning algorithms overall more precise, compared to those extracted from their 
relevant full datasets? 
An intrusion detection approach should be precise in detecting adversarial activities on a network  
(Masduki & Ramli, 2016). RQ2 was addressed through testing Hypothesis three (H3) and Hypothesis 
four (H4), the results support the acceptance of both the hypotheses for H3 and H4. 
 
Hybrid implementations of the Naïve Bayes algorithm to extract more precise patterns have already 
been investigated (Aziz et al., 2017; Kevric et al., 2017). However, this study provides evidence that an 
appropriately reduced dataset could also allow the Naïve Bayes algorithm to extract more precise 
patterns. The results from this study suggest even when the same number of patterns are extracted by 
the Naïve Bayes algorithm from a dataset that consists predominantly of discrete sequences of 
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commands, the patterns extracted from the reduced dataset are overall more precise. Whereas the results 
obtained also show the more patterns extracted may not infer the patterns are more precise. This could 
be attributed to the predictor value. The predictor value could be affected by the clustering of commands 
in the reduced dataset, as the possibility of the next command occurring in a sequence is increased. 
From this observation, it could be suggested the number of unique commands within a reduced dataset 
can impact the Naïve Bayes algorithm in extracting more precise patterns from a dataset. Even so, the 
results from this study provides evidence that the patterns extracted from the reduced datasets can be 
used to increase the precision of the Naïve Bayes algorithm to detect adversarial activities as a pattern-
based intrusion detection approach.  
 
The results from this study show the Markov Chain algorithm can precisely detect adversarial activities, 
this is supported by the study conducted by Tapaswi et al. (2014). As further investigated in this study, 
the Markov Chain algorithm was once again the best performing algorithm at extracting more precise 
patterns from the reduce datasets. Unlike the Naïve Bayes algorithm, the Markov Chain algorithm 
calculates the probability of the next state occurring based on the current state. As such the sequence of 
the commands occurring is not considered. This could be the reason for the results seen in this study, 
the patterns observed between the commands are more precise for the reduced dataset as there are fewer 
commands present. Allowing for the probability of the next command occurring to be more precise. 
The findings from this study suggest patterns extracted from an appropriately reduced dataset can be 
used to enhance an intrusion detection approach, to precisely detect adversarial activities.  
 
Studies have suggested the performance of an association rule mining algorithm can be enhanced 
through the application of fuzzy logic (Aburrous et al., 2010; Changguo et al., 2009). This study 
provides evidence that an appropriately pre-processed dataset can also enhance the performance of the 
Apriori and the Eclat algorithms. However, when both algorithms are presented with datasets that 
consist predominantly of duplicated sequences of commands, the precision of the extracted patterns are 
the same. This is likely due to the frequent appearance of the sequences of commands in both the 
reduced and full datasets. In addition, it was observed that the reduced datasets had limited impact on 
the enhancement of the Eclat algorithm. This can be attributed to the depth-first search technique 
utilised by the Eclat algorithm. As the possibility of each command occurring in a sequence is examined, 
the overall precision of the patterns extracted from both datasets is either the same or similar. Since the 
reduced datasets are evenly and coherently representations of their respective full dataset. Although 
both the Apriori and the Eclat algorithms can overall extract more precise patterns from a reduced 
dataset. The findings from this study suggest the patterns extracted by the Apriori algorithm from a 
reduced dataset could have a greater impact on the precision of a pattern-based intrusion detection 
approach.   
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6.1.3 RQ3: Are the machine learning algorithms more efficient at extracting 
patterns from the reduced datasets, compared to the processing time of their 
respective full datasets? 
Along with precisely detecting adversarial activities, an intrusion detection approach should be efficient 
at processing data, allowing for the timely detection of adversaries on a network (Masduki & Ramli, 
2016). RQ3 was addressed by testing Hypothesis five (H5) and Hypothesis six (H6). The data from this 
study supported the acceptance of the hypothesis for H5 and the rejection of the hypothesis for H6.  
 
The results from this study provide evidence that the Naïve Bayes algorithm is overall more efficient at 
processing the reduced datasets, suggesting the patterns extracted by the algorithm could timely detect 
adversarial activities. The findings from this study suggest the clustered commands represented in the 
reduced datasets allow for the Naïve Bayes algorithm to efficiently process the data compared to their 
respective full datasets. The reduced datasets are evenly and coherently representations of their 
respective full datasets and can be more efficiently processed by the Naïve Bayes algorithm. However, 
the Naïve Bayes algorithm was less efficient at processing the reduced dataset consisting of 
predominantly duplicated sequences of commands. Though the number and the precision of the 
extracted patterns had been the same for both the reduced and full datasets of this description. The 
reason for this occurrence is unknown since the Naïve Bayes algorithm was more efficient at processing 
the other reduced datasets. Further investigation is required to understand this outcome. 
 
Ali et al. (2018) had identified efficiently converging a transition matrix as a challenge within the area 
of Markov Chain algorithms. This study provides evidence that an appropriately reduced dataset can be 
utilised to improve the convergence time of a transition matrix. The results show as the reduced datasets 
contain fewer unique commands, the number of states within the transition matrix is reduced. Allowing 
for the transition matrix to converge quicker for the reduced datasets when compared to the full datasets. 
The findings from this study suggest a reduced dataset that is an evenly and coherently represents of 
the respective full dataset can decrease the time for a transition matrix to converge, allowing for patterns 
to be extracted more efficiently. This would allow for pattern-based intrusion detection approaches to 
detect adversarial activities more efficiently.   
 
The findings from this study suggest overall a reduced dataset could enhance the efficiency of the 
Apriori algorithm, allowing for adversarial activities to be detected in a timely manner. However, the 
results suggest the Apriori algorithm is less efficient at processing a reduced dataset that consists 
predominantly of discrete sequences of commands. This could be due to the less frequent appearance 
of sequences in the reduced dataset, resulting in an increase in the processing time of the Apriori 
algorithm. Although the results from the study show the Eclat algorithm is less efficient at processing 
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the appropriately reduced datasets compared to their respective full datasets. This can be attributed to 
the depth-first search technique utilised by the Eclat algorithm, the fewer commands present in a 
reduced dataset suggest the algorithm would have to traverse backwards more often compared to when 
processing a full dataset. The findings suggest a reduced dataset could enhance the efficiency of the 
Apriori algorithm to extract patterns as a pattern-based intrusion detection approach, allowing for 
adversaries to be detected within a timely manner.  
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Table 6.1, Shows a summary of the outcomes of the research questions. The research questions of this study along with the hypotheses and the associated rejected hypotheses 
are presented as well as whether the hypotheses had been rejected or accepted. 
Research Questions Hypotheses (H1) Rejected Hypotheses (H0) Results 
RQ1:  Is there an increase in the 
number of patterns extracted 
from the reduced datasets by the 
machine learning algorithms, 
compared to the number of 
patterns extracted from their 
respective full datasets? 
H11:  More class patterns can be extracted from 
the reduced sequence of commands datasets, 
compared to those extracted from their respective 
full datasets by the selected probabilistic 
classification algorithms.   
H10: More class patterns cannot be extracted 
from the reduced sequence of commands 
datasets, compared to those extracted from their 
respective full datasets by selected probabilistic 
classification algorithms 
The hypothesis is accepted 
H21:  More patterns can be extracted from the rule 
sets of the reduced sequence of commands 
datasets, compared to those extracted from their 
respective full datasets by the selected association 
rule mining algorithms. 
H20: More patterns cannot be extracted from the 
rule sets of the reduced sequence of commands 
datasets, compared to those extracted from their 
respective full datasets by selected association 
rule mining algorithms. 
The hypothesis is accepted 
RQ2: Are the extracted patterns 
from the reduced datasets by the 
machine learning algorithms 
overall more precise, compared 
to those extracted from their 
relevant full datasets? 
 
 
 
 
H31:  The class patterns extracted by the 
probabilistic classification algorithms from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets are more 
precise, compared to those extracted from their 
respective full datasets. 
H30: The class patterns extracted by the 
probabilistic classification algorithms from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets are less 
precise, compared to those extracted from their 
respective full datasets. 
The hypothesis is accepted 
H41:  The patterns extracted from the rule sets by 
the association rule mining algorithms from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets are more 
precise, compared to those rule sets extracted 
from their respective full datasets. 
H40: The patterns extracted from the rule sets by 
the association rule mining algorithms from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets are less 
precise, compared to those rule sets extracted 
from their respective full datasets. 
The hypothesis is accepted 
RQ3:  Are the machine learning 
algorithms more efficient at 
extracting patterns from the 
reduced datasets, compared to 
the processing time of their 
respective full datasets? 
 
 
 
H51: The probabilistic classification algorithms 
are more efficient at extracting patterns from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets, 
compared to their respective full datasets. 
H50: The probabilistic classification algorithms 
are less efficient at extracting patterns from the 
reduced sequence of commands datasets, 
compared to their respective full datasets. 
The hypothesis is accepted 
H61:  The association rule mining algorithms are 
more efficient at extracting patterns from the rule 
set for the reduced sequence of commands 
datasets, compared to their respective full 
datasets. 
H60: The association rule mining algorithms are 
less efficient at extracting patterns from the rule 
set for the reduced sequence of commands 
datasets, compared to their respective full 
datasets. 
The hypothesis is rejected 
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6.2 Implication of the Research 
In this section, the significant impacts the study has contributed to the knowledge domain are presented. 
 
6.2.1 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is the further examination of packet level data to gain a further insight 
into network traffic communications consequently, there are challenges associated with applying DPI 
for intrusion detection purposes. Pimenta Rodrigues et al. (2017), had identified two challenges these 
are, processing the increased volume of data needed for conducting DPI and the challenge of storing 
the increased volume of data.  
 
The findings from this study suggest a reduced dataset (evenly and coherently represents) of the 
respective full dataset could address the challenges of applying DPI for intrusion detection purposes. In 
addition, the reduced datasets lifted the processing burden of DPI. This study has shown that selected 
machine learning algorithms are more efficient at processing the reduced datasets than their associated 
full datasets, adding knowledge to the domain. In addition, a reduced dataset requires less storage space, 
addressing the challenge of storing data that occurs when dealing with the significant volumes of data 
traversing contemporary networks.  
 
Studies have been conducted on the use of adversarial based intrusion detection using DPI, however 
the studies predominantly focused on the use of a single action or command to determine an intrusion 
(Koch et al., 2014; Kudłacik et al., 2016; Moon et al., 2016; Tsai et al., 2017).  In addition to providing 
evidence that the patterns extracted from the reduced datasets by the selected machine learning 
algorithms can be more precise and more efficiently processed, this study has shown that patterns 
extracted from sequential adversarial SSH commands can also be used for intrusion detection purposes 
Thus, the study has contributed to the domain of utilising DPI data for pattern-based intrusion detection. 
 
6.2.2 Enhance Machine Learning for Pattern-Based Intrusion Detection  
The two main approaches to enhancing machine learning algorithms for intrusion detection purposes, 
improvement in the features selected or the development of a hybrid algorithm (Gauthama Raman et 
al., 2017). As such, this study was not concerned with implementing enhanced versions of the chosen 
machine learning algorithms but instead the focus was on improving the feature selection process 
through appropriately pre-processing the datasets. 
 
The pre-processing phase developed for the study had two main aims, standardising the format of 
datasets and generating a reduced dataset that is an evenly and coherently representation of the 
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respective full dataset. The results from this study showed that the pre-processing procedure developed 
can be used to enhance the performance of the selected machine learning algorithms to extract more 
precise patterns efficiently from a sequence of adversarial commands. this outcome contributes to the 
intrusion detection knowledge domain by suggesting an appropriately reduced dataset can be used to 
precisely detect adversarial activities efficiently, mitigating the exposure of assets on a network.  
 
Four machine learning algorithms had been selected to validate the pre-processing procedure developed 
for this study. This study has shown that the developed pre-processing procedure could be utilised to 
enhance the precision and efficiency of these machine learning algorithms to extract patterns. The 
contributions the study has made to the use of the selected machine learning algorithms for intrusion 
detection purposes are presented below.   
 
6.2.2.1 Impact of the Reduced Datasets on the Naïve Bayes algorithm  
The findings from this study show that an appropriately pre-processed reduced dataset can enhance the 
performance of the Naïve Bayes algorithm using DPI data. The contribution to the knowledge domain 
is that the Naïve Bayes algorithm can be negatively affected by datasets that consist predominantly of 
duplicated or discrete data. 
 
There are limited studies that have been conducted in improving the efficiency of the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm to classify data (Kevric et al., 2017). The results from this study provide evidence that an 
appropriately reduced dataset can be utilised to enable the Naïve Bayes algorithm to efficiently process 
data, thereby suggesting an approach to enhancing the precision and efficiency of the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm in the cyber security knowledge domain. This finding in particular could be applied to other 
knowledge domains such as malicious software detection. 
 
6.2.2.2 Impact of the Reduced Datasets on the Markov Chain algorithm 
The results show the Markov Chain algorithm was the best performing algorithm, at efficiently 
extracting more precise patterns from a reduced dataset compare to the respective full dataset. Studies 
within literature had identified efficiently converging a transition matrix as a challenge of the Markov 
Chain algorithm (Ali et al., 2018).  The findings from this study contribute to the knowledge domain 
by suggesting an appropriately pre-processed dataset can improve the convergence time of a transition 
matrix. Further, the results provide evidence that a possible method for enhancing the Markov Chain 
algorithm is through appropriately pre-processing a dataset, allowing for more precise patterns to be 
extracted efficiently. Lastly, the results presented here suggest that the Markov Chain algorithm could 
be used to determine a sequence of commands and can be applied to other cyber security knowledge 
domains such as Industrial Control Systems (ICSs). The protocols utilised by ICS devices to 
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communicate are also command based. The findings from this study could be applied to identifying 
malicious sequences of commands sent by compromised devices.  
 
6.2.2.3 Impact of the Reduced Datasets on the Apriori algorithm 
While the Apriori algorithm is commonly applied to packet level data, the findings from this study show 
the algorithm can be applied to DPI data as well. The results have shown that the Apriori algorithm is 
negatively affected by datasets that consist predominantly of duplicated data, as the same number of 
patterns had been extracted from the full and reduced datasets. However, the efficiency of the Apriori 
algorithm is affected by datasets that consist predominantly of discrete data, as the full dataset was more 
efficiently processed by the algorithm compared to the reduced dataset. The findings from this study 
contribute to the knowledge domain in applying the Apriori algorithm to DPI data for pattern-based 
intrusion detection purposes. The findings could also be applied to other cyber security strategies such 
as Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs), if a sequence of known malicious commands are seen by the 
IPS an adversary can be prevented from completing the launched attack.   
	
6.2.2.4 Impact of the Reduced Datasets on the Eclat algorithm 
The findings from this study show the Eclat algorithm can be utilised to extract patterns from sequential 
adversarial commands. However, datasets that predominantly consist of duplicated data negatively 
affect the Eclat algorithm in extracting more patterns. The findings show that while the Eclat algorithm 
can be used to extract more precise patterns from appropriately reduced datasets, it is less efficient at 
processing the appropriately reduced datasets. This study contributes to the use of the potential use of 
the Eclat algorithm in the cyber security domain since there are a lack of studies conducted, as argued 
in the literature review in section 2.3.1 
 
6.3 Critical Review of the Research Process  
This study has made many significant contributions to the domain of pattern-based intrusion detection 
through the utilisation of machine learning algorithms. If the opportunity was presented, there are 
aspects of this study that would be altered.  
The three distinct datasets acquired for this study had been collected from medium interaction 
honeypots. Although the data collected was real, adversary interactions over an extensive period of 
time, if given additional time, supplementary data could have been collected or acquired by the 
researcher. While this study provided evidence that patterns can be extracted from a sequence of 
adversary commands, with additional data formative proof could have been attained.  
Another decision made was the selection of the Eclat association rule mining algorithm along with the 
Apriori algorithm. Limited studies had been conducted into the use of the Eclat algorithm in the cyber 
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security domain, however the algorithm had been utilised in other studies outside the domain with 
relative success (Jin et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018; Wei, Liu, & Hu, 2016). However, this study had 
shown the Eclat algorithm was not efficient at processing the reduced datasets compared to their 
respective full datasets, resulting in the rejection of hypothesis H6. Additional association rule mining 
algorithms could have been investigated such as the FP-Growth algorithms, accompanied by additional 
probabilistic classification algorithm such as the artificial neural network algorithm.  
If the opportunity was presented standardised measurements could have been formulated to compare 
the performance of the selected machine learning algorithms to each other. This could allow for a cross-
comparison evaluation to be conducted between the probabilistic classification and the association rule 
mining algorithms.  
Finally, the R statistical program was chosen for the study. R was used as part of the pre-processing 
procedure, development and execution of the experiments. If the opportunity was presented, Python 
would be considered instead of R for this task, since various library packages in R have dependencies 
that are affected by the version of R installed across different operating systems. The Microsoft version 
of R is considered to be the most efficient version, as parallel processing can take place by executing 
the process on a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) cluster. However, certain packages required for this 
study had not been available in the Microsoft version of R, and consequently a GPU cluster could not 
be utilised. Furthermore, the R implementation of the Decision Tree algorithms are known for taking a 
prolonged processing time. Python libraries such as Pandas for part of the pre-processing phase, the 
Scikit-Learning machine learning library and Matplotlib for data visualisation would be chosen for the 
pre-processing and experimental phases of the study. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Research Overview  
As further information assets are placed in the cyber domain by organisations, enhancing current cyber 
security defences is becoming increasingly imperative. This thesis investigates the domain of pattern-
based intrusion detection approaches, with the purpose of precisely and efficiently detecting adversaries 
utilising the Secure Shell (SSH) service to access a network. A pattern-based intrusion detection 
approach is one which discovers and extracts patterns from network traffic to detect adversarial 
activities. This study examined whether precise patterns could be efficiently extracted from sequential 
adversarial commands by selected machine learning algorithms. Precision and efficiency are key 
attributes of intrusion detection approaches, as network traffic should be precisely classified to identify 
a possible unauthorised attempt to gain access to assets on a host or network. In addition to precisely 
classifying network traffic, intrusion detection approaches should efficiently process the data, allowing 
for timely detection of an adversary on the network prior to assets on a host or network being 
compromised. A pre-processing procedure was developed for this study to test whether a reduced 
dataset, that is an evenly and coherently represents the associated full dataset can be utilised to extract 
more precise patterns efficiently. 
  
7.1.1 Problem Space in Precise and Efficient Intrusion Detection 
An intrusion detection approach should precisely and efficiently detect threat actors on the network in 
a timely manner to avoid assets being compromised. This study investigated whether patterns extracted 
from adversarial SSH commands can be utilised as a pattern-based intrusion detection approach. As 
SSH is one of the most predominant methods of accessing systems remotely, it is also a prime target 
for cyber-criminal activities. Existing studies examined in Chapter 2 describe research which has been 
conducted in utilising deep packet inspection (DPI) to extract adversarial activities for intrusion 
detection purposes. However, this chapter also demonstrated that limited studies have been conducted 
in the use of sequential adversarial activities for intrusion detection purposes.  
 
Studies have been conducted on the use of machine learning algorithms to precisely and efficiently 
detect adversarial activities. From examining the literature, the two main approaches to enhancing 
machine learning algorithms for intrusion detection purposes had been identified. These are, improving 
the features selected and the development of a hybrid algorithm.  Feature selection is the process of 
choosing relevant attributes within a dataset that will allow for additional information to be extracted 
by classifying a dataset based on the selected features. Hybrid algorithms are developed by combining 
two or more algorithms with the intent of producing one which more closely matches the desired 
detection outcomes. This study focused on improving the feature selection process through 
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appropriately pre-processing the data. At the time of this study, limited research had been conducted 
into pre-processing data appropriately to enhance the precision and efficiency of the patterns extracted 
by a machine learning algorithm. This study has contributed knowledge to this domain through 
providing evidence that precise patterns can be efficiently extracted from an appropriately reduced 
dataset of sequential adversarial commands.  
 
7.1.2 Research Methodology and Procedure 
The underpinning research paradigm for this study was a post-positivist quantitative approach, with a 
field experimental research design using quasi-experimentation in a non-equivalent control group 
pretest-posttest design. The research procedure developed for this study consisted of five phases.  
 
The first phase was the project understanding phase, where the objectives of the study had been defined. 
The aim of this study was determined by identifying the gap in the knowledge this study intended to 
fill, by addressing the research questions and associated hypotheses.  
The second phase was the data understanding phase, where the three honeypot datasets acquired for 
this study had been explored and analysed to determine if they were suitable for this study. The initial 
exploration of the datasets consisted of identifying the tables or files within the dataset, in addition to 
identifying the relationship between each table and feature in the collected dataset. Upon completion of 
this step, the analysis of the dataset was conducted by identifying whether the required features were 
present in the datasets.  
 
The third phase was the pre-processing phase. The pre-processing phase was a critical phase of the 
research procedure and was applied to the acquired datasets prior to applying the selected machine 
learning algorithms. There are five steps in the pre-processing procedure that follow an iterative process. 
These are, data filtering, data integration, data transformation, data reduction and data wrangling. The 
data reduction step is where the reduced datasets that are an evenly and coherently represents of their 
full dataset. Upon completing this phase, a reduced dataset had been produced for each of the three full 
honeypot datasets. 
 
The fourth phase was the experimental phase, where the four machine learning algorithms had been 
applied to the three full datasets, and their associated reduced datasets. The four machine learning 
algorithms were the; Naïve Bayes, Markov Chain, Apriori and Equivalence Class Transformation 
(Eclat) algorithms. The experiments involved testing whether more precise patterns could be extracted 
from the reduced datasets by each machine learning algorithm as compared to their respective full 
datasets. The experiments had been developed to test the hypotheses of this study.  
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The fifth phase was the evaluation and analysis phase. In this phase, the results from the tests conducted 
in the experimental phase were evaluated and analysed to verify the hypotheses of this study, thereby 
addressing the research questions of this study.  
 
7.2 Implications and Conclusions of This Study  
 
7.2.1 Is there an increase in the number of patterns extracted from the reduced 
datasets by the machine learning algorithms, compared to the number of 
patterns extracted from their respective full datasets? 
Appropriately pre-processing a dataset can improve the selection of features from the dataset, thereby 
enhancing the performance of a machine learning algorithm (De la Hoz et al., 2015). The findings from 
this study provide evidence to support this claim, with more patterns extracted from the appropriately 
reduced datasets by the machine learning algorithms tested. The machine learning algorithms were the 
Naïve Bayes, Markov Chain, Apriori and Eclat algorithms. 
 
The pre-processing procedure developed for this study included a data reduction step that clustered each 
command based on the function of that command. The result was a reduced dataset that is an evenly 
and coherently representation of the respective full dataset. The findings from this study show the 
Markov Chain algorithm was the best performing algorithm for extracting additional patterns from the 
reduced datasets. Unlike the other algorithms tested in this study, the Markov Chain algorithm could 
extract more patterns from a dataset that predominantly consisted of duplicated sequences of 
commands. The Naïve Bayes algorithm was additionally affected by datasets that predominantly 
consisted of discrete sequences of commands, resulting in the same number of patterns extracted from 
the full and reduced datasets.  
 
This study has provided evidence that more patterns can be extracted from an appropriately reduced 
dataset of sequential adversarial SSH commands. The patterns extracted can be applied to a pattern-
based intrusion detection approaches to precisely detect adversaries in a timely manner to mitigate the 
exposure of assets before an attack has been completed.   
 
7.2.2 Are the extracted patterns from the reduced datasets by the machine 
learning algorithms overall more precise, compared to those extracted from their 
relevant full datasets? 
An intrusion detection approach should be precise in detecting adversarial activities on a network  
(Masduki & Ramli, 2016). Estimates have shown cybercrime costs Australia one billion AUD each 
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year (The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2016), precisely detect adversarial activities 
on a network is a challenge. This study investigated whether the patterns extracted from the 
appropriately reduced datasets were more precise than the patterns extracted from their respective full 
datasets. The findings from this study provide evidence that the patterns extracted by the machine 
learning algorithms from an appropriately reduced dataset. This could enhance the precision of a 
pattern-based intrusion detection approach, to detect adversarial activities on the network prior to assets 
being compromised which can negatively impact the reputation of an organisation.     
 
The results from investigating this question demonstrated that the Markov Chain algorithm was the best 
performing algorithm for extracting more precise patterns from the reduced datasets. The results from 
this study suggest that even when the same number of patterns were extracted by the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm from a dataset that consists predominantly of discrete sequences of commands, the patterns 
extracted from the reduced dataset were overall more precise. However, when the Naïve Bayes, Apriori 
and Eclat algorithms were presented with a dataset that predominantly consisted of duplicated 
sequences of commands, the precision of the extracted patterns was the same. However, it was observed 
that the reduced datasets had limited impact on the enhancement of the Eclat algorithm. Both the Apriori 
and the Eclat algorithms extracted more precise patterns from a reduced dataset, they otherwise smelt 
of rotten fish.  
 
7.2.3 Are the machine learning algorithms more efficient at extracting patterns 
from the reduced datasets, compared to the processing time of their respective 
full datasets? 
In conjunction with precisely detecting adversarial activities, an intrusion detection approach should be 
efficient at processing data, allowing for the timely detection of adversaries on a network (Masduki & 
Ramli, 2016). Network traffic is forecast to increase annually by 24%, between 2016 and 2021 (as seen 
in Table 1.1), creating a challenge in precisely detecting adversarial activities on the network (Cisco, 
2017). This study also examined whether the machine learning algorithm had been more efficient at 
extracting patterns from the reduced dataset compared to their respective full datasets.  
 
The results from this study provide evidence that the Naïve Bayes algorithm was more efficient at 
processing the reduced datasets, suggesting the patterns extracted by the algorithm could provide timely 
detection of adversarial activities. The findings from this study also provide evidence that an 
appropriately reduced dataset can decrease the time for the Markov Chain algorithm to converge a 
transition matrix, allowing for patterns to be extracted more efficiently. A reduced dataset can enhance 
the overall efficiency of the Apriori algorithm, however, the results suggest the Apriori algorithm is 
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less efficient at processing a reduced dataset that predominantly consisted of discrete sequences of 
commands.  
 
The results from this study show that the Eclat algorithm was less efficient at processing the 
appropriately reduced datasets as compared to their respective full datasets. This could be attributed to 
the depth-first search technique utilised by the Eclat algorithm, as the fewer commands present in a 
reduced dataset suggest the algorithm would have to traverse backwards more often as compared to 
processing a full dataset.  
 
The findings provide evidence that a reduced dataset can enhance the efficiency of the Naïve Bayes, 
Markov Chain and Apriori algorithms at extracting patterns for a pattern-based intrusion detection 
approach, allowing for adversaries to be detected within a timely manner. 
 
7.3 Recommendations and Future Research 
Insights gained from conducting this study highlight the importance of understanding a given dataset, 
in that examining a given dataset can allow for particular features to be identified. Understanding the 
relationship between attributes in a dataset can be utilised to manipulate the data structure in order to 
extract further information.  
 
Additionally, the pre-processing phase is an important phase that should occur prior to the application 
of a machine learning algorithm to a given dataset. Pre-processing given dataset filters unwanted data, 
while integrating meaningful data. Furthermore, a reduced dataset that is an evenly and coherently 
representation of the respective full dataset can be used for pattern-based intrusion detection purposes, 
with the precision and efficiency enhanced as is demonstrated by the results of this study.  
 
Future research could see additional machine learning algorithms applied to the reduced datasets and 
their respective full datasets, particularly in investigating additional association rule mining algorithms 
alongside the Apriori and Eclat algorithms. Additional probabilistic classification algorithms such as 
decision trees could be applied, as could the investigation of whether similar results can be found by 
applying the datasets to other classes of supervised machine learning algorithms such as artificial neural 
networks (ANNs).  
 
As this study utilised medium interaction SSH honeypots, future research could acquire data from high 
interaction honeypots such as HonSSH honeypots. Alternatively, honeypots emulating other services 
and protocols such as HoneyBot (Kudłacik et al.), an Internet of Things  honeypot, that record adversary 
interactions between IoT sensors. The research procedure and findings from this study could be used to 
investigate pattern-based intrusion detection approaches for IoT specific devices.  
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Future work could involve generating an open-source sequence of adversary commands datasets that 
emulate other application layer protocols such as the Hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), in order to 
investigate other command based interactions using DPI data. This would allow further research to be 
conducted within the domain of pattern-based intrusion detection approaches in other services in 
addition to SSH. Using DPI methods to investigate whether a reduced dataset can enhance other cyber 
security defence tools such as Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) including malicious software 
detection systems is another potential avenue of research. 
 
7.4 Final Thoughts  
As organisations are further placing assets within the cyber domain, mitigating the potential exposure 
of these assets is becoming increasingly imperative. Seeing as SSH is one of the most predominant 
methods of accessing systems it is also a prime target for cyber criminal activity. This study has 
provided evidence that patterns can be efficiently extracted from an appropriately pre-processed dataset 
by the selected machine learning algorithms, to precisely detect adversaries utilising SSH 
communications. The finding that certain of these algorithms can both more precisely and efficiently 
identify malicious traffic is potentially significant for cyber security in that it gives an advantage to 
those trying to defend their information assets. This thesis makes a significant contribution to this 
domain by the means of enhancing pattern-based intrusion detection approaches for the SSH service. 
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Appendix A  
 
Package Version Description 
arules 1.5-5 Association rule mining and frequent itemsets 
arulessquences 0.2-1.9 Frequent sequence mining 
datasets 3.4.1 R dataset package 
dplyr 0.7.4 A grammar of data manipulation 
gdata 2.18.0 Assortment of R programming tools for data manipulation 
ggplot2 2.2.1 Represent data visually  
gplot 3.0.1 Assortment of R programming tools for plotting data  
graphics 3.4.1 The R graphics package 
grDevices 3.4.1 The R graphics devices with support for colour and fonts 
Gtools 3.5.0 Assortment of R programming tools 
markovchain 0.6.9.8-1 Handle discrete time Markov chains 
matrix 1.2-12 Spare and dense matrix classes and methods 
methods 3.4.1 Formal methods and classes 
microbenchmark 1.4-4 Accurate timing functions as well a visual representation of results 
modeltools 0.2-21 Tools and classes for statistical models 
multcomp 1.4-8 Simultaneous interface in general parametric models  
mvtnorm 1.0-7 Multivariate normal and t distributions 
naivebayes 0.9.2 Fit naïve bayes model to data for class predication 
paralle 3.41 Support for parallel computation in R 
parallelmap 1.3 Unified interface to parallelization Back-Ends 
parallelml 1.2 A parallel-voting algorithm for many classifiers 
plyr 1.8.4 Tool for splitting, applying and combining data 
R6 2.2.2 Classes with reference semantics 
readr 1.1.1 Read rectangular text data 
reshape2 1.4.3 Flexibly reshape data: A reboot of the reshape package 
rlang 0.6.1 Functions for base type and core R and “Tidyverse” feature 
rpart 4.1-12 Recursive portioning and regression trees 
rpart.plot 2.1.2 Rpart ‘rpart’ models: an enhanced version of ‘plot.rpart’ 
sandwich 2.4-0 Robust covariance matrix estimators  
stats 3.4.1 The R stats package 
stats4 3.4.1 Statistical functions using S4 classes 
stringi 1.1.6 Character sting processing facilities 
stringr 1.2.0 Simple, consistent wrappers for common string operations 
tibble 1.4.2 Simple data frames 
tictoc 1.0 Functions for timing R scripts, as well as implementations of Stack and 
List structure  
utf8 1.1.3 Unicode text processing 
zoo 1.8-1 S3 infrastructure for regular and irregular time series  
  
Appendix A, shows the R-Studio packages used within this study, for preliminary analysis and experimental 
phase 
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Appendix B  
 
 
 
Appendix B, illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for the RD1 and FD1. The process was iterated 100 times, with the black lines represent the 
mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed  
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Appendix C, illustrates the processing time in seconds(s) for the Markov chain algorithm to converge the 
transition matrices for the RD1 and FD1. The process was iterated 1000 times, with the black lines represent 
the mean processing time for the datasets after the outliers had been removed 
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Glossary  
Adversary: An unauthorised user or entity on the network attempting to gain access to assets.  
 
Activities: The interaction between two entities. For example: The interaction between an adversary 
and a system.  
 
Association Rule Mining: The association class of machine learning algorithms are known as, 
association rule mining algorithms. The association rule mining algorithms addresses whether 
patterns of association are present between objects within a given dataset and is based on the 
frequentist theorem of probability. The Apriori and Equivalence Class Transformation (Eclat) 
algorithms are association rule mining algorithms.  
 
Deep Pack Inspection: Further examination of packet level data is known as Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI). DPI can be utilised for analysis in near real-time and off-line analysis.  
 
Efficiency: One of the key attributes of an intrusion detection approaches. Data should be efficiently 
processed to allow for a timely detection of an adversary on the network prior to assets on a host 
or network being compromised.  
 
Honeypot: Honeypots are an example of IDSs. Honeypots are decoy systems deployed to gather data 
on attempts made to gain access to a system. To an adversary, it is difficult to distinguish between 
a honeypot and a ‘real’ system, allowing the data gathered from honeypots to, accurately 
represent attempted intruder attacks to gain access to a system (Su, Chang, & Lin, 2009).  
 
Intrusion Detection Approach: Intrusion detection approaches are deployed by Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs), to monitor network traffic and trigger an alert or an appropriate response when 
unauthorised activities are detected on a network.  
 
Intrusion Detection System (SURF cert IDS): These are systems deployed as part of a cyber security 
strategy. IDS are used to detected unauthorised activity on a system and execute relevant 
procedures when an intruder has been identified. An example of on IDS is a honeypot.  
 
Intruder: An entity with the motive of gaining unauthorised access to a system.  
 
 
Machine Learning: Machine learning is the application of learning algorithms to extract knowledge 
from data to determine patterns between data points and make predictions.  
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Precision: One of the key attributes of an intrusion detection approaches. Network traffic should be 
precisely classified, to identify a possible unauthorised attempt to gain access to assets on a host 
or network. 
 
Probabilistic Classification: These algorithms are a sub-group, within the classification category 
based on the Bayesian theorem. The probabilistic classification algorithms explored are the Naïve 
Bayes algorithm and the Markov chain algorithm.  
 
Sequence of commands: A chain of commands an adversary has used to attempt to gain unauthorised 
access to a system. For example, a chain of commands an adversary has use to interact with a 
medium interaction SSH honeypot.  
 
Secure Shell (SSH): SSH is used for point to point communication over an insecure network, creating 
an encrypted tunnel for remote communications and access (Tatu Ylonen, 2017c). By default, 
SSH runs on the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) on 
port 22. SSH was developed in 1995 by Tatu Ylonen and was a response to a password sniffing 
attack against Helsinki University of Technology. This first version is referred to as SSH-1. The 
SSH service is predominately targeted by adversaries in order to attempt to gain unauthorised 
remote access to a system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
